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The dissertation, "Institutional Change in Higher Education: A Case Study" examines 
efforts to bring about fundamental institutional change at the University of Natal over a 
period of some 1 0 years, 1988 to 1997. The case study is characterised as being of an 
embedded single case design. It is an instrumental rather than an intrinsic study. It 
attempts to extend understanding of the complex social phenomenon of institutional 
change in higher education, through analytic generalization. The two sub-units of the 
case study relate to different attempts by the executive of the University of Natal to 
bring about consensus on the need for fundamental change and the nature of the 
change: through a more-or-less conventional strategic planning process; and by the 
adoption- as a strategic initiative- of the notion of becoming a learning organization. 
The two sub units are examined on the strength of University documents and interviews 
with past and present University office bearers and staff, within a conceptual framework 
of organizational theory derived mainly from Mintzberg, McGregor, and Senge. 
Both the strategic planning approach and the learning organization approach are seen 
to have failed as means of engineering consensual change and in the latter half of 1997 
the University experiences a restructuring crisis as a result of financial pressures. A 
puzzle around restructuring, viz. why the University should pursue structural change 
which goes beyond the needs of simple cost-cutting and efficiency, is ~ddressed first in 
terms of a perceived need for innovation, within the foregoing organizational theoretical 
framework. The analysis is then extended (effectively recontextualised) within a more 
pedagogic, social and political theoretical framework which is dependent largely on 
Bernstein. This analysis sees the changes being pursued at the University of Natal as 
being consistent with a shift in higher education generally to a market-dominated, 
competitive discourse in which University lecturers become knowledge entrepreneurs, 
competing within the institution and between institutions for scarce resources in 
response to perceived market needs. In this process, the narcissistic and introjected 
identities of academic departments, in which professionals in bounded disciplines 
determine priorities themselves, are replaced by projected identities and priorities are 
determined outside the discipline and the University. This cannot happen overnight. 
However, plans at the University of Natal to remove their administrative authority from 
academic departments are seen as a step in this direction. 
A NOTE ON STYLE 
1. REPORTED SPEECH 
The main sources of information for this case study are interviews and documents. To 
assist in distinguishing between the two in the text, the convention has been adopted of 
reporting the interviews in the past tense (e.g. "she said") while references to 
documents or books are reported in the continuous present (e.g. "Mintzberg says"). 
2. SPELLING 
English spelling has normally been followed, in preference to American. A notable 
exception to this rule is "organization", which is preferred to "organisation" throughout on 
the basis that the "learning organization" is virtually unknown (at least on the World 
Wide Web) under the other spelling. In direct quotation, the spelling of the source is 
followed. 
3. EMPHASIS 
In general, emphasis in quotations is the emphasis of the original text. Where emphasis 
has been added to the text, this is indicated. 
4. NAMES OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
The names of books are in italic type. The names of journal articles are in roman type, 
enclosed in quotation marks. Documents emanating from the University of Natal are in 
roman type, without quotation marks. For convenience, the University of Natal 
documents (whether official University publications or not) are numbered according to 
date and grouped together in the References section. 
5. UPPER CASE AND LOWER CASE 
The practice has been to restrict the use of the upper case to a minimum. Some 
exceptions to this rule include terms like "Professional Bureaucracy", where the practice 
of the source document has been followed; and "university", which is lower case when 
referring to universities in general, but upper case when referring to the University of 
Natal (although this has not always be consistently followed in direct quotations, where 
the practice of the source document is followed). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"What all of us want is more effective organizations.· 
This innocent-looking observation by Henry Mintzberg comes near the end of his work, 
The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994:381) . It is an observation which very few 
people engaged in an organization of any description would be inclined to argue 
against. Within the higher education sector in South Africa, it would be difficult to find a 
senior administrator who did not share the sentiment. 
. All universities and technikons in South Africa today are feeling enormous pressures to 
change, with the underlying assumption that such change will make them more 
"effective" organizations in some sense or another. Some of these pressures pre-date 
the first democratic elections in 1994, but they have certainly been more keenly felt 
since then. They include pressures to "transform" the institutions, by making their 
governance more open to students and more representative of the wider community; to 
bring their expenditure under control in a scenario of declining government subsidies; to 
be more accountable to the government and ultimately the taxpayers for those funds 
which they do receive; to be more competitive, in an environment in which a role is 
recognized in higher education for private institutions and in which foreign-based 
universities are establishing themselves in South Africa ; to become more responsive to 
the needs of the market and an economy which must be re-built to post-apartheid 
specifications; to revise their admission and teaching practices to meet the political and 
economic need for mass (rather than elite) higher education; and to reconfigure the 
courses they teach to coincide with the programme-based and outcomes-based 
approach which the national Department of Education is adopting. 
What this research is concerned with is the question of how one complex institution of 
higher education, the University of Natal, has responded to pressures for change over a 
period of roughly 1 0 years, from 1988 to 1997. It is not a history of change over that 
period, but a case study: its aim is to try to understand the complex social phenomenon 
of institutional change in higher education, as reflected in the University of Natal. 
The study does not attempt to do this from a common-sense or supposedly a-theoretical 
standpoint. It is based on theory, including theory concerning the nature of case study 
research ; theory on the structuring of organizations, and universities in particular; theory 
on strategic planning and the learning organization; and, finally, more sociological 
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theory related to general trends in higher education. To a limited extent, as argued in 
Chapter Two, the case study may be considered experimental in nature: an opportunity 
to take the theory and to test it in a real-world setting. The result of such 
experimentation is not any kind of statistical generalization, but- hopefully- an 
extension of our understanding of the complex social phenomenon being studied, 
through what has been termed "analytic generalization". 
It is the work of Chapter Two, then, to locate the present study within the broad field of 
case study research in the social sciences and to spell out the methodology of the 
study, including a consideration of the relationship between case study research and 
journalism. 
In Chapter Three, the theoretical framework relating to organizational change is 
developed. With the clear exception of Peter Senge, it is not suggested that the authors 
referred to in developing this framework are authors whom the main players at the 
University of Natal would necessarily have been familiar with. But the authors, and most 
notably Mintzberg, provide a framework which is consistent with the theoretical 
foundations of the actors involved in the unfolding developments. 
The first step here is to locate the university as an organization within a broad account 
of organizational structure. In this process, the university is characterized as a 
"Professional Bureaucracy" and some of the inherent difficulties of effecting change in 
such a bureaucracy are identified. Chapter Three then looks at the theory behind two 
different approaches to overcoming resi~tance to change in complex organizations, 
including universities- strategic planning and the learning organization. These two 
approaches are followed in the course of the University of Natal's efforts to bring about 
institutional change in the period studied and are different enough, it is argued, to 
characterize two distinct phases, or units, in the study. 
An argument is made that conventional strategic planning (to the extent that one can 
identify such an animal) is fundamentally Fordist in conception, seeking to meet the 
need of managers who hold a cynical view of human nature (those inclined towards 
Theory X in terms of Douglas McGregor's distinction between Theory X and Theory Y) 
for a machine-like mechanism for effecting change. The learning organization theory of 
Senge, more recently adopted by the University of Natal, on the other hand, is more of 
a Theory Y conception. The learning organization and its predecessors seem to offer 
the manager who is more optimistic about human nature (leaning more towards Theory 
Y) a different means to the same end -viz. overcoming resistance to change. 
2 
In Chapter Four, the strategic planning process at the University of Natal is examined. 
The account of the case in both Chapter Four and Chapter Five is based on a reading 
of key documents and on interviews with some present and past University employees 
or office bearers. Chapter Four portrays the strategic planning process at the University 
of Natal as being consistent with a conventional strategic planning process as described 
by Mintzberg. Difficulties with the process- as a means of bringing about institutional 
change- are variously characterised by key participants as a failure of implementation, 
or an absence of sufficient specificity. It is argued that these difficulties are partly 
attributable to the nature of the strategic planning process itself and its inability to 
deliver on its promises; and partly attributable to a mismatch between the process and 
the professional bureaucratic nature of the University. 
In Chapter Five, the introduction to the University of Natal of Senge's ideas regarding 
the learning organization is examined. Although clearly intended as a means of 
promoting consensual change within the University community, it has become clear by 
the end of the case study period (September 1997) that in the short term at least, the 
learning organization has also been unable to deliver on its promises in this regard. The 
learning organization and the University's corps of facilitators (or change agents) have 
been sidelined and there is a general retreat from the rhetoric of the learning 
organization on the part of the University executive. Chapter Five also examines the 
efforts of the executive to run downsizing and fundamental restructuring processes 
together in response to a financial crisis. 
At the end of Chapter Five, the study is left with a conundrum which, it is argued, 
cannot be adequately resolved in terms of the theoretical foundations employed to that 
point. The puzzle addressed in Chapter Six is this: Why does the University of Natal, in 
responding to the financial crisis it faces, pursue a restructuring programme which goes 
far beyond the needs of fiscal discipline? 
In an attempt to provide an answer, the case study is recontextualised at a more 
sociological and philosophical level than that of the preceding organizational theory. 
The work of Basil Bernstein is drawn upon in order to explicate the social and political 
implications of developments at the University of Natal and within the wider context of 
South African higher education. Whereas the organizational theorists, focusing on the 
requirements of effectiveness and efficiency, permit a view of pedagogy as a 
commodity like any other, Bernstein focuses attention on pedagogy as a code for a form 
of social and political control. 
The basic argument advanced is that restructuring the University cannot be seen simply 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, or of delivering new forms of commodities in 
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better ways, as the organizational theory approach suggests. Restructuring changes 
relations of knowledge and power in ways which have profound symbolic implications, 
socially and politically. Those implications are obscured by the language of 
organizational theory, but have to be uncovered to permit a fuller understanding of the 
case being studied. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY: CASE STUDY THEORY AND ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research takes the form of a case study. Some consideration should therefore be 
given to the nature of the case study method itself. 
In broad terms, this report adopts the position that case study is a naturalistic research 
method, the main purpose of which is to increase our understanding of complex social 
phenomena. It is not the business of case study in the social sciences, whether or not 
the researcher considers what he or she is doing to be "scientific", to extrapolate from 
the case study and to make generalizations about the occurrence of phenomena. It is 
argued in this chapter, however, that case study lends itself to what has been called 
"analytic generalization" in which the study is employed to explore the implications of 
social theory in a "real life" situation. 
In this chapter, then, consideration will be given to the nature of case study research. 
The account is based largely on two recent works on case study research, Robert E. 
Stake's The Art of Case Study Research (1995) and Robert K. Yin's Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods (1989). Although the authors are in broad agreement on 
the nature of case study research, there are significant differences in their approaches, 
which are useful in locating more clearly the nature of the present study. 
As will become evident, an earlier text on case study in educational research and 
evaluation, Towards a Science of the Singular (Edited by Helen Simons, 1980), has 
also been enlisted - particularly the essay by Stephen Kemmis, "The Imagination of the 
Case and the Invention of the Study". Although it is not considered critical for purposes 
of this study whether case study research is dubbed "science" or not, Kemmis puts 
forward a valuable argument for the scientific nature of case studies and also 
contributes to discussion in this chapter on analytic generalization and the quasi-
experimental nature of case study research. 
Yin and others have remarked on parallels between the methodology of case study 
research and the methodology of journalism (to the extent that the broad range of 
journalistic endeavour may be said to have any common methodology). This link is of 
more than academic interest in the present study, as the author has a history which 
includes eight years working as a journalist on a daily newspaper and 1 0 years teaching 
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others to be journalists, and this history contributes in significant ways to the conduct 
and character of the study. 
It would be satisfying, in an Aristotelean kind of way, to be able to report that the 
methodology of case study research in the social sciences has been largely agreed and 
mapped out and that the study in question conscientiously follows the agreed route. But 
the literature on case study seems to be in agreement that there is no one way of 
undertaking case study research. In the last part of this chapter, then, an account is 
given of the conduct of the present study in the light of the discussion to that point. 
2.2 THE NATURE OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
"As a research endeavour," Yin says, "the case study contributes uniquely to our 
knowledge of individual, organizational, social, and political phenomena." He continues: 
Not surprisingly, the case study has been a common research strategy in 
psychology, sociology, political science, and planning. Case studies are even 
found in economics, where the structure of a given industry, or the economy of a 
city or a region, may be investigated by using a case study design. In all of these 
situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena. In brief, the case study allows an 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events - such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, 
neighbourhood change, international relations, and the maturation of industries. 
(1989:14) 
In the introduction to The Art of Case Study Research, Stake makes a similar point in a 
somewhat more artistic way: 
A case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. A single leaf, 
even a single toothpick, has unique complexities - but rarely will we care enough 
to submit it to case study. We study a case when it itself is of very special 
interest. We look for the detail of interaction with its contexts. Case study is the 
study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand 
its activity within important circumstances. (1995:xi) 
Stake makes a few references in footnotes to the second edition of Yin's work, 
indicating ways in which they differ. He says, for instance, that Yin provides "an 
excellent guide for a more quantitative approach" (1995:xii); and, later, that Yin and 
others "concentrate on instrumental case study, particularly the use of case study for 
development of theory, leaving the intrinsic case researcher inadequately helped." 
(1995:77) 
This is useful in providing us with two broad categorizations of case study research 
within which to locate the present study: quantitative versus qualitative, and intrinsic 
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versus instrumental. The position adopted in this study largely follows Yin rather than 
Stake, particularly with regard to the instrumental nature of the study. With regard to the 
quantitative/qualitative distinction, however, it leans more in the qualitative direction 
than the quantitative; but not to the extent that Stake would take it. 
"The qualitative researcher," says Stake, "emphasizes episodes of nuance, the 
sequentiality of happenings in context, the wholeness of the individual", whereas 
quantitative case studies would "emphasize a battery of measurements of the case, · a 
collection of descriptive variables .. .. " (1995:xi-xii) An intrinsic case study, he says in 
circular fashion, is one where we have an intrinsic interest in the case; for example: "It 
happens when a teacher decides to study a student having difficulty, when we get 
curious about a particular agency, or when we take the responsibility of evaluating a 
program. The case is given. We are interested in it, not because by studying it we learn 
about other cases or about some general problem, but because we need to learn about 
that particular case." On the other hand, in an instrumental case study, "we will have a 
research question, a puzzlement, a need for general understanding, and feel that we 
may get insight into the question by studying a particular case .... This use of case study 
is to understand something else." (1995:3) 
Referring to Louis Smith's definition of the case as •a bounded system", Stake observes 
that people and programs are clearly prospective cases, but that events and processes 
fit the definition less well. (1995:2) Case study research, he emphasises, is not sampling 
research. "We do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. Our first 
obligation is to understand this one case. In intrinsic case study, the case is pre-
selected. In in~trumental case study, some cases would do a better job than others." 
(1995:4) . 
A problem for Stake, it could be argued, is that the notion of a purely intrinsic case 
study is difficult to sustain. It suggests a tabula rasa approach to a situation which is 
incompatible with his own account of how case study research can advance our 
understanding of the social whole which is being studied. To take one of his own 
examples: why does the teacher decide to study a particular student having difficulty? 
Presumably, Stake would say, because certain issues arise in the mind of the teacher 
regarding the student. But how do those issues arise? What theories, implicit or explicit, 
which the teacher holds about the world and the classroom do the issues arise from? 
How will the teacher, writing a report on the case study, advance the understanding of 
the readers without locating the study within some at least of the theories he or she 
holds? The argument against the intrinsic case study would say that all case studies 
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arise from "a research question, a puzzlement, [or) a need for general understanding". 
Because some case studies are given, for example when a funder commissions a study 
of a particular programme, it does not follow that they are therefore intrinsic in the 
sense which Stake is proposing. On the other hand, to argue that all case study is more 
or less instrumental is not inconsistent with saying, as Stake does, that in qualitative 
case study research the aim is to "thoroughly understand" the case. (1995:9) 
One of the problems which Stake's views on intrinsic case study lead to is illustrated in 
his example of an observer's assertions which go well beyond the reported observation 
of a fourth-grade classroom ~ituation (where Stake understands "assertion" as a form of 
generalization, but generalization with in the case rather than to other cases). 
Says Stake: 
The logical path to assertions often is apparent neither to reader nor to the 
researchers themselves. What we describe happening in the classroom and what 
we assert do not have to be closely tied together. For assertions, we draw from 
understandings deep within us, understandings whose derivation may be some 
hidden mix of personal experience, scholarship, assertions of other researchers. 
(1995:12) 
Although Stake distinguishes between such assertions and "strictly determined 
findings", and although he says it would be useful if researchers labeled the leaps to 
conclusion which assertions represent as speculation or theory, he concedes that they 
often do not. (1995:12) 
While Stake is no doubt correct in saying that assertions are often made on grounds 
which are not always immediately apparent to the researcher, it should surely be 
required - if the reader is to put any weight at all on such assertions -that they should 
at least in principle have an explicable logical path. That logical path, it is suggested, 
could (at least in principle) be discerned from the theories which the researcher holds 
and, ideally, the theories which he or she is concerned to test in some way in the case 
study. But for Stake, such theories lurk only in instrumental case studies and not in the 
intrinsic studies with which he is primarily concerned. The readers of such an intrinsic 
study, it would seem, have only the assertion: take it or leave it. 
Stake recommends a "noninterventive and empathetic" approach to case study, trying 
"not to disturb the ordinary activity of the case, not to test, not even to interview, if we 
can get the information we want by discrete observation or examination of records". 
(1995:12) That is a valid approach, although not one which has been followed in this 
case study, which relies heavily on interviews. But although he concludes that, 
ultimately, "the conclusions of the researcher are likely to be emphasized more than the 
interpretations of those people studied" (1995:12), there is again implied in the 
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approach being recommended by Stake the notion that the researcher can somehow 
approach a case study as a tabula rasa, ready for noninterventive observations to write 
upon. Again, this would seem to misrepresent the reality of the situation and to weaken 
considerably the validity of the resulting case study report. 
Stake's treatment of "issues" as a conceptual structure for case study research and 
"issue questions" as his primary research questions goes some way towards resolving 
the difficulty. Stake says he uses issues "in order to force attention to complexity and 
contextuality" and he uses them "because identification of issues draws attention to 
problems and concerns". (1995:16) This goes some way towards solving the problem 
because the search for issues is much more interventionist, as opposed to the tabula 
rasa model which is otherwise implied, and it is difficult to see issues being identified in 
a theory-free environment. But unfortunately, Stake then tries to push issues out of the 
intrinsic case study and into the instrumental. Using E> (theta) to stand for the case and t 
(iota) to stand for an issue or issues, he says: "One of the most important things to 
remember is that for intrinsic case study, E> is dominant; the case is of the highest 
importance. For instrumental case study, t is dominant; we start and end with issues 
dominant.· (1995: 16) 
Noting the difficulty raised with regard to Stake's approach and the argument that there 
may be no such thing as a purely intrinsic case study, we may say with confidence that 
the present case study is instrumental (in Stake's terms). In a sense, using Stake's 
words, it is "case study for development of theory" (1995:77), rather than case study for 
the understanding of the case itself. But it would not be correct to say that the present 
study is pre-theoretical work, as case study research is sometimes seen to be. 
As will become clear later, the role of theory in the case study was not clearly set out at 
the beginning of the case study, nor were the "issues", in Stake's terms. Like so many 
other case studies, it would seem, the role of theory and the issues in the study became 
clearer as time passed, in the kind of "progressive focusing" of Parlett and Hamilton, 
which Stake refers to. (1995:9, 22) "If early questions are not working, if new issues 
become apparent, the design is changed," Stake says. And he quotes Parlett and 
Hamilton on the three stages of observation, renewed inquiry, and explanation through 
which researchers move: 
Obviously the three stages overlap and functionally interrelate. The transition 
from stage to stage, as the investigation unfolds, occurs as the problem areas 
become progressively clarified and re-defined. The course of the study cannot be 
charted in advance. Beginning with an extensive data base, the researchers 
systematically reduce the breadth of their inquiry to give more concentrated 
attention to the emerging issues . . (Quoted in Stake, 1995:22) 
9 
To further specify the nature of the present case study, it is useful to tum now to Yin. In 
Case Study Research, Yin makes the observation that "the case study has long been 
stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science methods" (1989:10); but he argues 
that this stereotyping is based on a misunderstanding of what the case study can 
deliver. 
To begin with, Yin says, the case study as a research tool needs to be distinguished 
from "(a) the case study as a teaching tool, (b) ethnographies and participant 
observation, and (c) 'qualitative' methods." (1989:11) As a research tool, the greatest 
concern has perhaps been over "the lack of rigor of case study research". "Too many 
times, the case study investigator has been sloppy, and has allowed equivocal evidence 
or biased views to influence the direction or the findings and conclusions." But it is often 
forgotten, he says, "that bias can also enter into the conduct of experiments ... and in 
using other research strategies, such as designing questionnaires for surveys .. . , or in 
conducting historical research .... The problems are not different, but in case study 
research, they have been less frequently documented and addressed." (1989:21) 
Yin makes the point that the case study, the experiment, the survey, a history, are all 
different ways of "collecting and analyzing empirical evidence. And each strategy has 
its own advantages and disadvantages." (1989:15) The boundaries between the 
strategies are not clear and sharp, and there are "large areas of overlap among them". 
(1989:16) They do not form a hierarchy, as often held, with case studies being 
appropriate for "the exploratory phase of an investigation", surveys and histories for the 
descriptive phase, and experiments only for explanatory or causal inquiries. (1989: 15) 
"The more appropriate view of these different strategies is a pluralistic one. Each 
strategy can be used for all three purposes- exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory .. .. " 
(1989:16) The appropriate strategy will depend on three conditions, says Yin: "(a) the 
type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioral events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events." (1989:16) 
Looking at the type of research question, Yin says that, "in general, 'what' questions 
may either be exploratory (in which case any of the strategies could be used) or about 
prevalence (in which surveys or the analysis of archival records would be favored). 
'How' and 'why' questions are likely to favor the use of case studies, experiments, or 
histories." (1989:19) The case study has a distinct advantage, Yin argues, when: "A 
'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which 
the investigator has little or no control." (1989:20) 
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Experiments are more appropriate "when an investigator can manipulate behavior 
directly, precisely, and systematically", as in a laboratory setting (1989:20) . The 
distinctive contribution of the historical method, he says, "is in dealing with the 'dead' 
past- that is, when no relevant persons are alive to report, even retrospectively, what 
occurred, and when an investigator must rely on primary documents, secondary 
documents, and cultural and physical artifacts as the main sources of evidence." 
(1989:19) 
Yin argues: 
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the 
relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. Thus, the case study relies on many 
of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not 
usually included in the historian's repertoire: direct observation and systematic 
interviewing. Again, although case studies and histories can overlap, the case 
study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence -
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. (1989: 19-20) 
As will become evident later, the present case study does not call on the full range of 
evidence which might be called upon: the main sources for this case study are 
documents and interviews. There do not appear to be any significant artifacts (apart 
from documents); and personal observation, although not entirely excluded, has been 
limited given the distance separating the investigator (based at Peninsula Technikon in 
the Western Cape) and the University of Natal. 
Nevertheless, the present study would seem to fall squarely within Yin's definition of the 
case study: 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and 
in which 
• multiple sources of evidence are used. (1989:23) 
The definition, says Yin, "not only helps us to understand case studies, but also 
distinguishes them from other research strategies that have been discussed": 
An experiment, for instance, deliberately divorces a phenomenon from its 
context, so that attention can be focused on a few variables (typically, the context 
is 'controlled' by the laboratory environment). A history, by comparison, does deal 
with the entangled situation between phenomenon and context, but usually with 
noncontemporary events. Finally, surveys can try to deal with phenomenon and 
context, but their ability to investigate the context is extremely limited. The 
survey designer, for instance, constantly struggles to limit the number of 
variables to be analyzed (and hence the number of questions that can be asked), 
to fall safely within the number of respondents that can be surveyed. (1989:23) 
In terms of Yin's classification of case studies, this is clearly a single-case study, rather 
than a multiple-case study. Although there are some passing references to the 
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Peninsula Technikon (as in this chapter), these are peripheral and there is no attempt to 
study any other institution than Natal University. In terms of Yin's distinction between 
"holistic" single-case design, with only one unit of analysis, and "embedded" single-case 
design, with multiple units of analysis, it is submitted that the present case study is an 
example of an embedded single-case design. While the overall focus of the study is 
"institutional change in higher education", it is submitted that the nature of the case 
admits of two sub-units, viz. conventional strategic planning and learning organization 
theory. 
Finally, it may be said that the present case study is "naturalistic", as argued by Kemmis 
in "The Imagination of the Case and the Invention of the Study" (in Simons (Ed.) 1980). 
Important points are made in the course of Kemmis' account with regard to the 
intervention implied by case study research ; and the degree of intervention is one of the 
points on which this case study may be distinguished from the model Stake is 
proposing, even though Stake would also argue that his intrinsic case study is 
naturalistic. 
Kemmis says that case study work is naturalistic in three senses: 
(1) It is as much a search for phenomena in the social world as it is an attempt 
to develop coherent theories about given social phenomena. 
(2) It is a quest to articulate the (social) world by creating descriptions of 
particular (social) contexts. 
(3) The 'objects' of case study work are 'given' situations. What is 'given' is a 
particular issue arising in a particular social situation or a particular social 
context ... . In general, the case study worker cannot 'create' the situation he 
is to observe, nor can he artificially simplify it by manipulation of its 
context. He must study the situation as a whole. (1980:1 07) 
He adds: 
It is sometimes thought that naturalistic science is 'naturalistic' in the sense that 
the appearance of phenomena is 'left to nature'. Under such a view, it might be 
said that the observer merely waits for phenomena to present themselves to him 
- it is as if he could discover the real world outside by waiting for it to manifest 
itself. Observation is a far more interventive process than this ... , but this view of 
'naturalistic' science accounts for the prevalence of the view that case study is 
simply a 'method' (comparable, for example, with the use of questionnaires or 
psychometric tests). (1980:1 07) 
In social science, observation is only rarely unobtrusive with respect to the 
observed and it is never unobtrusive with respect to the theoretical, ethical 
and ideological commitments of the observer. The observation process 
unavoidably calls into play the frameworks of the observer just as the process of 
communication unavoidably calls into play the frameworks of the hearer. 
(1980:108, my emphasis) 
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However, the interventions of naturalistic research go beyond the theory- and value-
ladenness of observation. Says Kemmis: 
Case study rarely proceeds by observation in the sense of merely watching: 
observation also entails such interventions as interviewing, recording and 
participation (which may amount to manipulation of conditions within the 
situation), let alone data analysis, interpretation, and selection of participants to 
observe or interview. In these respects, case study (and naturalistic research in 
general) resembles other forms of research as interventive, not passive. 
(1980:1 09) 
Within the range of case study researchers which Stake and Kemmis represent then, 
who all characterise their research as "naturalistic", the present study falls clearly on the 
interventive rather than the passive side. 
2.3 CASE STUDY: ART OR SCIENCE? 
It would seem to be the almost inevitable fate of the case study researcher to have to 
justify this research method in the face of criticisms with regard to its scientific status. 
However, an attempt will be made here to sidestep the question, at least in part. To 
engage in a thoroughgoing debate on how scientific case study research is (or is not) 
would require more general questions to be addressed about how scientific the social 
sciences are (or are not). While fascinating, the debate would delay the arrival of the 
case study indefinitely. The sleight of hand proposed here, is to take the argument 
which Kemmis adduces for case study indeed being a science and then to turn part of it 
against him. 
"Those who expect to follow the progress of science in brilliant light," Kemmis says, "will 
be ill at ease following the case study worker stumbling from lamplight to lamplight in 
the fog.· (1980:1 00) 
Those who do expect to follow the progress of science in brilliant light, Kemmis would 
argue, include those who are given over to "scientism", or are adherents of the tradition 
of logical positivism. Scientism, Kemmis says, appeals to the authority of a particular 
view of science (1980:98) and "invites faith in the results of scientific investigations as if 
research workers could somehow 'guarantee' the truth of their findings". (1980:97) 
Kemmis continues: 
In scientific debate, scientism is evident when one school of scientists claims to 
hold the keys to truth. Upon examination, it almost always turns out that such a 
group will demand justification from other schools in forms which cannot be 
satisfied. These scientists may be asking their colleagues in other schools to 
provide 'guarantees' which will reassure everyone that the conclusions reached in 
a particular study are not merely sound but certain; they appeal for their authority 
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to 'transcendental' forms of justification - logical or metatheoretical forms which 
are meant to be a priori truth-justifying. (1980:97) 
Because case studies speak about a world we know at a commonsense level, 
they often leave readers in doubt about how much the truths they tell are 
commonsense and how much scientific. Because case studies are usually the 
product of an intense involvement by one or a few individuals with their subject-
matter, they are sometimes dismissed as purely 'subjective' and are regarded 
with suspicion, even hostility, by some social scientists. And because questions of 
social science theory and practice (and matters of truth in science in general) are 
always controversial, case studies are sometimes rejected on purely doctrinaire 
grounds. (1980:99) 
"The ascendancy of the view of science inspired by logical positivism," Kemmis says, 
"was so complete in social science that case study research today is still frequently 
judged and damned by truth tests which, though they may make sense in the 
philosopher's library, make little sense in and of the social world outside. Such doctrines 
as that of verifiability seem to cast a cold light on the progress of social science and 
created expectations which the work of social science could not satisfy." (1980:1 00) 
Kemmis argues that case study work may lay claim to being scientific on the following 
grounds: 
(1) Case study, like all science, is a process of truth-seeking. (1980:101) 
(2) Case study, like all science, is a social and cultural process. (1980:102) 
(3) At the root of case study research, as in all science, lies the problem of 
"justified true belief". (1980: 1 02) 
Case study, says Kemmis, "is not a purely mechanical process by which truth is 
'discovered' .... Equally, it is not just story-telling or word-spinning - it is an empirical 
exercise. Truth is not to be found entirely within language, nor is it to be found entirely 
outside language -it relates to propositions, not to experience alone. The problem, 'how 
do we decide if a thing is true?' depends upon the way we use language, which in tum 
depends upon our having forms of life sufficiently comprehensible to one another to 
support communication." (1980:101) 
After an explicit nod to Wittgenstein, Kemmis adds: 
Case study is empirical- it refers to the real world. The truth or falsity of 
statements made in a case study, as in all science, is judged by reference to a 
world accessible to the experience of any observer (though such judgements can 
be made in some forms of science only by trained observers- ones with the 
appropriate forms of life- or ones who are at the right place at the right time). 
But the comprehensibility of the statements themselves is as important as 
'verification' through experience. To be comprehensible they must encapsulate 
our 'agreements' about how language is to be used, negotiated and established 
through ways of acting, working and living in particular cultures and subcultures. 
(1980:101) 
Referring to case study as a social and cultural process, Kemmis says that case study in 
the social sciences may be more like art than other forms of science in being especially 
14 
historically and contextually sensitive. But he adds: "Like all social science, case study 
is a social and cultural process in the senses that its 'objects' are the phenomena of 
social life, its prosecution is a social act, and its products are absorbed into social life. 
Moreover, case study workers are, like all scientists, participants in social life in general 
as well as that part of social life which is the research act." (1980: 1 02) 
Turning to the problem of justified true belief, Kemmis argues that it is really a double 
problem: 
On the one hand, it concerns the nature of justification, and on the other, the 
nature of belief. As it turns out, the two are profoundly related in practice. In the 
work of science, whole worlds of assumptions about the nature of justification and 
the nature of belief are made in reporting research: the scientist assumes them to 
be part of the taken-for-granted knowledge of the scientific community within 
which he works and as necessary prerequisites for intelligent reading of the 
reports. The double problem of justified true belief is one of reconciling the beliefs 
(the private knowledge) of researcher and reader with the forms of knowledge of 
public discourse. The form of the justification will depend on how these two 
aspects are reconciled to one another. (1980:1 03-1 04) 
The two aspects of the problem of justified true belief, Kemmis says, are always jointly 
resolved in the practice of science: 
Because institutional science is an attempt to share justified true belief, it reaches 
across the boundary between cognition and culture. Particular scientific truths 
always emerge in contexts of rules governing the use of justificatory language; 
particular circumstances for action (for example, research settings) which make 
the rules reasonable and believable; and particular cultural , historical , and 
contemporary problem-contexts for a study (for example, definitions of a 
phenomenon and shared beliefs concerning what is problematic about it.) 
(1980:105) 
The burden of this argument for Kemmis, clearly, is that case study research is 
"scientific" in the way that he is defining "science". In the process, he has (it is 
submitted) issued timely warnings about "scientism" and operating within a too simplistic 
positivist paradigm, which would a priori exclude much of the work of the social 
sciences from "science" and hence from serious consideration .. 
But at the end of the day, how much turns on the name, provided one is not led down 
the kind of intellectual cui de sac Kemmis is warning against? Even Ernest Nagel, in 
unfavourably comparing the social sciences to the natural sciences in The Structure of 
Science (1971) observes: 
The propriety of designating any extant branch of social inquiry as a 'real science' 
has been repeatedly challenged - commonly on the ground that, although such 
inquiries have contributed large quantities of frequently reliable information about 
social matters, these contributions are primarily descriptive studies of special 
social facts in certain historically situated human groups, and supply no strictly 
universal laws about social phenomena. It would not be profitable to discuss at 
any length an issue framed in this manner, particularly since the requirements for 
being a genuine science tacitly assumed in most of the challenges lead to the 
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unenlightening result that apparently none but a few branches of physical science 
merit the honorific designation ... . 
The important task, surely, is to achieve some clarity in fundamental 
methodological issues and the structure of explanations in the social sciences, 
rather than to award or withhold honorific titles. (1971 :449) 
And returning to Stake for a moment, is it an accident that he called his text The Art of 
Case Study Research? Or that he discusses the paintings of Rene Magritte in the 
context of the case researcher as interpreter? "Research, • says Stake, "is not just the 
domain of scientists, it is the domain of craftspersons and artists as well, all who would 
study and interpret. • (1995:97) 
In the course of Kemmis' own argument, he refers to an argument made by Koestler 
(1976) in "The Vision that Links the Poet, the Painter and the Scientist" that art and 
science share many significant features, although science "builds rather more narrowly 
than art, taking more of its problems from what has gone before and recognising more 
explicitly the historical growth of understanding about them. Art seems more 'volatile' 
historically - its problems are more contemporaneous, more contextually-embedded 
(style and taste, by contrast, are historically-developed). Case study research in the 
social sciences may be more like art than other forms of science in being especially 
historically- and contextually-sensitive." (Kemmis, in Simons (Ed.) 1980:102) 
Questions of "scientism" aside, if case study research can be more like art than other 
forms of science, perhaps it can be more like "art" than "science", depending on the 
definitions one employs. The important point, following Kemmis, is that case study 
research is an especially context-sensitive process of truth-seeking in the world of social 
phenomena. 
2.4 CASE STUDY AND ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION 
A common concern raised against case study research, Yin says, is that case studies 
"provide very little basis for scientific generalization. 'How can you generalize from a 
single case?' is a frequently heard question." (1989:21) 
"The short answer," says Yin, "is that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable 
to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case 
study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sample,' and the investigator's goal is 
to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization)." (1989:21) 
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This is a crucial point which needs to be borne in mind in what follows. The case study 
is not undertaken with a view to extrapolating from the one case to others in the same 
universe. It is of no use as a sampling strategy and should not be confused with one. 
The appropriate analogy, as Yin points out, is to the experiment. The case study, like 
the experiment, is an opportunity to test a theory in the real world. And to the extent that 
any generalization may be made as a result of the case study, it is an internal 
generalization relating to the theory which is made, and not a generalization outwards to 
the frequency of occurrence in a particular universe. 
Clearly, some care needs to be taken not to push the analogy with the experiment in the 
physical sciences too far. But one should also be careful not to hold too simplistic a 
notion of the experiment. 
As Kemmis points out: 
Naturalistic research shares a number of characteristics with experimental 
research which are often mistakenly thought to be missing from the latter. This is 
partly because experimental research is often discussed in terms of the design 
and analysis of single experiments, so that some features of experimental 
science are obscured. An isolated experiment shows little: only when it is part of 
a research programme may it advance understanding. One might say that the 
critical thing in experimental research is what happens between experiments. 
Case study is certainly comparable to a programme of experimental research 
involving a series of controlled interventions and replications with variation. 
Processes of disconfirmation and triangulation within a case study or other 
naturalistic research parallel the use of hypothesis-testing and replication with 
variation in experimental research programmes .... 
Of course, differences between case study research and programmes of 
experimental research remain. The most important difference is in the way 
control is understood, and the implications of control in conceptualising the nature 
of a phenomenon. 
In experimental research, control is attained through the manipulation of 
experimental arrangements. The conditions of the experiment provide a context 
of production for the phenomenon to be studied. The experiment is designed to 
'produce' the phenomenon under conditions suitable for observation: the direct 
intervention of control standardises the conditions of production so that 
measurements (observations) will be comparable from condition to condition and 
study to study .... 
In naturalistic research, the situation is analogous to that in astronomy: the 
processes of observation and interpretation are controlled (as for experimental 
research) but control is not exercised over the context of production of the 
phenomenon. The phrase 'context of production' is replaceable for naturalistic 
research by the generic phrase context of occurrence: the observer must be there 
in the situation to identify the phenomenon. This is why it is sometimes said that 
in naturalistic research the occurrence of the phenomenon is 'left to nature'. For 
the naturalistic researcher, the only hold on the phenomenon is through the 
processes of observation and interpretation; in general, the naturalistic researcher 
will not intervene in order to produce the phenomenon to be observed but, rather, 
will treat the context of occurrence as problematic just because it appears to 
produce the phenomenon ... . 
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The problem of the independence of the phenomenon is real within both 
approaches. In both cases the researcher must try to disentangle the 
phenomenon from its context of occurrence. In the case of naturalistic research, 
the process of disentangling is what 'creates' the phenomenon as phenomenon; 
in experimental research, the context of the occurrence is 'designed' or 'artificial' 
(that is, it becomes a context of production) so that the phenomenon is 
distinguishable from the experimental arrangements in terms of both context of 
production (experimental design) and context of observation (measurement). 
Theories of experimentation and instrumentation lay the foundations upon which 
the experiment and thus the phenomenon will be understood. When we speak 
about experiments, we often idealise our descriptions of them so that these 
foundations are taken for granted; they provide the backcloth against which the 
phenomenon appears distinct and independent. If the experimentalist, given 
certain assumptions about the production and observation of a phenomenon may 
be said to treat it as distinct and independent, then it might be said of the 
naturalistic researcher that he attempts to prise a phenomenon off the backcloth, 
as it were, picking it out by finding perspectives which distinguish it from its 
surroundings. (1980:109-112) 
To this extent, then, the case study may be said to be experimental: it can result in 
"valid modification of generalization", to borrow a phrase from Stake (1995:8). It can 
validly be applied in the development and testing of social theory. To the degree that it 
results in generalization, the generalization is internal to the theory, or analytical. It 
cannot validly be applied to generalization about the occurrence of phenomena within a 
universe, or across universes. 
Before leaving this point, it may be useful to distinguish the analytic generalization 
argued for here from Stake's "naturalistic generalization", which has a number of 
improbable features. Stake says that "people can learn much that is general from single 
cases. They do that partly because they are familiar with other cases and they add this 
one in, thus making a slightly new group from which to generalize, a new opportunity to 
modify old generalizations." (1995:85) 
Stake distinguishes between "explicated (or propositional) generalizations" and what he 
and Deborah Trumbull called "naturalistic generalizations" (in a 1982 paper by that 
name). "Naturalistic generalizations are conclusions arrived at through personal 
engagement in life's affairs or by vicarious experience so well constructed that the 
person feels as if it happened to themselves.· He adds, rather lamely: "It is not clear 
that generalizations arrived at in two quite different ways are kept apart in any way in 
the mind. One set of generalizations through two doors." (Stake, 1995:85) 
Clearly, given the kind of Wittgensteinean position developed by Kemmis, as outlined 
above, one would have to respond to Stake that there are not two doors, but only one. 
The notion of a "naturalistic generalization" which is not propositional but is still 
somehow communicable and able to add to our knowledge of social phenomena is 
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difficult to sustain, Rene Magritte notwithstanding. It must surely be impossible to 
sustain if, as Stake is suggesting, the necessary vicarious experience is to be conveyed 
through a case study report. 
One can see where Stake is coming from, for his model of case study research is that 
of his (problematic) intrinsic research, which is non-interventionist to the extent that the 
researcher is reduced to a (problematic) tabula rasa, and pure (but problematic) 
observation takes place. Some of this observation is then conveyed to the reader 
through narrative description, while some of it is conveyed through assertions. And it is 
the narrative description which is (in a very problematic way) meant to carry the 
vicarious experience which results in "naturalistic generalization". "The reader," Stake 
says, "will take both our narrative descriptions and our assertions: narrative descriptions 
to form vicarious experience and naturalistic generalizations, assertions to work with 
existing propositional knowledge to modify existing generalizations.· (1995:86) 
Such a duality is not sustainable. At the very least, "naturalistic generalization" as 
described by Stake must rob the word "generalization" of any meaning. But what can we 
make of naturalistic generalization when Stake says "that such generalization loses its 
experiential privateness even when made conscious to that same person" (1995:86)? 
How can it make sense for such generalization to be conveyed, communicated, to 
others in a research report? 
Certainly, the analytic generalization which is sought in the present case study bears no 
relationship to Stake's naturalistic generalization. To the extent that analytic 
generalization can be communicated, it is propositional in nature; it relates to theory, 
and the theory needs to be expressed in propositional language. It is only in the area of 
what Stake has called "existing propositional knowledge" that we see any useful 
discussion taking place. 
2.5 CASE STUDY AND JOURNALISM 
Comparisons between case study research and the work (or at least some of the work) 
of journalists are commonly encountered in the literature. Yin, to take one example, 
says that "certain journalistic efforts can qualify as case studies". And he adds, referring 
to All the President's Men (197 4), that "one of the best written and most interesting case 
studies is about the Watergate scandal, by two reporters from The Washington Post." 
(1989:24) 
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This is significant, in that an ongoing tension in the production of the present case study 
has been between a journalistic approach and a more academic approach. (This might 
of course, following Yin, simply be a tension between a mediocre and an outstanding 
journalistic effort.) The author of this case study, after four years of study at the 
University of the Witwatersrand and two years as a graduate assistant and then junior 
lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Cape Town, spent eight years 
as a reporter on The Argus and then taught journalism as a Senior Lecturer at the 
Peninsula Technikon for 10 years, before taking up a newly-created post of Strategic 
Planning Facilitator at the Technikon in June 1995. 
The habits of such a working life die hard. Indeed, apart from the suitability- following 
Yin's account- of the case study method for the study in hand, there was no doubt an 
intuitive sense of convergence between the journalistic endeavour and the case study 
method which made the present study attractive to the author. While on the one hand, 
the subject matter speaks directly to the present role of the author within the Technikon 
(as Strategic Planning Facilitator), the method would be the more or less familiar one 
with which he had worked for many years as a journalist. 
It is unnecessary here to take issue with Yin on the inclusion of "journalistic efforts", or 
to draw fine distinctions within the category of journalistic case studies, or- even more 
ambitiously -to try to define just what the journalistic endeavour or the academic 
endeavour entails. But the author believes it is worth noting that the case study method, 
at least as practised here, does differ significantly from common or garden journalistic 
practice (although it might not differ that much from the example which Yin has 
chosen) . 
The difference would seem to lie in a number of areas: 
• The explicit statement of a theoretical position; 
• The experimental nature of the case study; 
• The explicit analysis of the case in order to draw conclusions. 
A journalist will not usually begin an article, even an in-depth investigative one, with any 
account of the theoretical framework within which he or she is working. However deeply 
the journalist might think about such matters, the theoretical framework is largely taken 
for granted; after all, writer and readers all live in the same real world of middle-sized 
lumpy objects. 
Nor will the journalist generally think of himself or herself as conducting any sort of 
experiment or test in writing an article, still less engaging in "analytic generalization" as 
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discussed above. An in-depth article, or series of articles, might indeed strive to provide 
the reader with an understanding of some complex aspect of social reality, but the 
journalist would not usually see this as a test for some theory. The aim is an informative 
one, in the public interest. 
Nor will there generally be explicit analysis or interpretation of the social phenomena 
reported on, with a view to the development or expansion of theory. It is true that the 
traditional journalistic distinction between fact and opinion is one which is often blurred, 
and deliberately so on some newspapers Which strive to interpret events rather than 
simply report them. But by and large, the ingrained approach of the journalist is to 
present the facts, as best he or she has been able to ascertain them, and to let the 
readers make up their minds about them. It has been one of the difficulties faced by the 
author of the present study to move beyond the "tell it like it is" approach of the 
journalist to the more theoretically based, experimental, and interpretative approach of 
the case study investigator (and the reader will no doubt make up his or her mind as to 
how far he has succeeded). 
Despite the differences noted above, it is clear that there is a significant degree of 
overlap in the work of the case study researcher in the social sciences and the work (or 
some of the work) of the journalist. And both the case study researcher and the 
journalist, if they do their jobs properly, may contribute to a better understanding of 
complex social phenomena. In this context, the kind of position adopted by Peter Wilby 
in "Illumination of the Relevant Particular" (in Simons (Ed.) 1980) does not seem very 
helpful. 
Wilby argues that there is no methodology of journalism. "Each journalist has his own 
working rules, methods of collecting data, ways of dealing with informants - and he may 
well use different rules and methods in different situations: (1980:213) However, Wilby 
adopts Nicholas Tomalin's definition of the journalist's task (in the Sunday Times 
Magazine, 26 October, 1969) as the creation of interest, and adds: "Within that 
consideration of creating interest, the journalist may have a variety of other aims: to 
transmit information, to amuse, to impress with fine phrases, to convert, to expose a 
scandal. But interest must remain paramount. • (1980:213-214) 
Journalists can achieve relevance and accuracy, argues Wilby, but not truth -where he 
defines truth as "the relevant whole": 
In other words, while I am defining truth as the relevant whole (to which an 
educational researcher might legitimately aspire), I am defining journalism as the 
illumination of the relevant particular. Journalistic pretensions to 'truth' in the way 
I have defined it are dangerous and misleading. They either sacrifice brevity and 
readability (and, thus, the reader's interest) or they sacrifice accuracy (and, thus, 
the writer's credibility.) (1980:214) 
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In response to Wilby, one might say either that journalists do not necessarily aspire to 
"truth" as he has defined it (so that the danger falls away), or alternatively that the really 
dangerous thing is his definition of truth as "the relevant whole" -to which an 
educational researcher might aspire, but not a journalist. Why, a priori, should the 
journalist be confined to "relevant particulars", while the educational researcher can lay 
claim to "relevant wholes"? Quite apart from the difficulty of reaching agreement on 
"relevance" in either case, what case study researcher is likely to claim to have 
captured the truth, in Wilby's sense of the relevant whole, of a complex social 
phenomenon? 
Wilby is no doubt correct in criticising Woodward and Bernstein for introducing 
speculative material presented as factual material in The Final Days, their sequel to All 
The President's Men. For as Wilby says: "The journalist's job is to report what he knows, 
to describe what he sees, to analyse what he understands and to state what he 
suspects." (1980:215) But it is one thing to rap Woodward and Bernstein over the 
knuckles for deviating from good journalistic practice by presenting speculation as fact; 
it is quite another to conclude from this, as Wilby does, that truth is not the proper 
preserve of journalists: 
The lesson for journalists is that, if 'truth' can be achieved, the subject is too 
small and insignificant to be interesting; if the subject is interesting, it is too large 
and complex for the 'truth' to be established. The selection of journalistic material 
is arbitrary and distorting. Unless this is recognised and the constraints are 
acknowledged, both reader and writer are led into false and confusing 
expectations. (1980:215) 
The difficulties of dealing with size and complexity are in principle no different for the 
researcher or the journalist. They are both labouring in the same vineyard : the world of 
complex social phenomena. 
A similar confusion attends Wilby's comment on the comparison by (in his view) "a 
muddled reviewer" of Hunter Davies' journalistic account of a comprehensive school in 
The Creighton Report to Elizabeth Richardson's Authority and Organisation in the 
Secondary School. Comments Wilby: "It would be as absurd for a journalist to devote a 
chapter to 'the school as a bounded institution' as for a researcher to devote a chapter 
to 'Sally and the petition'". (1980:217) 
Wilby adds: 
Another comment on Davies's book suggested that he could have revealed more 
about the school if he had not named it. But that would have implied a purpose 
that Davies did not have: to tell the 'truth' about comprehensives. The best 
journalism is particular about names and places precisely because anonymity 
implies generality. (1980:217) 
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Wilby is moving, inappropriately, from a consideration of what form of presentation is 
appropriate in certain social contexts (or markets) to conclusions about the truth status 
of the studies presented. This does not seem very helpful. What might be much more 
helpful, is to borrow and slightly amend a phrase which Wilby uses and to say that both 
journalists and case study researchers in the social sciences are engaged in 
"illumination of the particular". That the degree of complexity of the particulars 
illuminated might differ does not make the task different in principle. 
2.6 CONDUCT OF THE CASE STUDY 
Moving now from theory to practice, what should be said about the conduct of the 
present study? 
The fact that the study suffered from problems of time and resources seems to put it in 
the company of most other such studies. The case study was undertaken by a single 
researcher, the author of this thesis, with input upon request from his supervisor. The 
study included two weeks of fieldwork at the University of Natal: one week in January 
1996 and a second week in September 1997. It was not the intention for the study to 
stretch over a period of almost two years, but this was the almost inevitable result of the 
author's attempts to fit the study in with his new responsibilities as Strategic Planning 
Facilitator at Peninsula Technikon (from June 1995). The level of contact which the 
author was able to maintain with sources at the University of Natal between the two 
fieldwork sessions was negligible. 
What did take place between the two fieldwork sessions was an uneven learning 
process on the part of the author: both on the nature of case study work in the social 
sciences in general and on the nature of the particular case. Louis Smith has written of 
"collapsing outlines" (in Simons (Ed.) 1980:191); Parlett and Hamilton (as quoted in 
Stake 1995:9) have written of "progressive focusing": both were experienced in the 
present study. 
It must be admitted that when the first fieldwork began, the author had a very different 
project in mind from the one which has since developed, although the "foreshadowed 
problem" may be said to have remained fairly constant if broadly stated as ·an attempt 
to understand the process of institutional change at the University of Natal within the 
context of strategic planning and the learning organization. 
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The University of Natal was selected for the case study because of the extensive work 
which it had done in strategic planning over a number of years and the new "strategic 
initiative" which it had recently adopted of becoming a learning organization, in terms of 
Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline (1994). The author visited the University of Natal and 
conducted a series of interviews, equipped mainly with a recent reading of The Fifth 
Discipline and a review of Henry Mintzberg's The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning 
(1994), and experience as a journalist and lecturer. The concept of analytic 
generalization, which has since become a key element in the author's understanding of 
the case study, was unknown to him at the time. 
Much initial effort went into transcribing interviews from shorthand notes of the first 
fieldwork interviews and into a close reading of documents provided by the University 
on its strategic planning efforts since the 1989 Mission Statement. Among the 
"collapsing outlines" was an early one- and a difficult one to shake off- which saw the 
task as the largely journalistic one of "telling it like it is". Analysis, or analytic 
generalization, was elusive. 
Mintzberg's The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning provided valuable conceptual tools 
for characterising and analysing the conventional strategic planning process as 
reflected in the documents and interviews. A need for a more fundamental account of 
organizational change led to Mintzberg's The Structuring of Organizations (1979) , works 
by Argyris and Schon, and various others, including Gideon Kunda's Engineering 
Culture (1992) . Through the entire period of the study, there has been an interplay of 
evolving theory development, empirical data gathering, and case study theory. Although 
this must weaken the experimental nature of the case study, at least in terms of a 
conventional understanding of experimentation derived from the physical sciences, 
something along these lines appears to be common in case study research . 
Skrtic, for example, refers to "new directions" which evolved in a study which 
investigated the impact of educational service agencies on rural school district 
implementation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in the United States. 
"Change occurred as the direct result of new insights that had developed from studying 
the problem at hand," says Skrtic, as well as from refinement or evolution of the design. 
("Doing Naturalistic Research into Educational Organizations", in Yvonna S. Lincoln 
(Ed.) Organizational Theory and Inquiry, 1985:186, 187) 
Louis Smith, in "Some Not so Random Thoughts on Doing Field Work: The Interplay of 
Values" (in Simons (Ed.) 1980:184), says of participant observation studies that one 
typically does not have "a specific hypothesis or set of hypotheses to be tested as 'the 
problem'. One has an educational setting in which a teacher, a pupil, a class, a 
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curriculum, a school, or complex of educational organizations are going about their 
activities for their own good purposes." Quoting Diesing (1971), he says that the 
problem becomes one of "studying a whole human system in its natural setting". This 
may seem to work against the notion of analytical generalization and to lean too heavily 
towards the view of Stake which we have tried to distance ourselves from; but Smith 
adds: "For us, that has come to mean a descriptive narrative of life in that setting and 
the development or generation of a conceptualization or theory which makes 
more general sense, explains, the set of events." (1980:185; my emphasis) 
Referring to arguments about the degree to which one theorizes before going into the 
field, Smith adopts a stance which he describes as being in between the "tabula rasa of 
no (or minimal) theoretical presuppositions before the project begins versus having 
some well worked out point of view that one is trying to test." (1980:186) He talks of 
"foreshadowed problems" which, he says, were found "to be quite productive in guiding 
the initial observations, making tentative procedural decisions (where to be in the field, 
when to be in the field, and who to talk to) and beginning the analysis." (1980:186-187) 
This is closer to what happened in the present study than the process which Smith says, 
"in long retrospect", was being followed in Anatomy of Educational Innovation (1971): 
"We were implicitly running several general theories against each other, that is, putting 
them in competition. In a sense we were unwittingly initiating an ethnographic paradigm 
for falsification." (1980:190) 
Smith's characterisation of "collapsing outlines", however, is particularly apposite in the 
present case: 
As we have begun analyzing the data usually in terms of the foreshadowed 
problems which initially guided our entry and data collection we have come upon 
interpretative asides and latent theoretical issues which seem a vital part of the 
setting and our understanding of the setting. As pieces are developed we keep 
making tentative outlines that put some meaningful and logical order into the 
interpretation. Invariably the tentative outlines collapse in the face of more 
complex data and ideas. (1980:191) 
Smith also puts neatly the "core ethical problem in any social science research", which 
problem needs to be touched on in rounding off this account of the conduct of the case 
study. Social science research, says Smith, acts "in the context of two conflicting values 
-the pursuit of truth through scientific procedures and the maintenance of respect for 
the individuals whose lives are being lived, focally or peripherally, in the context of 
one's research project." (1980: 192) 
Leaning in the direction of respect for the individual will lead to written contracts 
between researcher and those researched, perhaps to the maintenance of anonymity 
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through coding or disguise of location and participants, and perhaps to negotiation on 
publication of the research observations. Leaning in the other direction, I would argue, is 
to take a position closer to that of the journalist, although the journalist is more likely to 
appeal to notions of "truth in the public interest" than "truth through scientific 
procedures". 
In the present case, there are no written contracts. There is no agreement on 
anonymity; nor any agreement on gatekeeping as far as publication is concerned. The 
original entry to the University of Natal was negotiated by the author's supervisor with 
Vice-Chancellor Brenda Gourley and followed up by telephone calls and E-mails by the 
author. The authority of Professor Gourley's agreement to participate in the study 
facilitated further contacts on the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses. The author 
was acting, in the field, very much as he would have done if instructed by his news 
editor to visit the University of Natal and to find out what they were doing about 
institutional change. 
The news editor would naturally have been concerned that the reporter in the field 
should check his facts before publication; and this might, if the issue was considered 
contentious enough, have included giving the interviewees sight of the copy for a check 
on the accuracy of the facts (but not for purposes of re-writing the piece) . This is, of 
course, not far from what Stake (1995: 1 07ff) and others have called "triangulation"; 
although, it is submitted, there is a considerable difference between the journalist 
triangulating facts in a universe assumed to be atheoretical , or at least theoretically 
neutral, and the case study researcher who is triangulating theoretically interpreted 
social reality. 
Stake says that case study researchers have ethical obligations to minimize 
misrepresentation and misunderstanding, which require "deliberative effort to find the 
validity of data observed". (1995:109) These include triangulation and a process called 
"member checking" in which "the actor is requested to examine rough drafts of writing 
where the actions or words of the actor are featured , sometimes when first written up 
but usually when no further data will be collected from him or her". (Stake, 1995:115) 
In the present study, the second field study trip to the University of Natal was 
undertaken -at least in part- to undertake member checking and triangulation of the 
arguments (assertions, in Stake's terms) of the study to that point; although it was 
mainly concerned with the assimilation of further empirical data. 
In concluding this chapter, it is probably advisable to remind ourselves that the truth 
claims of case study research are modest; and that case study research can be well or 
26 
badly done. We quoted earlier Kemmis' characterisation of the case study researcher 
as "stumbling from lamplight to lamplight in the fog". (1980:100) At another point, he 
says: "Despite its ambiguities, its imperfections and its simplifying interpretations, case 
study can create conceptual stabilities which are platforms for understanding and for 
action." (1980:131) 
It is hoped that the present study is some small contribution to creating such 
"conceptual stability" in a small comer of a vineyard which has been labelled 
"institutional change in higher education". 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE LITERATURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As argued in the previous chapter, this study can be characterised as a case study of an 
embedded single case design. It arises from a "desire to understand complex social 
phenomena"; it asks "how" and "why" questions "about a contemporary set of events 
over which the investigator has little or no control"; and its aim is not statistical 
generalization, but analytic generalization. Using the term "experiment" loosely, it is an 
experiment which aims to test theory in the real world. 
Broadly speaking, the "real world" in which the study is located is the world of 
institutional change in higher education in South Africa. More particularly, the case 
study looks at the process of institutional change at the University of Natal from the so-
called Walker Report of 1988 (University of Natal 2, 1988) and the drawing up of a 
Mission Statement in 1988-89 (University of Natal 3, 1989), to the financial and 
structural crisis being experienced at the University in September 1997. 
It should be said that the study is not directly concerned with issues of "transformation\ 
although pressures for transformation are clearly important among the various 
pressures for change which the University has experienced. This is partly because 
efforts to bring about institutional change at the University of Natal began before the 
relatively recent calls for transformation. But also the "institutional change" referred to in 
the title of this thesis is seen to be a broader category, taken to refer to change of a 
fundamental structural or organizational type, whatever its genesis; whereas 
"transformation" is understood here to relate to change related to political requirements 
for representivity and transparency. It is largely as a result of this broader focus that the 
student voice is muted in this study. Although the Broad Transformation Forum 
established at the University of Natal may still play a role in such structural changes as 
are made at the University, its concerns are mainly those related to transformation and 
directly student-related issues like Financial Aid. And theBTF at Natal University has 
been incorporated as a "parallel structure" alongside other structures and is committed 
to making decisions by consensus. Although students have other ways of making their 
wishes felt, the BTF does not have an over-riding authority of veto whereas, arguably, 
Senate does. (Those interested in the effects upon students of the University's efforts to 
transform itself in the narrower sense are referred to a 1996 M. Soc. Sci. dissertation by 
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Gary Phillips: Social tensions, space and identity at the Univers;ty of Natal: a study into 
the effects of transformation on students at the Durban campus, 1989 -1996.) 
As briefly alluded to in Chapter One, the case study can be divided into two sub-units, 
both in terms of historical development and underlying theory - conventional strategic 
planning and learning organization theory. Efforts to bring about institutional change at 
the University of Natal will be examined under those two headings in Chapters Four and 
Five. It is the task of this chapter to provide the theoretical framework for the 
presentation of the case and its analysis. 
As a case study of institutional change in higher education, the present study is taken to 
be an instance of the broad category of organizational change - higher educational 
institutions like the University being understood to be organizations of a particular kind. 
The first part of the framework, then, requires the location of the University within the 
broader field of organizations. A general theory of categorizing organizations is 
adopted, based largely on Henry Mintzberg's The Structuring of Organizations (1979). 
This theory, described in the next section of this chapter, is applied in both sub-units or 
phases of the study to analyse from an organizational perspective the developments at 
the University of Natal. 
However, more specific theoretical tools are also applied in each of the phases; and 
these tools are developed in subsequent sections of this chapter. In the earlier phase, 
examined in Chapter Four, an understanding of the nature of strategic planning is 
applied which is indebted to Mintzberg's The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994). 
In the later phase, examined in Chapter Five, notions of organizational learning are 
discussed against a background of work in this area by Argyris and Schon, and by Peter 
Senge, particularly Senge's The Fifth Discipline (1994) . 
Although an in-depth discussion of the ontological and epistemological presuppositions 
of the various theories and practical developments referred to is beyond the scope of 
this case study, the classical distinction in managerial policy and practice developed by 
McGregor, between Theory X and Theory Y, is used as a shorthand for rough 
distinctions with regard to such underlying assumptions between conventional strategic 
planning and the learning organization. 
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3.2 THE UNIVERSITY AS ORGANIZATION 
To say that universities are organizations of a particular kind may seem self-evident. 
However, as Lockwood states (in Fielden & Lockwood, 1973:19), universities can be 
analysed from many points of view - for instance as organizations, as institutions, or as 
communities: 
Studying them as organisations would imply that they exist to achieve concrete 
ends which are capable of rational analysis. Looking at them as institutions, as 
the embodiment of values, would involve a behavioural examination of how their 
internal processes contribute to the maintenance of those values. If the view of 
universities as communities is given the primary emphasis, the study would be 
more concerned with their effects upon the development of groups and 
individuals. (1973: 19) 
Lockwood adds: "We recognise that those three, and probably other, concepts coexist 
in an uneasy balance in each individual university." (1973:19) 
Much depends, it would seem, on how one chooses to define these terms and to see 
their inter-relations. For instance, the links between "organisations" and "concrete ends 
which are capable of rational analysis", or between "institutions" and "the embodiment 
of values", are not clear in any a priori way. Nor is it clear why a university as institution 
(however defined) and a university as community (however defined) could not both be 
subsidiary features of the university as organization (if widely enough defined). 
Nevertheless, Lockwood's point is well taken that there are different ways of 
categorising universities, as also is his point that universities are "extremely difficult to 
classify as organisations", for example because they contain elements of the firm and 
the guild. The assumptions which he lists about the university as organization point to 
some key features, which will be further developed in a wider-ranging organizational 
context below: 
Our assumption is that universities are organisations which have corporate 
responsibilities, and which possess powers to manage the activities of their 
members in order to carry out those responsibilities. Members of the academic 
staff collectively constitute the major element in the government of a university, 
but individually they are employees by contract. Members of academic staff may 
be influenced by, and give their prime loyalty to, the national and sometimes 
international professional groups which cut across all universities; but, in terms of 
organisation and management, the existence of the university creates a firm 
boundary. Faculties, colleges, departments and other units are not autonomous 
units within a guild structure, they are inter-dependent parts of a unitary 
organisation. We believe that the management of a university should be 
conducted on a participative basis and that authority and initiative for many 
activities should be delegated as far as possible to constituent groups and 
individuals. It nevertheless remains the case that the university statutory bodies 
are fully responsible constitutionally for the management of the organisation and 
have powers to exercise this responsibility. (1973:20-21) 
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Of interest in relation to Fielden and Lockwood's work, but not of major concern for our 
purposes, is the fact that Fielden was employed as a consultant by the University of 
Natal, particularly in the early strategic planning phase associated with the Vice-
Chancellor's Review and there are some clear echoes, in some cases taken over 
verbatim, from the Fielden and Lockwood text in the December 1991 Report of the 
Vice-Chancellor's Review (University of Natal 4, 1991). (This is referred to again in 
Chapter Four, page 71.) What the coincidence usefully indicates is that this kind of 
"organization-speak" was part of the vocabulary and conceptual framework of the actors 
at the University of Natal at the time. 
The wider-ranging analysis of organizational structure in general, which is relied upon in 
presenting and interpreting the case of the University of Natal in subsequent chapters, 
is developed by Henry Mintzberg in The Structuring of Organizations (1979). Mintzberg 
sets out to produce a synthesis of the literature on organizational structure, within which 
he locates five structural configurations, including one which he believes characterises 
universities. While we cannot reflect the detail of the undertaking, a sketch will be 
useful in approaching that structural configuration and two others which - it is argued 
later- are relevant to the case study. 
Mintzberg writes: 
Every organized human activity - from the making of pots to the placing of a man 
on the moon - gives rise to two fundamental and opposing requirements: the 
division of labor into various tasks to be performed and the coordination of these 
tasks to accomplish the activity. The structure of an organization can be 
defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into 
distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination among them. (1979:2, original 
emphasis.) 
(The frequent use of bold type in quotations from Mintzberg follows his usage, 
intended to facilitate scanning of The Structuring of Organizations. Where 
emphasis differs from the original, this is stated.) 
Mintzberg identifies five coordinating mechanisms which, he says, "seem to explain 
the fundamental ways in which organizations coordinate their work: mutual 
adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of work processes, 
standardization of work outputs, and standardization of worker skills. These 
should be considered the most basic elements of structure, the glue that holds 
organizations together." (1979:3) 
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He identifies and discusses the inter-relationships between five basic parts of the 
contemporary organization: ''the operating core, strategic apex, middle line, 
technostructure, and support staff'; and overlays on this five "systems of flows" which 
are in effect theories of how the organization functions: "as a system of formal authority, 
as a system of regulated information flows, as a system of informal communication, as 
a system of work constellations, and as a system of ad hoc decision processes," each 
describing part of what goes on inside organizations. (1979: 13) 








Figure 2-1 . The Five Basic Parts of Organizations 
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Nine design parameters are discussed, as well as sixteen hypotheses "which review a 
good deal of the evidence on the relationship between structure and situation". 
(1979:15) The design parameters, described as "the basic elements used in designing 
organizational structures", are: 
Job specialization 
Behavior formalization 
Training and indoctrination 
Unit grouping 
Unit size 





Concerned with the 
design of individual 
positions 
Constituting the design 
of the "superstructure" 
Concerned with the design 
of lateral linkages 
Constituting the design 
of the decision-making system 
Against this background, Mintzberg discusses five structural configurations: 
Together with the corresponding design parameter and preeminent part of the 
organization, the five configurations are: Simple Structure (direct supervision, 
strategic apex), Machine Bureaucracy (standardization of work processes, 
technostructure), Professional Bureaucracy (standardization of skills, operating 
core), Divisionalized Form (standardization of outputs, middle line), and 
Adhocracy (mutual adjustment, support staff). (1979:15) 
The Professional Bureaucracy, says Mintzberg, is "common in universities, general 
hospitals, school systems, public accounting firms, social work agencies, and craft 
production firms. All rely on the skills and knowledge of their operating professionals to 
function; all produce standard products or services." (1979:349) 
He adds: 
The Professional Bureaucracy relies for coordination on the standardization of 
skills and its associated design parameter, training and indoctrination. It hires 
duly trained and indoctrinated specialists - professionals - for the operating core, 
and then gives them considerable control over their own work .... 
Control over his own work means that the professional works relatively 
independently of his colleagues, but closely with the clients he serves .... 
Most of the necessary coordination between the operating professionals is then 
handled by the standardization of skills and knowledge, in effect, by what they 
have learned to expect from their colleagues. (1979:349) 
There is a marked difference, says Mintzberg, in the source of standardization between 
the Professional Bureaucracy and the Machine Bureaucracy: 
Whereas the Machine Bureaucracy generates its own standards - its 
technostructure designing the work standards for its operators and its line 
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managers enforcing them - the standards of the Professional Bureaucracy 
originate largely outside its own structure, in the self-governing 
associations its operators join with their colleagues from other 
Professional Bureaucracies. These associations set universal standards which 
they make sure are taught by the universities and used by all the bureaucracies 
of the profession. So whereas the Machine Bureaucracy relies on authority of 
a hierarchical nature- the power of office- the Professional Bureaucracy 
relies on authority of a professional nature - the power of expertise .... 
(1979:351) 
The research suggests, says Mintzberg, that the other forms of standardization are 
difficult to rely on in the Professional Bureaucracy: 
The work processes themselves are too complex to be standardized directly by 
analysts. One need only try to imagine a work study analyst following a 
cardiologist on his rounds or observing a teacher in a classroom in order to 
program their work. Similarly, the outputs of professional work cannot easily be 
measured, and so do not lend themselves to standardization. Imagine a planner 
trying to define a cure in psychiatry, the amount of learning that takes place in the 
classroom, or the quality of the accountant's audit. Thus Professional 
Bureaucracies cannot rely extensively on the formalization of professional work 
or on systems to plan and control it. 
Much the same conclusion can be drawn for the two remaining coordinating 
mechanisms. Both direct supervision and mutual adjustment impede the 
professional's close relationships with his clients. That relationship is predicated 
on a high degree of professional autonomy - freedom from having not only to 
respond to managerial orders but also to consult extensively with peers. In any 
event, the use of the other four coordinating mechanisms is precluded by the 
capacity of standardization of skills to achieve a good deal of the coordination 
necessary in the operating core. (1979:351-352) 
Of course, the analysts and planners are not "precluded" in any strong sense from 
applying the other coordinating mechanisms, should they feel that the standardization of 
skills does not provide adequate coordination in the operating core. And from the fact 
that "the outputs of professional work cannot easily be measured", it does not follow that 
they cannot be measured and standardized. It might be argued, for example, that the 
current outcomes-based approach to learning which underlies the National 
Qualifications Framework is a reflection of the zeal of the technocrats and 
administrators of education to extend the frontiers of coordination. The empirical 
evidence, Mintzberg is saying, suggests that such efforts are unlikely to be successful. 
Mintzberg argues that the Professional Bureaucracy "is unique among the five 
structural configurations in answering two of the paramount needs of 
contemporary men and women. It is democratic, disseminating its power directly 
to its workers (at least those who are professional). And it provides them with 
extensive autonomy, freeing them even of the need to coordinate closely with 
their peers, and all of the pressures and politics that entails ... ." (1979:371) 
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(It is important to note the sense in which Mintzberg is using "democratic" here. If one 
were to understand "democratic" in the sense of the joint decision-making of the polis of 
the Greek city state, or the inclusive decision-making processes of transformed 
institutions in post-apartheid South Africa, one would encounter an immediate 
contradiction between "democracy" on the one hand and •autonomy" on the other. 
Mintzberg is using the term not in relation to collective decision making, but in relation 
to the dissemination of power to individual workers and in contrast to systems which 
tend to autocracy or oligarchy, where power is centralised in one or few hands. 
"Egalitarian" might have been a better word to use.) 
"As a result," Mintzberg says, "professionals tend to emerge as responsible and highly 
motivated individuals, dedicated to their work and the clients they serve .... 
But in these same characteristics of democracy and autonomy lie all the major 
problems of the Professional Bureaucracy. For there is virtually no control of 
the work outside the profession, no way to correct deficiencies that the 
professionals themselves choose to overlook. What they tend to overlook are 
the major problems of coordination, of discretion, and of innovation that arise in 
these structures. (1979:371-372) 
The standardization of skills, says Mintzberg, "is a loose coordinating mechanism at 
best, failing to cope with many of the needs that arise in the Professional 
Bureaucracy." 
There is, first of all, the need for coordination between the professional and the 
support staff. To the professional, that is simply resolved: he gives the orders. 
But that only catches the support staffer between two systems of power pulling in 
different ways, the vertical power of line authority above him, and the horizontal 
power of professional expertise to his side. 
Perhaps more severe are the coordination problems between the professionals 
themselves. Unlike Machine Bureaucracies, Professional Bureaucracies are not 
integrated entities. They are collections of individuals who join to draw on 
common resources and support services but otherwise want to be left alone. As 
long as the pigeonholing process works effectively, they can be. But that process 
can never be so good that contingencies do not fall in the cracks between the 
standard programs. The world is a continuous intertwined system. Slicing it up, 
although necessary to comprehend it, inevitably distorts it. Needs that fall at the 
margin or that overlap two categories tend to get forced -artificially- into one 
category or another. ... 
The pigeonholing process, in fact, emerges as the source of a great deal of 
the conflict of the Professional Bureaucracy. Much political blood is spilled 
in the continual reassessment of contingencies, imperfectly conceived, in 
terms of programs, artificially distinguished. (1979:372-373) 
Mintzberg describes the "pigeonholing process" as the application by professionals of a 
repertoire of standard programs to predetermined situations, called contingencies, also 
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standardized. "In this regard, the professional has two basic tasks: (1) to categorize 
the client's need in terms of a contingency, which indicates which standard 
program to use, a task known as diagnosis, and (2) to apply, or execute, that 
program." (1979:352) 
But even where pigeonholing works, adds Mintzberg, problems arise. "For it focuses all 
the discretion in the hands of single professionals, whose complex skills, no matter how 
standardized, require the exercise of considerable judgment. That is, perhaps, 
appropriate for professionals who are competent and conscientious. Unfortunately not 
all of them are; and the professional bureaucratic structure cannot easily deal with 
professionals who are either incompetent or unconscientious." (1979:373) 
A common means-end inversion in Professional Bureaucracies occurs, Mintzberg says, 
when "the professional confuses the needs of his clients with the skills he has to offer 
them. He simply concentrates on the program that he favors- perhaps because he 
does it best or simply enjoys doing it most -to the exclusion of all the others ... 
Dealing with this means-end inversion is impeded by the difficulty of measuring · 
the outputs of professional work .... When no one has been able to measure the 
learning that takes place in the classroom, how can it be demonstrated with 
reliability that lectures are better or worse than seminars or, for that matter, than 
staying home and reading. (1979:374) 
But, organizationally speaking, there is a more serious problem related to discretion: 
Discretion not only enables some professionals to ignore the needs of their 
clients; it also encourages many of them to ignore the needs of the 
organization. Professionals in these structures do not generally consider 
themselves part of a team. To many, the organization is almost incidental, a 
convenient place to pract:ce their skills. They are loyal to their profession, not to 
the place where they happen to practice it. But the organization has need for 
loyalty, too- to support its own strategies, to staff its administrative committees, 
to see it through conflicts with the professional association. Cooperation ... is 
crucial to the functioning of the administrative structure. Yet ... professionals 
resist it furiously. Professors hate to show up for curriculum meetings; they simply 
do not wish to be dependent on each other. One can say that they know each 
other only too well! (1979:37 4) 
But it is not only the regular functioning of the administrative structure which requires 
cooperation. In Professional Bureaucracies, says Mintzberg, major innovation also 
depends on cooperation: 
Existing programs can be perfected by individual specialists. But new ones 
necessarily cut across existing specialties- in essence, they require a 
rearrangement of the pigeonholes - and so call for interdisciplinary efforts. As a 
result, the reluctance of the professionals to work cooperatively with each other 
translates itself into problems of innovation. 
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Like the Machine Bureaucracy, the Professional Bureaucracy is an 
inflexible structure, well suited to producing its standard outputs but ill-
suited to adapting to the production of new ones. All bureaucracies are 
geared to stable environments; they are performance structures designed to 
perfect programs for contingencies that can be predicted, not problem solving 
ones designed to create new programs for needs that have never before been 
encountered. 
The problems of innovation in the Professional Bureaucracy find their roots in 
convergent thinking, in the deductive reasoning of the professional who sees the 
specific situation in terms of the general concept. In the Professional Bureaucracy 
this means that new problems are forced into old pigeonholes .... 
The fact is that great art and innovative problem solving require inductive 
reasoning, that is, the induction of new general concepts or programs from 
particular experiences. That kind of thinking is divergent- it breaks away from old 
routines or standards rather than perfecting existing ones. And that flies in the 
face of everything the Professional Bureaucracy is designed to do. (1979:374-
375) 
What are the implications of this for effecting change in a Professional Bureaucracy? 
Mintzberg says: 
... It should come as no surprise that Professional Bureaucracies and the 
professional associations that control their procedures tend to be conservative 
bodies, hesitant to change their well-established ways. Whenever an 
entrepreneurial member takes up the torch of innovation, great political clashes 
inevitably ensue. Even in the Machine Bureaucracy, once the managers of the 
strategic apex finally recognize the need for change, they are able to force it 
down the hierarchy. In the Professional Bureaucracy, with operator autonomy and 
bottom-up decision making, and in the professional association with its own 
democratic procedures, power for strategic change is diffuse. Everybody must 
agree on the change, not just a few managers or professional representatives. So 
change comes slowly and painfully, after much political intrigue and shrewd 
maneuvering by the professional and administrative entrepreneurs. 
As long as the environment remains stable, the Professional Bureaucracy 
encounters no problem. It continues to perfect its skills and the given system of 
pigeonholes that slots them. But dynamic conditions call for change- new skills, 
new ways to slot them, and creative cooperative efforts on the part of 
multidisciplinary teams of professionals. And that calls for another structural 
configuration .. .. (1979:375-376) 
That configuration, more "organic" than "bureaucratic", Mintzberg calls the Adhocracy. 
He notes: 
The Simple Structure also retains an organic structure, and so is able to innovate 
as well. But that innovation is restricted to simple environments, ones that can be 
easily comprehended by a central leader. Innovation of the sophisticated variety 
takes place in environments not easily understood. So another kind of organic 
structure is required, one that relies on the application of sophisticated expertise. 
The Adhocracy must hire and give power to experts- professionals whose 
knowledge and skills have been highly developed in training programs ... . 
But unlike the Professional Bureaucracy, the Adhocracy cannot rely on the 
standardization skills of these experts to achieve coordination, because that 
would lead to standardization instead of innovation. Rather it must treat existing 
knowledge and skills merely as bases on which to build new ones. 
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Moreover, the building of new knowledge and skills requires the combination of 
different bodies of existing ones. So rather than allowing the specialization of the 
expert or the differentiation of the functional unit to dominate its behavior, the 
Adhocracy must instead break through the boundaries of conventional 
specialization and differentiation .... Thus, whereas each professional of the 
Professional Bureaucracy can operate on his own, in the Adhocracy the 
professionals must amalgamate their efforts .... 
The experts are grouped in functional units for housekeeping purposes - for 
hiring, professional communication, and the like- but then are deployed in 
project teams to carry out their basic work of innovation. 
And how is coordination effected in and between these project teams? As noted 
earlier, standardization is precluded as a major coordinating mechanism. The 
efforts must be innovative, not standardized. So, too, is direct supervision, 
because of the complexity of the work. Coordination must be effected by those 
with the knowledge, the experts who actually do the project work. That leaves 
mutual adjustment, the prime coordinating mechanism of the Adhocracy. As 
Khandwalla (1976) notes, 'the job of coordination is not left to a few charged with 
the responsibility, but assumed by most individuals in the organization, much in 
the way members of a well-knit hockey or cricket team all work spontaneously to 
keep its activities focused on the goal of winning' .... (Mintzberg, 1979:434-435) 
It should be noted that the kind of "sophisticated innovation" which Mintzberg has in 
mind in discussing the characteristics of the Adhocracy is primarily "the kind required of 
a space agency, an avant-garde film company, a factory manufacturing complex 
prototypes, an integrated petrochemicals company". (1979:432) But "even hospitals and 
universities, described ... as closest to Professional Bureaucracy for their routine clinical 
and teaching work, are drawn to Adhocracy when they do innovative research. Their 
orientation to convergent, deductive thinking in their routine work precludes real 
innovation. So, while their professionals are often able to work alone when they apply 
their standard knowledge and skills, they must typically join in organic multidisciplinary 
teams to create new knowledge and skills." (1979:450) 
For purposes of application to the particular case of Natal University, the above 
discussion has focused on three of Mintzberg's five organizational configurations: 
Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, and Adhocracy (the other two being 
Simple Structure and Divisionalized Form). As the case is presented in Chapters Four 
and Five, features of these organizational configurations will be called upon to throw 
light on the University of Natal's situation. In Chapter Six, the question of innovation at 
the University of Natal - seen as a crucial issue by the University leadership - is 
brought to the fore and the capacity of Mintzberg's analysis to elucidate the case is 
tested. 
In closing the discussion for the moment, Mintzberg's warnings against tre~ting the 
configurations as though they were found in idealised form in the real world should be 
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noted. Mintzberg says the five organizational configurations which he has described 
"represent a set of five forces that pull organizations in five different structural 
directions." (1979:469) "Almost every organization experiences these five pulls; what 
structure it designs depends in large part on how strong each one is." (1979:472) 
He asks the question: "Do any of these five structural configurations really exist?" And 
he answers it: 
In one sense the structural configurations do not exist at all. After all, they are just 
words and pictures on pieces of paper, not reality itself. Real structures in all but 
the most trivial organizations are enormously complex, far more than any of 
these five configurations on paper. What they constitute is a theory, and every 
theory necessarily simplifies and therefore distorts reality. (1979:468) 
3.3 THEORY X AND THEORY Y 
At the risk of simplifying and distorting reality, Douglas McGregor's well-known 
distinction between Theory X and Theory Y will be used to characterise very broadly two 
opposing views about human nature, particularly as these views relate to organizational 
or work-related behaviour. The argument is that the two phases or units of the case 
study (strategic planning and the learning organization) belong, broadly speaking, within 
the different views represented by Theory X and Theory Y. 
"Behind every managerial decision or action are assumptions about human nature and 
human behavior," says McGregor. "A few of these are remarkably pervasive. They are 
implicit in most of the literature of organization and in much current managerial policy 
and practice." (McGregor, 1960, in OS Pugh (Ed) Organization Theory, 1984:317) 
McGregor gives the name Theory X to "the traditional view of direction and control", 
which has the following assumptions: 
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if 
he can. 
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be 
coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put 
forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives. 
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all. 
(1984:317-318) 
Writing in 1960, McGregor says: "Theory X .. . materially influences managerial strategy 
in a wide sector of American industry today. Moreover, the principles of organization 
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which comprise the bulk of the literature of management could only have been derived 
from assumptions such as those of Theory X. Other beliefs about human nature would 
have led inevitably to quite different organizational principles." (1984:318, original 
emphasis.) 
Following an account of human motivation which leans heavily (although not explicitly) 
on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, McGregor concludes that Theory X "neither explains 
nor describes human nature although it purports to. Because its assumptions are so 
unnecessarily limiting, it prevents our seeing the possibilities inherent in other 
managerial strategies." (1984:324) 
He then turns to Theory Y, saying that "the accumulation of knowledge about human 
behavior in many specialized fields has made possible the formulation of a number of 
generalizations which provide a modest beginning for a new theory with respect to the 
management of human resources." (1984:326) Theory Y , which McGregor applies to 
"the integration of individual and organizational goals", has the following assumptions: 
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or 
rest. 
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for 
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-
direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed . 
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their 
achievement. 
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept 
but to seek responsibility. 
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity and 
creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, 
distributed in the population. 
6. Under the conditions of modem industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of 
the average human being are only partially utilized. 
(1984:326-327) 
Says McGregor: 
These assumptions involve sharply different implications for managerial strategy 
than do those of Theory X. They are dynamic rather than static: they indicate the 
possibility of human growth, and development; they stress the necessity for 
selective adaptation rather than for a single absolute form of control. They are not 
framed in terms of the least common denominator of the factory hand, but in 
terms of a resource which has substantial potentialities. 
Above all, the assumptions of Theory Y point up the fact that the limits on human 
collaboration in the organizational setting are not limits of human nature but of 
management's ingenuity in discovering how to realize the potential represented 
by its human resources. (1984:327) 
Clearly, McGregor is himself a subscriber to Theory Y. "The assumptions of Theory Y 
are not finally validated," he says. "Nevertheless, they are far more consistent with 
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existing knowledge in the social sciences than are the assumptions of Theory X". 
(1984:327) 
But for present purposes, it is not material whether McGregor is right or wrong in 
holding to the assumptions of Theory Y. The usefulness of the distinction between 
Theory X and Theory Y is that it boldly states two opposing (although not necessarily 
exhaustive) sets of assumptions about human nature; and as such will serve as a kind 
of shorthand for two broad groupings of ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
There will obviously be some loss of precision and detail in the use of such a shorthand. 
McGregor himself acknowledges in the case of Theory X, for instance, that there are 
important exceptions "here and there". (1984:325) But, it is submitted, the distinction he 
draws is nevertheless a useful one in separating the two general approaches which 
Theory X and Theory Y represent. 
Part of the purpose here is simply to draw attention to the fact that underlying 
epistemological and ontological assumptions are at work, both in conventional strategic 
planning models and in learning organization works like Senge's The Fifth Discipline 
(1994), but often without being explicitly discussed as such. It is not possible to engage 
in detailed discussion of the assumptions here. But in the following account of 
conventional strategic planning and the learning organization, it will become apparent 
that conventional strategic planning leans more towards Theory X in terms of its 
ontological assumptions, while the learning organization leans more towards Theory Y. 
Whereas conventional strategic planning is largely concerned about giving people 
direction and controlling them, the learning organization is based on a belief that people 
have vast untapped resources of creativity which can be released for the benefit of the 
organization. 
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3.4 CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING 
It will be argued in the next chapter that the University of Natal followed a more-or-less 
conventional approach to strategic planning when it embarked on the process in 1988-
89. But what does it mean to talk of "a more-or-less conventional approach to strategic 
planning"? 
After all, strategic planning has grown from fairly humble beginnings as a budget 
exercise in the United States in the 1950s (Mintzberg, 1994:6) to a massive 
international industry including publishing, education and training, consultancy, and, of 
course, planners. And every author, planner, or business school will have their own 
recommendations on how strategic planning ought to be done. 
Nevertheless, it is not unusual to find references in the literature to "conventional 
strategic planning", whether or not the authors associate their particular brand of 
strategic planning with such conventional planning, or seek to distance themselves from 
it in some way or other. 
To take one example, Team-based Strategic Planning by C. Davis Fogg (1994, 
published by the American Management Association and sub-titled "A complete Guide 
to Structuring, Facilitating, and Implementing the Process") opens with this statement: 
"This book is about how to make the conventional strategic planning process work ... " 
(1994:ix) and the first chapter is entitled "The Traditional Strategic Planning Process". 
What one can expect to find in such accounts will depend very largely on where the 
author is coming from and where he or she is heading. And the discussion can take 
place at a variety of levels of abstraction. 
At a fairly superficial level, one is likely to encounter some discussion of SWOT 
analysis (for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). This is so much a 
part of the common parlance of strategic planners that it has become a cliche, however 
difficult it might actually be to do. 
One is also likely to find some debate over the definition of terms, for key terms in the 
strategic planning lexicon have been used in a bewildering variety of ways. Many 
people new to strategic planning processes must have been surprised by how much 
heat can be generated by arguments starting: "But is that a goal or is it an objective?" 
In the discussion which follows, an attempt is made to delineate the main features of a 
conventional approach to strategic planning, relying mainly on Mintzberg's The Rise 
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and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994). As the discussion so far suggests, there might be 
any number of other accounts of "conventional strategic planning"; but it is submitted 
that Mintzberg's account is sufficiently critical and analytical to provide a useful 
perspective on the process. 
The point should be made that there is no implication here that the main actors at the 
University of Natal over the 1 0-year period of the case study were pursuing a strategic 
planning model quite like any of those referred to in this chapter. Indeed, there is 
evidence from interviews with some of the major players that they did not see 
themselves as pursuing any model in particular (see page 70). The point is that, in 
practice, they can be said to have pursued a more-or-less conventional strategic 
planning model as described by Mintzberg, at least until the notion of the learning 
organization was introduced. 
The key metaphor which helps to distinguish the conventional approach to strategic 
planning is the "cascade", although the term may or may not be explicitly used by the 
authors. The basic picture here is of plans emanating from some central point in an 
organization, typically the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and spilling over to lower and 
lower levels of the organization for implementation. Fogg, for instance, says that part 
three of his book, headed Implementing the Plan, "covers how to cascade the plan 
down into the organization ... " (1994:xi). 
The most important characteristic of conventional strategic planning is its analytical 
nature. While the stated objective of the process might often be something like 
"synthesis" or "synergy", the process itself is an analytical one: breaking complex 
situations down into increasingly discrete parts. 
To explicate the significance of the cascade metaphor and the analytical nature of 
strategic planning, it is useful to examine Mintzberg's account of conventional strategic 
planning. 
Curiously, given the title of his book, Mintzberg tends to talk mostly of "planning", rather 
than "strategic planning". This is the result of a basic distinction he draws between 
"planning" (as in conventional strategic planning) and "strategy formation". 
For Mintzberg, strategy formation is concerned with the broad direction of a business or 
organization, which other theorists might try to capture under ''vision" or "goal" or 
"objective". Contrast this with Fogg, for example, who says that "strategies are the 
means, the ways, the hows, the devilishly detailed methods by which organizations 
accomplish their objectives." (1994:12) Granted , Fogg immediately confuses the issue, 
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including something of what Mintzberg is trying to capture, when he says: "Note that 
strategies can be as broad as 'grow by acquisition and joint venture' and as narrow as 
'expand distribution into three additional cities."' (1994:13) 
Mintzberg's paradigm of successful strategy formation is that of Steinberg Inc, a 
privately owned chain of supermarkets in Canada (1994:111). The company had a 
highly successful strategy of expansion by building shopping centres, which strategy 
existed only in the mind of the CEO, Sam Steinberg. Not until Steinberg needed to raise 
money on the capital market did he find any need for a plan, as opposed to his strategy. 
Mintzberg's basic argument is that strategy formation is necessary and desirable, but 
planning very often discourages or inhibits the formation of strategy. The extreme case 
which Mintzberg alludes to in this regard (1994: 114-115) is the Canadian armed forces, 
which planned when it had no fighting to do, and threw away the plans when it did. 
Mintzberg identifies 10 different schools of thought on strategy formation: Design, 
Planning, Positioning, Cognitive, Entrepreneurial, Learning, Political, Cultural, 
Environmental, and Configurational (1994:3); but his discussion is restricted mainly to 
the Design and Planning Schools. 
Beginning perhaps in 1962, if not earlier, he says, "the literature of planning has offered 
literally hundreds of models of a process by which strategy could supposedly be 
formally developed and operationalized." A few specific exceptions aside, these all 
"built on a single conceptual framework, or basic model, differing less in fundamentals 
than in levels of detail." (1994:35) 
According to this basic model, which he calls the Core "Design School" Model: 
... Strategy is created at the intersection of an external appraisal of the threats 
and opportunities facing an organization in its environment, considered in terms 
of key factors for success, and an internal appraisal of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organization itself, distilled into a set of distinctive 
competences. Outside opportunities are exploited by inside strengths, while 
threats are avoided and weaknesses circumvented. Taken into consideration, 
both in the creation of strategies and their subsequent evaluation to choose the 
best, are the values of the leadership as well as the ethics of the society and 
other aspects of so-called social responsibility. And once a strategy has been 
chosen, it is implemented. (1994:36) 
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Among the underlying premises of the model, Mintzberg identifies these: 
1. Strategy formation should be a controlled, conscious process of 
thought. 
2. Responsibility for the process must rest with the chief executive officer: 
that person is THE strategist. 
3. The model of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal. 
4. Strategies should be unique: the best ones result from a process of 
creative design. 
5. Strategies must come out of the design process fully developed. 
6. The strategies should be made explicit and, if possible, articulated, 
which means they have to be kept simple. 
7. Finally, once these unique, full-blown, explicit, and simple strategies are -
fully formulated, they must then be implemented. 
(1994:38-39. Here again, the use of bold text follows the original.) 
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The Planning School model has much in common with this Design School model. 
Perhaps the only real difference, Mintzberg says, is an emphasis on "the setting of 
formal objectives in place of the implicit incorporation of managerial values". (1994:39) 
"Where the two literatures most decidedly parted company was in the premise of 
keeping the process simple and informal." (1994:40) The Ansoff model, as developed 
by H. Igor Ansoff in his 1965 book Corporate Strategy, contains no less than 57 boxes, 
Mintzberg observes. A second difference relates to the role of the CEO: 
The premise of the chief executive as architect of strategy was not so much 
dismissed as sidestepped .... While lip service was paid to the top line 
management in this regard , a good deal of the literature implicitly brought the 
planner front and center, sometimes as an advisor with more than passive 
influence, sometimes as the designer of the system of strategy making, or even 
of the strategies themselves (which could relegate the CEO/architect to the role 
of approving rather than designing strategies) , and sometimes as the police 
officer who ensured that everyone else planned (meaning carried out the 
designated planning procedures) . (1994:42) 
And a third difference relates to generic rather than unique strategies: the nature of the 
process, based on formalization , "often undermined creativity and so promoted 
strategies that were more generic than unique", (1994:42) , where generic means "well-
defined, belonging to a class" (1994:181). 
Mintzberg summarises the premises of the planning school as follows: 
1. Strategy formation should be controlled and conscious as well as a 
formalized and elaborated process, decomposed into distinct steps, each 
delineated by checklists and supported by techniques. 
2. Responsibility for the overall process rests with the chief executive in 
principle; responsibility for its execution rests with the staff planners in 
practice. 
3. Strategies come out of the process fully developed, typically as generic 
positions, to be explicated so that they can then be implemented through 
detailed attention to objectives, budgets, programs, and operating plans 
of various kinds. (1994:42) 
In Mintzberg's account of the Ansoff model , of particular interest in the Natal University 
context, is Ansoffs characterisation of his model as a "cascade of decisions, starting 
with highly aggregated ones and proceeding toward the more specific" (1965:201) . "This 
gives the appearance of solving the problem several times over, but with immensely 
more precise results .. . . " (As quoted in Mintzberg, 1994:44) 
Mintzberg also refers to the concepts of gap analysis and synergy. Again quoting Ansoff 
on gap analysis: 
The procedure within each step of the cascade is similar. (1) A set of objectives is 
established. (2) The difference (the 'gap') between the current position of the firm 
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and the objectives is estimated. (3) One or more courses of action (strategy) is 
proposed. (4) These are tested for their 'gap-reducing properties.' A course is 
accepted if it substantially closes the gaps; if it does not, new alternatives are 
tried. (Quoted in Mintzberg 1994:44) 
Synergy, observes Mintzberg, has a dictionary definition of "combined" or cooperative 
action", as between nerves in a body or drugs in chemistry. (1994:44-45) For Ansoff, it 
includes any "effect which can produce a combined return on the firm's resources 
greater than the sum of its parts". (Quoted in Mintzberg 1994:45). 
"In essence," says Mintzberg, "synergy serves as an attractive label (or perhaps 
measure) for the most basic concept of the design school model, namely fit or 
congruence, the linking of components to gain competitive advantage". (1994:45) He 
quotes Ansoff as saying that the measurement of synergy is similar in many ways to 
what is frequently called "evaluation of strengths and weaknesses". (1994:45) 
The detail of Mintzberg's "decomposition" of the basic model, as represented by Ansoff 
and the later work of George Steiner, need not concern us here. Some of his 
conclusions, however, are relevant. 
"Somehow," says Mintzberg, ''the ostensible object of the whole exercise got lost in the 
exercise": 
The whole planning exercise ... was programmed in great detail [in the models]: 
the delineation of steps, the application of checklists and techniques to each of 
these, the scheduling of this whole thing, everything nicely accounted for. Except 
for one minor detail : strategy formation itself ... Nowhere was anyone told how to 
create strategy. How to collect information, yes. How to evaluate strategy, yes. 
How to implement it, for sure. But not how to create it in the first place. Every 
writer literally talked around that step. (1994:66, italics in original) 
He continues: 
When Malmlow, in a 1972 article in the journal Long Range Planning, put boxes 
into his planning chart labeled 'Apprehend Inputs' and 'Add Insights,' he was 
merely presenting the worst example of a problem symptomatic of the entire 
literature: assuming that a phenomenon has been captured, that action will take 
place, simply because it has been labeled in a box on a piece of paper. With all 
that decomposition, there never was any integration. Ansoff's talk of synergy 
notwithstanding, the Humpty Dumpty of planning lay in pieces on its flat surface. 
Of course, this was all to be taken care of in one step, called formulating strategy. 
But they forgot to specify that step- no decomposition, no articulation, no 
rationalization , indeed, no description! (1994:66) 
The key to understanding planning, for Mintzberg, is formalization: 
What to us captures the notion of planning above all - most clearly distinguishes 
its literature and differentiates its practice from other processes - is its emphasis 
on formalization, the systemization of the phenomenon to which planning is 
meant to apply .... 
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Formalization here would seem to mean three things, especially (a) to 
decompose, (b) to articulate, and especially (c) to rationalize the processes by 
which decisions are made and integrated in organizations. 
An emphasis on formal rationality permeates the literature of planning. (1994:12-
13) 
For Mintzberg, the process of planning is analytical and reductionist: 
Rationality of this formal kind is, of course, rooted in analysis, not synthesis. 
Above all, planning is characterised by the decompositional nature of analysis-
reducing states and processes to their component parts. Thus the process is 
formally reductionist in nature. This may seem curious, given that the intention of 
planning is to integrate decisions. But the performance of planning has been 
curious too and for this very reason .... Here, in any event, we seek to 
characterize planning by the nature of its process, not by its intended results. In 
fact, the key, if implicit, assumption underlying strategic planning is that analysis 
will produce synthesis: decomposition of the process of strategy making into a 
series of articulated steps, each to be carried out as specified in sequence, will 
produce integrated strategies. This, in fact and not incidentally, is the old 
"machine" assumption, the one that underlies the design of the manufacturing 
assembly line - itself a kind of machine of human steps. If every component is 
produced by the machine as specified and assembled in the order prescribed, an 
integrated product will appear at the end of the line. Indeed, ... this analogy 
underlies some of the most important thinking in the field of planning, and has 
proved to be patently false. Organizational strategies cannot be created by the 
logic used to assemble automobiles. 
Along with rationality and decomposition, articulation is the third key component 
of formalization. The product of planning - the plans themselves - after being 
carefully decomposed into strategies and substrategies, programs, budgets, and 
objectives, must be clearly and explicitly labeled- by words and, preferably, 
numbers on sheets of paper. (1994:13-14) 
Mintzberg claims that the definition he proposes "is, by virtue of planners' own 
behaviors, closest to the one that planning has created for itself, and, indeed, has 
chosen for itself, however implicitly." (1994:14) 
Obviously, formalization is a relative, not an absolute, term. And obviously, 
planners carry out a range of activities, some more, some less formal. But as a 
process, we argue here that planning sits towards the formal end of the 
continuum of organizational behavior .... It must be seen, not as decision making, 
not as strategy making, and certainly not as management, or as the preferred 
way of doing any of these things, but simply as the effort to formalize parts of 
them- through decomposition, articulation, and rationalization. (1994:15) 
Referring back briefly to the discussion of Theory X and Theory Y, one sees in this 
account of conventional strategic planning the operation of a Theory X-like approach. 
The answer to producing plans and getting everyone to follow them is the establishment 
of a lock-step procedure- effectively a Fordist assembly line of planning and 
implementation -which is consistent with the Theory X assumption (to take one 
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example) that "the average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all". (McGregor, in 
Pugh (Ed.) 1984:318) 
And anticipating for a moment the argument advanced in Chapter Four, one can clearly 
see the assembly line at work in the University of Natal's "Planning Cycle and Process", 
a flow chart which accompanied the December 1991 Report of the Vice-Chancellor's 
Review (University of Natal 4, 1991 ), reproduced here as Appendix 1. 
3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
The shift at the University of Natal which distinguishes the first phase or sub-unit of the 
case study from the second is, it is submitted, largely a shift from a more or Jess 
conventional strategic planning discourse to talk of a learning organization, as 
popularised by Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline (1994) . As will be seen in Chapter 
Five, the notion of the University becoming a learning organization was rather abruptly 
introduced as one of the institution's "strategic initiatives" in 1994, after the University 
had persevered for a number of years with a conventional strategic planning process. 
The notion of organizational learning, however, is not without its antecedents. One 
important antecedent is to be found in notions of "single-loop· and "double-loop 
learning" in organizations, as developed by Argyris and Schon. 
In a recent update of their 1978 Organizational Learning, Argyris and SchOn note that 
Senge's approach to organizational learning "combines the methodology of systems 
dynamics with certain ideas adapted from our theory-of-action perspective, notably an 
awareness of the importance of the 'mental models' held by organizational practitioners, 
including those that constrain or facilitate reliable inquiry into organizational processes: 
(1996:184) "Senge's treatment of the subject," they say, "unites systems thinking with 
organizational adaptation and with the realization of human potential in a mixture that 
has a distinctly Utopian flavor." (1996:184) 
It is not necessary to take a position here on the flavour of The Fifth Discipline, nor to 
address the skeptical challenges to the very notion of organizational learning which 
Argyris and Schon themselves refer to. The purpose here is to provide a fairly typical 
account of organizational learning in general, before turning to Senge's learning 
organization . 
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Taking Argyris and Schon's Organizational Learning (1978) as an example: The authors 
say that organizational learning is "a metaphor whose spelling out requires us to re-
examine the very idea of organization". (1978:29) "Organizations do not literally 
remember, think, or learn. At least," they add, "it is not initially clear how we might go 
about testing whether or not they do so." (1978:11) 
There are a number of ways of looking at an organization, the authors say. With regard 
to the sense in which an organization may be said to act, an organization may be a 
government or polis, an agency, or a task system. (1978:12) 
This seems fairly straightforward. A mob or collection of people is not an organization; 
but if the people devise procedures for "making decisions in the name of the 
collectivity", for "delegating to individuals the authority to act for the collectivity", and for 
"setting boundaries between the collectivity and the rest of the world", they become an 
"organizational 'we' that can decide and act", a polis or political entity. (1978:13) "So 
long as there is continuity in the rules which govern the behavior of individuals, the 
organization will persist, even though members may come and go"; and even though 
the rules may remain tacit. (1978:13) 
As an agency, the collection of people becomes "an instrument for continuing collective 
action". "Such agencies have functions to fulfill, work to do." (1978:14) Because an 
agency's work is generally complex and on-going, the agency "embodies a strategy for 
decomposing that complex task into simpler components which are regularly delegated 
to individuals. Organizational roles - president, lathe-operator, shop steward - are the 
names given to the clusters of component tasks which the agency has decided to 
delegate to individual members. The organization's task system, its pattern of 
interconnected roles, is at once a design for work and a division of labor." (1978:14) 
This notion of ''task system" as a pattern of interconnected roles is familiar, being 
arguably very close to Mintzberg's notion of organizational structure as the division of 
labour into distinct tasks and their coordination. 
What is not familiar, or straightforward, is the treatment which Argyris and Schon give 
to the organization in the sense that it may be said to know something and to learn. As 
such, they say, an organization is "a theory of action"; "a cognitive enterprise 
undertaken by individual members"; and "a cognitive artifact made up of individual 
images and public maps". (1978:12) 
Taking the example of a sugar-refining company, they say that the company's way of 
growing cane reflects certain strategies, norms and assumptions which , embedded in 
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the company's cane-growing practices, constitute its theory of action for cane-growing. 
Taken together with comparable theories of action implicit in the company's ways of 
distributing and marketing its products, these component theories of action represent an 
"instrumental" theory of action for achieving corporate objectives. (1978:14) 
The company's instrumental theory of action is a complex system of norms, 
strategies, and assumptions. It includes in its scope the organization's patterns of 
communication and control, its ways of allocating resources to goals, and its 
provisions for self maintenance .... 
Like the rules for collective decision and action, organizational theories of action 
need not be explicit. Indeed, formal corporate documents such as organization 
charts, policy statements, and job descriptions often reflect a theory of action (the 
espoused theory) which conflicts with the organization's theory-in-use (the theory 
of action constructed from observation of actual behavior) - and the theory-in-use 
is often tacit. Organizational theory-in-use may remain tacit .. . because its 
incongruity with espoused theory is undiscussab/e. Or it may remain tacit 
because individual members of the organization know more than they can say -
because the theory-in-use is inaccessible to them. Whatever the reason for 
tacitness, the largely tacit theory-in-use accounts for organizational identity and 
continuity. (1978: 15) 
Taking the US Army as an example, Argyris and Schon say that in a period of 50 years 
or so, its personnel might have turned over completely and its uniforms and weapons 
might have changed entirely. So in what sense can it be said to be the same 
organization? The answer would lie in studying the evolution of the Army's theory-in-
use, its norms for military behavior, strategies for military action, and assumptions 
about military functioning. (1978: 15) 
It is this theory-in-use, an apparently abstract thing, which is most distinctively 
real about the Army. It is what old soldiers know and new ones learn through a 
continuing process of socialization. And it is the history of change in theory-in-use 
which we would need to consult in order to inquire into the Army's organizational 
learning. 
In order to discover an organization's theory-in-use, we must examine its 
practice, that is, the continuing performance of its task system as exhibited in the 
rule-governed behavior of its members. (1978:16) 
Argyris and Schon argue: 
Each member of the organization constructs his or her own representation, or 
image, of the theory-in-use of the whole. That picture is always incomplete. The 
organization members strive continually to complete it, and to understand 
themselves in the context of the organization. They try to describe themselves 
and their own performance insofar as they interact with others. As conditions 
change, they test and modify that description. Moreover, others are continually 
engaged in similar inquiry. It is this continual, concerted meshing of individual 
images of self and others, of one's own activity in the context of collective 
interaction, which constitutes an organization's knowledge of its theory-in-use. 
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An organization is like an organism each of whose cells contains a particular, 
partial, changing image of itself in relation to the whole. And like such an 
organism, the organization's practice stems from those very images. 
Organization is an artifact of individual ways of representing organization. 
Hence, our inquiry into organizational learning must concern itself not with static 
entities called organizations, but with an active process of organizing which is, at 
root, a cognitive enterprise. Individual members are continually engaged in 
attempting to know the organization, and to know themselves in the context of the 
organization. At the same time, their continuing efforts to know and to test their 
knowledge represent the object of their inquiry. Organizing is a reflexive inquiry. 
(1978:16-17) 
There seem to be too many jumps in this chain of argument, with no empirical evidence 
for a safety net, and too many terms which are not immediately clear. For example, 
Argyris and Schon talk as though all members of an organization participate almost by 
definition in an active and reflective process of some complexity, when in fact most of 
them might be daydreaming. And just where and how does the "continual, concerted 
meshing of individual images of self and others" take place? 
And when they turn to organizational maps as "public representations of organizational 
theory-in-use", and conclude that "organizational theory-in-use, continually constructed 
through individual inquiry, is encoded in private images and in public maps" (1978:17), 
one is left to wonder how these organizational maps are to be distinguished from the 
"formal corporate documents such as organization charts, policy statements, and job 
descriptions" which, we are told, "often reflect a theory of action (the espoused theory) 
which conflicts with the organization's theory-in-use". (1978:15) 
However, suspending these reservations for the moment, it may be useful to agree that 
organizations are active, largely cognitive undertakings, rather than static and given, 
and to consider the kinds of learning which Argyris and Schon see as occurring within 
organizations. 
Their basic distinction is between "single-loop" and "double-loop" learning. In single-loop 
learning, there is "a single feedback loop which connects detected outcomes of action to 
organizational strategies and assumptions which are modified so as to keep 
organizational performance within the range set by organizational norms. The norms 
themselves ... remain unchanged." (1978:18-19) 
Just as individuals are the agents of organizational action, so they are the agents 
for organizational/earning. Organizational learning occurs when individuals, 
acting from their images and maps, detect a match or mismatch of outcome to 
expectation which confirms or disconfirms organizational theory-in-use ... 
But in order for organizational learning to occur, learning agents' discoveries, 
inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory. They 
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must be encoded in the individual images and the shared maps of organizational 
theory-in-use from which individual members will subsequently act. If this 
encoding does not occur, individuals will have learned but the organization will 
not have done so. (1978:19, original emphasis.) 
"Single-loop learning," the authors say, "is sufficient where error correction can. proceed 
by changing organizational strategies and assumptions within a constant framework of 
norms for performance. It is concerned primarily with effectiveness .... In some cases, 
however, error correction requires an organizational learning cycle in which 
organizational norms themselves are modified." (1978:20-21) 
In such double-loop learning, there is "a double feedback loop [which] connects the 
detection of error not only to strategies and assumptions for effective performance but 
to the very norms which define effective performance." (1978:22) 
"In organizational double-loop learning, incompatible requirements in organizational 
theory-in-use are characteristically expressed through a conflict among members and 
groups within the organization .... Double-loop learning, if it occurs, will consist of the 
process of inquiry by which these groups of managers confront and resolve their 
conflict." (1978:22-23) 
Where the groups settle a conflict by fighting it out rather than by inquiry, the conflict 
may be settled for the time being, "but not by a process that could be appropriately 
described as learning". (1978:23) 
We will give the name 'double-loop learning' to those sorts of organizational 
inquiry which resolve incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities 
and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with 
associated strategies and assumptions. (1978:24, original emphasis.) 
In these cases, individual members resolve the interpersonal and intergroup 
conflicts which express incompatible requirements by creating new 
understandings of the conflicting requirements, their sources, conditions, and 
consequences - understandings which then become embedded in the images 
and maps of organization. (1978:24) 
Argyris and Schon make three observations on single-loop and double-loop learning: 
First, it is often impossible, in the real-world context of organizational life, to find 
inquiry clearly separated from the uses of power. Inquiry and power-play are often 
combined .... 
Second ... Organizations may learn more or less well, yet their inquiries may still 
qualify as learning of the single- or double-loop kind. 
Finally, ... the distinction between single- and double-loop learning is less a binary 
one than might first appear. (1978:24-25) 
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They also say: "It is possible, we think, to make clear distinctions between relatively 
deep and relatively peripheral examples of organizational learning." (1978:26) 
Beyond single-loop and double-loop learning, however, Argyris and Schon introduce the 
notion of "deutero-leaming" or second-order learning, somewhat incongruously 
introduced for a work on organizational learning by an example on the training of a 
porpoise: 
When an organization engages in deutero-learning, its members learn, too, about 
previous contexts for learning. They reflect on and inquire into previous contexts 
for learning. They reflect on and inquire into previous episodes of organizational 
learning, or failure to learn. They discover what they did that facilitated or 
inhibited learning, they invent new strategies for learning, they produce these 
strategies, and they evaluate and generalize what they have produced. The 
results become encoded in individual images and maps and are reflected in 
organizational learning practice. (1978:27) 
Organizations, they say, are not only theories of action: 
They are also small societies composed of persons who occupy roles in the task 
system. What we have called the internal environment of an organization is the 
society of persons who make up the organization at any given time. These 
societies have their own characteristic behavioral worlds .... These behavioral 
worlds, with their characteristic models of individual theory-in-use, may be more 
or less conducive to the kinds of collaborative inquiry required for organizational 
learning. 
Hence, if we wish to learn more about the conditions that facilitate or inhibit 
organizational learning, we must explore the ways in which the behavioral worlds 
of organizations affect the capacity for inquiry into organizational theory-in-use. 
(1978:28) 
For purposes of the present case study, the importance of the work of Argyris and 
Schon lies not so much in the detail of the various kinds of learning which they discuss, 
but more in the emphasis they place on the organisation as an active, cognitive 
enterprise and the consequent stress which they place upon learning within 
organizations. It is Senge's idea of the "learning organization", incorporating as it does 
some aspects of Argyris and Schon's theory-of-action perspective, which is of more 
direct concern in Chapter Five when the University of Natal's new strategic initiative to 
become a learning organization is discussed. 
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3.6 THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
Turning now to Senge's views, it is possible to see in his account of the learning 
organization a number of the features alluded to in the discussion thus far. For 
example, whether "Utopian" or not, Senge is clearly more inclined to McGregor's Theory 
Y than to Theory X; and elements of Argyris and SchOn's theory-of-action perspective 
and double-loop learning are apparent. 
"The central message of The Fifth Discipline," says Senge, "is more radical than 'radical 
organizational redesign' - namely that our organizations work the way they work, 
ultimately, because of how we think and how we interact. Only by changing how we 
think can we change deeply embedded policies and practices. Only by changing how 
we interact can shared visions, shared understandings, and new capacities for 
coordinated action be established." (1994:xiv) 
From a very early age, Senge says, "we are taught to break apart problems, to fragment 
the world. This apparently makes complex tasks and subjects more manageable, but we 
pay a hidden, enormous price. We can no longer see the consequences of our actions; 
we lose our intrinsic sense of connection to a larger whole." (1994:3) 
The "tools and ideas" he presents "are for destroying the illusion that the world is 
created of separate, unrelated forces. When we give up this illusion- we can then build 
'learning organizations,' organizations where people continually expand their capacity to 
create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are 
nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together." (1994:3) 
Turning to leadership, Senge says: 
It is no longer sufficient to have one person learning for the organization, a Ford 
or a Sloan or a Watson. It's just not possible any longer to 'figure it out' from the 
top, and have everyone else following the orders of the 'grand strategist.' The 
organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that 
discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an 
organization. (1994:4) 
The key to the learning organization, for Senge, is "systems thinking", which he 
designates the "fifth discipline" and from which he takes the title of his book. It is the 
fifth discipline, he says, because "it is the discipline that integrates the disciplines, 
fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice." And it is vital, he says, that 
"the five disciplines develop as an ensemble" for although integrating the disciplines is 
more difficult than applying them separately, "the payoffs are immense". (1994:12) The 
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other disciplines are personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team learning and 
dialogue. 
Systems Thinking. Businesses and other human endeavours, says Senge, are 
systems, "bound by invisible fabrics of interrelated actions, which often may take years 
to fully play out their effects on each other. Since we are part of that lacework 
ourselves, it's doubly hard to see the whole pattern of change. Instead, we tend to focus 
on snapshots of isolated parts of the system, and wonder why our deepest problems 
never seem to get solved. Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, a body of 
knowledge and tools that has been developed over the past fifty years, to make the full 
patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change them effectively." (1994:7) 
Personal Mastery. People with a high level of personal mastery, says Senge, "are able 
to consistently realize the results that matter most deeply to them - in effect, they 
approach their life as an artist would approach a work of art. They do that by becoming 
committed to their own lifelong learning." (1994:7) 
Personal mastery is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our 
personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing 
reality objectively. As such, it is an essential cornerstone of the learning 
organization -the learning organization's spiritual foundation. An organization's 
commitment to and capacity for learning can be no greater than that of its 
members. (1994:7) 
Mental Models. '"Mental models"', says Senge, "are deeply engrained assumptions, 
generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world 
and how we take action. Very often, we are not consciously aware of our mental models 
or the effects they have on our behavior." The success of Royal Dutch/Shell in 
"managing through the dramatic changes and unpredictability of the world oil business 
in the 1970s and 1980s came in large measure from learning how to surface and 
challenge manager's mental models." (1994:8) 
Senge quotes Arie de Geus, onetime Coordinator of Group Planning for Shell, as saying 
that continuous adaptation and growth in a changing business environment depend on 
"institutional learning, which is the process whereby management teams change their 
shared mental models of the company, their markets, and their competitors. For this 
reason, we think of planning as learning and or corporate planning as institutional 
learning." (Quoted in Senge, 1994:8-9) 
Says Senge: 
The discipline of working with mental models starts with turning the mirror inward: 
learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface 
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and hold them rigorously to scrutiny. It also includes the ability to carry on 
'leamingful' conversations that balance inquiry and advocacy, where people 
expose their own thinking effectively and make that thinking open to the influence 
of others. (1994:9) 
Building Shared Vision. "When there is a genuine vision," says Senge, "(as opposed 
to the all-too-familiar 'vision statement'), people excel and learn, not because they are 
told to, but because they want to. But many leaders have personal visions that never 
get translated into shared visions that galvanize an organization .... What has been 
lacking is a discipline for translating individual vision in~o shared vision - not a 
'cookbook' but a set of principles and guiding practices. 
"The practice of shared vision involves the skills of unearthing shared 'pictures of the 
future' that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than compliance." 
(1994:9) 
Team Learning. Senge says that team learning is vital "because teams, not individuals, 
are the fundamental learning units in modern organizations. This is where 'the rubber 
meets the road'; unless teams can learn, the organization cannot learn." (1994:10) 
Team learning starts with "dialogue", which Senge calls the "capacity of members of a 
team to suspend assumptions and enter into a genuine 'thinking together'." 
The discipline of dialogue also involves learning how to recognize the patterns of 
interaction in teams that undermine learning. The patterns of interaction in teams 
are often deeply engrained in how a team operates. If unrecognized, they 
undermine learning. If recognized and surfaced creatively, they can actually 
accelerate learning. (1994:1 0) 
Returning to systems thinking, Senge says it "makes understandable the subtlest aspect 
of the learning organization -the new way individuals perceive themselves and their 
world. At the heart of a learning organization is a shift of mind -from seeing ourselves 
as separate from the world to connected to the world, from seeing problems as caused 
by someone or something 'out there' to seeing how our own actions create the problems 
we experience. A learning organization is a place where people are continually 
discovering how they create their reality. And how they can change it." (1994:12-13) 
Senge uses the term "metanoia" for this shift of mind. 
"This, then, is the basic meaning of a 'learning organization'- an organization that is 
continually expanding its capacity to create its future." (1994:14) 
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Senge identifies seven "learning disabilities" of organizations, to which, he says, the five 
disciplines can act as "antidotes": 
"I am my position" 
"The enemy is out there" 
The illusion of taking charge 
The fixation on events 
The parable of the boiled frog (maladaptation to gradually building threats to 
survival) 
The delusion of learning from experience 
The myth of the management team 
(1994:18-26) 
The "beer game" is introduced as a "laboratory experiment", involving a 
production/distribution system, to show the learning disabilities in action. (1994:27) 
Senge adduces three lessons from the beer game: 
1. Structure influences behavior. 
2. Structure in human systems is subtle. 
3. Leverage often comes from new ways of thinking. 
Says Senge: 
When placed in the same system people, however different, tend to produce 
similar results. 
The systems perspective tells us that we must look beyond individual mistakes or 
bad luck to understand important problems. We must look beyond personalities 
and events. We must look into the underlying structures which shape individual 
actions and create the conditions where types of events become likely. (1994:42) 
He adds: 
The term 'structure,' as used here, does not mean the 'logical structure' of a 
carefully developed argument or the reporting 'structure' as shown by an 
organizational chart. Rather, 'systemic structure' is concerned with the key 
interrelationships that influence behavior over time. These are not 
interrelationships between people, but among key variables, such as population, 
natural resources, and food production in a developing country; or engineers' 
product ideas and technical and managerial know-how in a high-tech company .... 
But it is very important to understand that when we use the term 'systemic 
structure' we do not just mean structure outside the individual. The nature of 
structure in human systems is subtle because we are part of the structure. This 
means that we often have the power to alter structures within which we are 
operating. (1994:44) 
Success in the beer game is possible, Senge says, but "it requires a shift of view for 
most players. It means getting to the heart of the fundamental mismatches between 
common ways of thinking about the game - what we will later call our 'mental models' 
of it- and the actual reality of how the game works. Most players see their job as 
'managing their position' in isolation from the rest of the system. What is required is to 
see how their position interacts with the larger system." (1994:48) 
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Senge argues: 
The systems perspective shows that there are multiple levels of explanation in 
any complex situation ... . But their usefulness is quite different. Event 
explanations- 'who did what to whom' - doom their holders to a reactive 
stance .... 
Pattern of behavior explanations focus on seeing longer-tenn trends and 
assessing their implications .. .. 
The third level of explanation, the 'structural' explanation, is the least common 
and most powerful. It focuses on answering the question, 'What causes the 
patterns of behavior?' ... 
The reason that structural explanations are so important is that only they address 
the underlying causes of behavior at a level that patterns of behavior can be 
changed. Structure produces behavior, and changing underlying structures can 
produce different patterns of behavior. In this sense, structural explanations are 
inherently generative. Moreover, since structure in human systems includes the 
'operating policies' of the decision makers in the system, redesigning our own 
decision making redesigns the system structure. (1994:52-53) 
Although much more could be written to reflect the "flavour" of The Fifth Discipline, it is 
submitted that there is enough in the above account of Argyris and Schon on single-
and double-loop learning and Senge on systems thinking and mental models to provide 
sufficient background for the later discussion (Chapter Five) of the second sub-unit of 
the case study, viz. the learning organization. 
The two sub-units, strategic planning and the learning organization, represent two 
strategies adopted (consciously or otherwise) by the leadership of the University of 
Natal to engineer consensus among the professionals in the operating core of the 
University (as Professional Bureaucracy) with regard to wide-ranging proposals for 
fundamental institutional change. It is the task of the remaining three chapters to 
present and analyse the case which those efforts constitute, beginning with the 
conventional strategic planning phase or sub-unit in Chapter Four. 
Borrowing loosely from Senge's account of different levels of explanation above, it 
might be said that the discussion operates initially (in Chapters Four and Five) at the 
level of "patterns of behaviour", with the case study attempting to understand patterns 
of events and behaviour more or less within the conceptual frameworks of the 
participants or actors. In the final chapter, the discussion is re-contextualised at a more 
"structural" level after the explanatory power of these frameworks runs out of steam. As 
will be seen, the structural framework employed in the recontextualisation in Chapter 
Six is, however, of a more sociological nature than the sort of framework based in 




UNIVERSITY OF NATAL: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE SEARCH FOR 
SPECIFICITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The University of Natal fonnally became an independent University on 15 March 1949, 
but its history goes back to the foundation of the Natal University College in 
Pietennaritzburg in 1910. The time frame of this case study, however, is much more 
limited. It covers a period of roughly 10 years, from 1988 to 1997, with field work at. the 
University being conducted (as mentioned earlier) in January 1996 and September 
1997. 
The time frame is to some extent arbitrary, reflecting a period which was considered 
important- strategically speaking - by those interviewed in the course of the research. 
An argument could be made for any one of a number of other starting points: for 
example, the adoption in 1982 of a Statement of Management Policy for the University 
would be a possibility (University of Natal 1, 1982). But, although reference will be 
made to this document in passing, it does not appear to have played a key role in tenns 
of institutional change. 
The period selected for the case study begins with a financial crisis for the University 
and a report on the crisis, which recommends fundamental (or strategic) organizational 
changes to the University. The period of the study ends with another financial crisis; 
another report on the crisis, which again recommends fundamental change; and the 
beginnings of the institutional response to the latter crisis. 
Although this gives the time frame a neat unity, the overriding factor for the time frame 
selected is that it encompasses the two strategies employed by the University executive 
to bring about institutional change, characterised in earlier chapters as conventional 
strategic planning and learning organization theory. It is the main purpose of the case 
study to illuminate these responses to the challenge of change on the part of the 
University of Natal. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the conventional strategic 
planning unit of the embedded single-case design (following Yin) . 
The main sources for this examination are key documents, including the so-called 
Walker Report of 1988 (University of Natal 2, 1988), the 1989 Mission Statement and 
its supporting document (University of Natal 3, 1989), the Vice-Chancellor's Review of 
1991 (University of Natal 4, 1991) and later related documents; interviews conducted 
with the present Vice-Chancellor, Professor Brenda Gourley, and others at the 
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University of Natal in January 1996 and September 1997; and interviews conducted 
with former office bearers such as Professor James Leatt and Professor Chris 
Cresswell. 
It is not possible to reflect fully the content of the various documents produced, or to 
provide a blow-by-blow account of how they were drawn up and their effects. The 
intention is to focus on those aspects of the process which relate to the preceding 
discussion around "conventional strategic planning" and the University as an 
organization. In particular, the focus is on strategic planning as a means of overcoming 
resistance to change within the University. 
The argument developed in this chapter is twofold . Firstly, that the search for specificity 
which characterises Professor Gourley's account of the process, and which is reflected 
in the documents, is the University of Natal's attempt to realise the "cascade" of ever 
more detailed plans in the conventional strategic planning model. To the extent that this 
process was expected to produce a strategy for the institution, it was unlikely (following 
Mintzberg on conventional strategic planning) to succeed. Secondly, it is argued that 
the model mis-cast the University as a Machine Bureaucratic organization. To the 
extent that the model implied top-down planning and a loss of autonomy for the 
academic staff- the professionals who work in the "operating core" of the University - it 
was likely to meet with resistance. 
4.2 THE WALKER REPORT, 1988 
Perhaps the most prominent engine for change at the University of Natal during the 
period under review has been the financial difficulties it experienced. A key document 
produced in 1988, titled "The Short Term Plan for Academic Departments• but 
commonly referred to as the Walker Report (University of Natal 2, 1988), observed that 
the University was "R8-mill ion short of even meeting those current activities which our 
priorities committees have rated as contractual obligations", and it argued for reductions 
in the staff complement to effect savings of R13-million. (1988:5) The savings would be 
spread across the non-medical academic departments (R7,600,00) , the Medical Faculty 
(R1 , 1 00,000) , and the non-academic departments (R4,300,000). (1988:11-12) 
The report refers to the goal of the University, as stated in the 1982 Mission Statement 
(University of Natal1 , 1982), as being : "To serve the community through excellence in 
teaching , learning, scholarship and research". It says in its introduction: 
Planning towards our goal has, until now, been carried out against a background 
of growth. Decisions could be made on academic criteria without serious 
consideration of financial constraints. This situation has now changed. In a 
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situation of zero or negative growth new activities and the improvement of 
existing activities cannot occur without pruning other activities which no longer 
have high priority. The prudent assumption in the short term is that levels of 
funding will not be significantly different from those of 1988. At these levels, 
given its existing staffing establishment and activities, the University does not 
have enough money to carry out its day-to-day activities. It is thus essential to 
make substantial savings on our staffing budget. (1988:i) 
The focus of the report is on the academic departments. It says: 
This document is a plan for academic departments. It assumes that equivalent 
cuts will be made in the administrative and service departments by looking 
critically at their operations, improving their productivity and ceasing operations 
which are not essential to the proper functioning of the University in its attempt to 
meet its goal. (1988:2) 
As far as the Medical Faculty is concerned, the report says: 
We have had great difficulty in making any recommendations for the medical 
faculty. They have in the past not provided staffing statistics in the same way as 
other faculties and they have now failed to supply a faculty plan. Their staffing is 
extremely expensive with staffing costs amounting to almost 20% of the staffing 
costs of all other academic departments. In the circumstances, we have no 
alternative but to recommend a pro rata cut. (1988:19) 
Implementation of the plan should start from 1 January 1989, the report says. "Where 
departments must shrink, use should be made of natural staff attrition so that the plan is 
implemented over 3 years. Where departments are to be abolished it would, however, 
be advisable to implement this without delay." (1988:21) 
But prior to the start of implementation, a complicated set of "Procedures for Planning" 
were to be followed, because the details of planning within the financial constraints were 
considered an academic affair and "the details of how the targets are to be achieved are 
put firmly within the hands of the faculties themselves". (1988: 12) 
Some closely related faculties will be grouped together for planning purposes. 
The intention is that each faculty or group of faculties will have a review 
committee appointed by UPC [the then University Planning Committee] and a 
planning committee which is either the present faculty planning committee or a 
joint committee in the case of linked faculties. The review committee will interact 
with the faculty planning committees and will consist of a Deputy Vice Chancellor 
and two academic members of UPC. (1988:12) 
Broadly speaking, there was to be an academic evaluation of departments (driven 
mainly by the review committees, consulting with the Deans and assisted by the faculty 
planning committees) and a faculty plan (mainly the responsibility of the faculty 
planning committees) built upon the academic evaluations and other department-
related information. (1988:12-13) 
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Significantly, very little of this plan was implemented. The result of the exercise was not 
departmental cuts, but rather the drawing up of a new Mission Statement. 
Referring to the Walker document in a September 1997 interview, Professor Chris 
Cresswell said it had a lot of common sense, but was hastily put together. "It was almost 
grounded because of inaccurate data that was presented. It wasn't palatable in many 
ways, and the academics soon jumped on it. Nothing was ever implemented, or it was 
done half-cock. The general attitude was: 'Just weather it'." 
This attitude was assisted by the response of the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Peter 
Booysen, who took the view (in Professor Cresswell's account) that one could not go 
about planning with no clear directions on where the institution wanted to go in the next 
five years. This stimulated the Mission Statement -written largely by Professor 
Booysen, Professor Gourley, and Professor Cresswell- which "set major signposts for 
the direction the University would take over the next 1 0 yearsu. 
Professor James Leatt's account of the response to the Walker Report (in an August 
1997 interview) is similar: "The implications of the Walker Report were so difficult to 
handle that in a way he became a scapegoat. People questioned his methodology. They 
found fault with his figures. Walker, who was a Professor of Physics, was left high and 
dry. Instead of doing an audit, the University said: Let's agree on where we want to go." 
The result of the process of agreeing on where the University wanted to go was the 
1989 Mission Statement which, among other things, was premised on continued growth 
for the university, where the basic assumption of the Walker document was that there 
would be zero growth. An account of this turnabout is provided in the next section. 
4.3 THE 1989 MISSION STATEMENT 
"The University of Natal strives to serve all sections of its community through 
excellence in scholarship, teaching, learning, research and development." 
This summary appears at the head of the University's 1989 Mission Statement. (The 
text of the Mission Statement is included here as Appendix 2.) The overall goal of the 
1982 Mission Statement was: "To serve the community through excellence in teaching, 
learning, scholarship and research." (See 1988: i, 2) 
Although there may not seem to be much difference between the two broad 
formulations, there were differences in the detailed objectives, and the document 
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supporting the later Mission Statement, entitled "The Role in Society of the University of 
Natal, 1989 Onwardsa (University of Natal 3, 1989), was clearly critical of the earlier 
attempt. It says: 
In the early 1980's the forerunner of the University Planning Committee, the 
Academic Planning and Policy Committee, prepared a Statement of Management 
Policy for the University in the form of a broadly encompassing statement of 
Goal, a list of nine Objectives, each with an attendant list of Strategies totalling 
73, and a further 43 statements of Action. 
This document, which may for convenience be referred to as "Mission Statement 
1982", was approved by Senate and Council in 1982 and was intended to provide 
the basis for forward planning in the University. On reflection, it is clear that 
Mission Statement 1982 has had very little impact on the planning process and 
has not significantly influenced decisions and actions on current issues. 
There may be a number of reasons why this is so and these may include the fact 
that the Goal is a brief and broad statement of an ideal with no reference to the 
particular circumstances of the University of Natal and the society in which it 
exists. Perhaps, as a consequence, the list of Objectives, Strategies and Actions 
which flow from the Goal tend to be a comprehensive 'wish list' striving towards 
an ideal, rather than a statement of mission which takes into account the social 
and financial circumstances of the day. (University of Natal 3, 1989:1) 
The document notes two factors as the most significant changes in the circumstances of 
the University since 1982: "the allowance of a non-racial student admission policy and 
the imposition of financial constraints". (1989: 1) 
In 1982, it says, "the University of Natal was receiving a full subsidy provision and the 
staff establishment was in a state of expansion" (1989:1). But in the five years 1984-
1988, the university's subsidy entitlement had been cut by 5%, 16%, 15%, 17%, and 
25% respectively. (1989:4) And in 1982, the document reports, "the student population 
was overwhelmingly White as the government controls on admission of other races 
were still being enforced and there was little prospect of any change in that area in the 
foreseeable future". But new legislation in 1983 "relaxed governmental control on 
student admissions". (1989:1) Between 1983 and 1988, there was a 166% increase in 
the number of African enrolments at the University and an 88% increase in the number 
of Indian students, while Coloured students increased by 16% and White students by 
13%. The proportion of African students increased in the period from 5.5% (542 
students) to 11 .3% (1,442 students), while the proportion of White students declined 
from 81% (7,928 students) to 70.3% (8,939 students), as the total number of students 
grew by 30% from 9,800 in 1982 to 12,724 in 1988. (1989:3) 
The document marshals a strong argument, based on national and regional 
demographics and student demand for admission to the country's universities, for a 
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policy of growth with increasing admission of students who were not white. It says; 
The Minister of Education and Culture has decreed that the University of Natal, 
together with other so-called 'White' universities that resort under his ministry, 
should have negligible or very low growth rates .... However, the University is 
unable to accept this basis of planning for the future since it takes no account of 
demographic realities and the demand for education. (1989:5) 
It says the scenarios for university enrolment implied by the government's racially 
based "own affairs" policy are "clearly not practical". It says: 
The only feasible solution is to take a global non-racial view of the future 
provision of university education in South Africa and provide for an annual growth 
of approximately 3,4% in student numbers at all universities in South Africa, with 
each university being expected to provide for all race groups. (1989:8) 
The document calculates that "the universities of the Natai/KwaZulu region should plan 
to provide for an annual increase in student numbers of the order of 6,4% until the year 
2010. If the ratio of 9,1/1000 head of population is to be achieved for each of the race 
groups as presently defined by Government, then the growth of African student 
numbers must continue at a much faster rate than that of other race groups and a 
decline in Indian and White students numbers must take place." (1989:10) It takes a 
somewhat more conservative view, however, arguing for a controlled growth rate of 4% 
per annum for the University of Natal, projecting a total of 28,091 FTEs (Full-time 
Equivalent Students) by the year 2010, in approximate proportions of 67% African, 20% 
White, 10% Indian and 3% Coloured. (1989:11-12) 
Committing the university to an "Equal Opportunities, Affirmative Action" policy, the 
document notes that in terms of this EO/AA policy "the current practice for determining 
student admission to the University on the basis only of performance in the 
matriculation examination is clearly not proper". (1989: 15) It says: 
Every effort must be made to develop other criteria for judging the potential for 
prospective students to succeed at university so that these can be used in 
conjunction with past performance for determining admission to the University. 
In circumstances where students enter the University without the necessary 
educational background to benefit immediately from the experience, irrespective 
of the method of selection, it is necessary for special academic support 
programmes to be developed so that these students can make good their 
educational deficiencies and so be given the best possible opportunity of realising 
their potential for success. These support programmes are of a variety of kinds, 
including intermediate tertiary colleges, bridging courses, back-up tutorial 
courses, extended curricula and additional courses, etc ... . 
The educationally disadvantaged students also come for the most part from 
economically impoverished family circumstances. The need for substantial 
amounts of money is evident to provide alternative methods of instruction, as 
well as to provide bursaries for the rapidly increasing number of these students. 
These funds should be sought from Central Government, who at present do not 
include this activity for subsidy purpose, as well as from the private sector and 
other sources, as it is clear that the University will not be able to meet these 
needs from its own resources. (1989:15) 
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In a section entitled "Structures and Procedures for Policy Implementation", the 
document makes the observation: 
It is one thing to make statements of policy and another to ensure their 
implementation. It is, however, necessary to examine all existing structures and 
procedures in the University to ensure that they are conducive to the 
implementation of the policy and the realisation of goals. Where deficiencies 
exist then either current structures and procedures must be adapted or new ones 
developed. (1989:17) 
This statement, as we shall see in what follows, sets up a fundamental problem with 
which the University has been struggling in the past 10 years. Whatever the policy (or 
strategy) that the institution decides upon, there remains the problem of 
implementation. Here, as in more recent developments at the University, it is clear that 
the examination of "existing structures and procedures in the University to ensure that 
they are conducive to implementation of the policy and the realisation of goals" goes 
beyond what would reasonably be required to meet the immediate problem of balancing 
the books. (At the same time, in the case of the 1989 Mission Statement, it was the 
strategic decision to go for growth which, however logical and politically laudable, set up 
the financial crisis which had to be addressed in 1997 .) 
Looking firstly at "Present Macro-structures and Functions", the 1989 document notes 
that the University of Natal "is a unitary institution consisting of two centres (Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg) including three academic campuses - Howard College and Medical 
School in Durban, and Scottsville in Pietermaritzburg." (1989:17) It argues that there is 
good reason for maintaining the two-centre structure; and the advantage of maintaining 
the unitary nature of the institution at the highest level of Senate and Council "is that the 
three campuses can be developed rationally in relation to one another." (1989:17) But 
below this highest level, it says, "the maximum amount of autonomy of the two centres 
is to be encouraged". (1989:17) 
Consistent with the needs for institutional unity and centre autonomy, full 
encouragement should be given to the maximum possible degree of devolution 
of authority in terms of administrative functions and resource allocation. Greater 
authority and responsibility must be devolved to Centre, Faculty and 
Departmental levels. Clearly, policy will still be determined centrally and the 
resource allocation process will commence centrally. 
Improvement in efficiency of operation is not only a matter of internal 
rationalization and devolution of authority. The case for inter-university 
rationalization is growing in proportion to the reduction of resources. Clearly, a 
considerable opportunity for inter-university rationalization exists amongst the 
three residential universities in Natai/KwaZulu and UN I SA. ... (1989:18) 
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Turning to "Faculty and Departmental Functions and Structures", the document says: 
The present arrangement of 16 faculties (9 in Durban and 7 in Pietermaritzburg) 
and the attendant 110, or so, departments has arisen by a process of evolution 
and elaboration of traditional programmes. The structure (Departments and 
Faculties) has evolved in order to give effect to functions (disciplines, curricula 
and courses). With the advent of serious financial constraints, the University has 
to look critically first at its functions and then its structures. It will have to restrict 
its range of functions to affordable limits. In order to do this rationally, it must 
examine and prioritise all functions so that those it sheds do not include those 
which are academically essential or highly desirable. An academically appropriate 
narrowing of the range of disciplines, a reduction of courses within a discipline 
and a simplification of curriculum options with less undergraduate specialization 
can be achieved and will have to be achieved if the University is to have 
sufficient resources for the functions it wishes to retain, and for the developments 
which its new obligations will demand of it. 
This critical review of new functions may well suggest new structures. New and 
more appropriate department alignments, fewer larger departments reflecting less 
undergraduate specialization, new faculty alignments avoiding, where possible, 
the luxury of small faculties - all these will need to be considered and will flow 
logically from rationalization of function. (1989:18) 
Apart from the significant assumption that certain structural changes will "flow logically 
from rationalization of function", what is proposed would seem to make sense in terms 
of reducing costs. But when the document turns to consideration of "Alternative 
Structures for Alternative Functions", factors which go well beyond rationalization for 
cost-cutting or efficiency purposes are introduced, attached to a notion of inter-
disciplinary programmes which is repeated and becomes more insistent over the 1 0-
year period. The document says: 
As the University develops new programmes (curricula and research) aimed at 
meeting the needs of all sections of our community, so it will need to consider 
alternative structures. Existing structures may not be suited to these new 
programmes because of the essential interdisciplinary nature of the programmes. 
Present curricula by and large reflect a selection of courses arising from 
discipline determined departments. The curricula options have been developed 
with a view to first-world experiences and opportunities. The applications of these 
same disciplines to the needs of other sections of our community requires 
different course emphasis and a far greater degree of interdisciplinarity in 
curriculum structuring. Present structures are not well suited to such 
developments. (1989: 18) 
This could almost be a paraphrase of Mintzberg's observation, quoted in Chapter Three, 
that major innovations and new programmes in Professional Bureaucracies "cut across 
existing specialities" and "require a rearrangement of the pigeonholes". (1979:37 4-375) 
The University's "Role in Society" document continues: 
For instance, perhaps the University should now create four inter-departmental 
and inter-faculty Schools, each with its Board of Studies - a School of 
Educational Development, a School of Developmental Medicine, a School of 
Rural Development, and a School of Urban Development. Each School would 
govern a Bachelors degree of the same name. The membership of each of these 
Schools would be drawn from the staff in a variety of departments and faculties. 
The Boards of Studies would develop the inter-disciplinary undergraduate 
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curricula and co-operative research programmes to address appropriately 
community needs in these areas. Each School should span not only Faculties, 
but also Centres. 
The term 'School' should then be reserved for interdepartmental structures which 
govern and administer a degree programme of their own. The Board of Study of 
a School may report either directly to Senate Executive, as do Boards of Faculty, 
or it may report to Senate Executive through a Board of Faculty. Provision must 
be made for community input into the Board of Study of the School. The existing 
and proposed alternative structures are illustrated diagrammatically in Annexure 
1. (1989:18) (Annexure 1 is included here as Appendix 3.) 
The diagram is significant, as a graphic illustration of a fundamental restructuring of the 
institution which the university executive envisaged at that time. It sets up a duality in 
terms of institutional governance, between the proposed Schools on the one hand and 
the existing Departments and Faculties on the other, with the academic staff (the 
professionals in the operating core of the organization) being distributed between the 
two structures. One might go so far as to say that the dotted lines of the diagram 
represent the academic staff being "interpellated" or "hailed" in two different ways by the 
proposed structure: as serried ranks of professionals grouped together in the various 
Departments, and as dispersed individuals in relation to the Schools. This will be 
returned to later, particularly as the 1997 restructuring proposals go a step further than 
the diagram suggests - effectively proposing to eliminate the academic department as 
a significant administrative entity. For the moment, it should be noted that what the 
1989 Mission Statement document and its diagram propose is a degree of restructuring 
which goes beyond the needs of cost-cutting and efficiency and which (if only implicitly) 
points in the direction of a reduction of the authority of the discipline-based academic 
departments. 
The question to be posed now is this: If the 1989 Mission Statement was the response 
of the institution to the cost-cutting proposals of the Walker Report, what was the 
response to the Mission Statement? 
This is the way Professor Leatt saw it (in an August 1997 interview): 
The 1989 Mission Statement took a long time to negotiate. Very much against the 
stream, it argued for growth. Although Natal University considered itself a 
national university, it said: If you look at the Natal region, the number of 
university places relative to the population is very poor. So, despite fiscal 
stringencies, Peter Booysen and others were arguing for growth. 
Where it came unstuck: Having come up with the Mission Statement, the 
question of how to implement it arose. In my understanding, the University 
spawned something like 80 working committees on how to implement the Mission 
Statement. The upshot was predictable; the thing ran into the sand, it ground to a 
halt. There were too many people burrowing away at different things. The work of 
key University committees ground to a halt as committees waited for each other 
to complete tasks. 
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One of the arguments advanced in the Mission Statement document was that the 
University of Natal should not only grow, but should be about 70% black by the 
year 2010. It came unstuck, as things often do, at the level of implementation. 
The Mission Statement was silent on how the growth was to be paid for. 
Subsidies were being cut. Operating expenses were still way over subsidy, by 
about R20-million. But a lot of people felt: How could you not be in favour of this? 
It was like being against motherhood or apple pie. But they were gravely cynical 
about how to get there. They didn't put their shoulders to the wheel, because they 
couldn 't see how it could be done. 
Professor Gourley, who was Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the time of the 1989 Mission 
Statement, took this view of the process in a January 1996 interview: 
Strategic planning is not something that universities have been involved in 
traditionally. We had very savage budget cuts. As the executive changed, we had 
a group of people who felt strongly that it was important to do strategic planning. 
We thought that we should be involved in strategic planning in a much more 
specific kind of way than we had been before that. 
Wherever the idea originated, we got on with putting together a mission 
statement, which was published in 1989. It was all covered with blood, sweat and 
tears. There was a tremendous amount of consultation. 
The Vice-Chancellor wrote the first draft. We had done consultation before that. 
There were about 67 different inputs. The mission statement says we want to be 
excellent in everything. It talks about research and development, and developing 
the community. 
Having written the mission statement, we fell back with delight and exhaustion. 
We had solved the problem. We had made progress, but we hadn't made it 
easier for people to make specific decisions about specific things. The mission 
statement wasn't specific enough. 
4.4 THE 1991 VICE-CHANCELLOR'S REVIEW 
The response to the 1989 Mission Statement, then , was essentially more planning -as 
contained in the 1991 Vice-Chancellor's Review (University of Natal4, 1991), discussed 
below; and the September 1992 Working Paper (University of Natal 5, 1992), which will 
be examined in the next section. 
The Vice-Chancellor's Review covers an enormous amount of ground, dealing with 
several key issues of the time, and shows evidence of gargantuan tasks having been 
undertaken as part of the process. 
For instance, the review discusses four options for the arrangement of the Durban 
campus, including Medical School , and the Pietermaritzburg campus (status quo, 
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devolution, total autonomy, centralisation) and recommends the option of devolution. 
And in its review of the University's committee system alone, it records that more than 
137 interviews were held and 47 written submissions evaluated, in addition to earlier 
committee reports and accounts of committee structures at several other institutions. 
The detail of the review cannot be reflected here. Of more concern in the present 
context are some of the presuppositions of the review and its approach to planning and 
resource allocation. The argument made here is that the University of Natal followed a 
more-or-less conventional approach to strategic planning, although both Professor 
Gourley and Professor Leatt said that there was no one, explicit, model of strategic 
planning being followed . 
One illuminating pre-supposition is the acceptance by the planners of the conventional 
planning doctrine that structure should follow strategy. (This could be seen as a 
variation of the view found in the 1989 Mission Statement document that structures will 
follow logically from functions.) In Chapter 9, on Implementation and Transition , the 
review states: "Before Phase One of the Review, there was some debate as to whether 
the strategic planning phase should precede rather than follow the consideration of 
structure. The literature demonstrates that 'structure follows strategy', and indeed it is 
self-evident that this must be so." (1991 : 141-142) 
This is illuminating, in that it illustrates how organisations can become mesmerised by 
the models they consciously adopt, or the received wisdom they less consciously accept 
and apply. 
To say that structure must follow strategy is a powerful argument for keeping planners 
in business. But it can surely only be in a situation in which an organisation is being 
planned de novo that such a claim can be seriously made. Where an existing 
organization of any complexity undertakes a strategic planning exercise in media res, 
its history and existing structures must influence the planning debate and frame the 
possibilities open to it. 
By accepting the view that structure must follow strategy, the authors of the review put 
themselves into something of a bind. They effectively apologise for a decision to 
"proceed immediately with the examination of structural matters on the understanding 
that much could be achieved in streamlining the operational functions of the University, 
thereby releasing great energy into the system", although "it must be appreciated that 
the strategic planning exercise in Phase Two could conceivably carry structural 
implications and it would be unfortunate to have to impose two sets of changes on any 
part of the system in a short period of time". (1991 : 142) 
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Yet one of their key recommendations, with implications throughout the system, is 
clearly dictated at least in part by structural considerations: and that is to devolve 
authority to the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses, dictated (once total autonomy 
was excluded) by the simple physical distance between the two centres and the time it 
takes senior administrators to travel back and forth . 
The precedence of this consideration is implicitly acknowledged in Professor Gourley's 
account of the review process: 
The Vice-Chancellor had given notice of his retirement. The new Vice-Chancellor 
was James Leatt, from UCT. He was quite vigorous and eager to get things 
going. 
He recognised the frustration in the executive and the organisation as a whole in 
not coming to grips with a more specific direction. He set in motion the Vice-
Chancellor's Review. We wanted to be more specific about strategies. What do 
words like 'excellence' and 'equity' mean? 
We knew there was an enormous amount of frustration and waste of effort as a 
result of being a three-way campus: Medical School , Maritzburg, and Durban. A 
lot of time was wasted up and down the road. 
One of the first things we decided was to look at how we were governing 
ourselves. Accepted business theory says that structure follows strategy. But we 
knew that we had to have a more devolved structure. We needed to push power 
down to the people. Being highly centralised doesn't encourage initiative. 
In the chapter on Planning and Resource Allocation, the review makes the point that all 
institutions and organisations, including universities, are "involved in planning, whether 
processes and procedures are formalised or not" (1991 :131). It endorses the view of 
Fielden and Lockwood (John Fielden being the overseas consultant who assisted the 
review team) that "planning is the continuous and collective exercise of judgment in the 
taking of decisions affecting the future" (Fielden and Lockwood, 1973:112). 
The review says: 
Because planning is a continuous process, a planning cycle must be defined. For 
the collective exercise of judgment, planning should also be participative at its 
base. Obviously only a few members of the University can be involved in all 
facets of planning, but all members should be involved in some aspects. At the 
very least, each member of staff should be involved in the forward planning of 
the Department or unit to which he or she belongs, while students should be 
afforded the opportunity of giving feedback on courses and thereby having input 
into Departmental course planning. The planning process is essentially 
integrative and includes coordinating financial plans and resource allocation with 
human resource plans (students and staff) and physical and space plans, etc. 
(1991 :132) 
Again, the accepted wisdom ties the process into something of a knot. What does it 
mean, in the context of a complex organisation like the University of Natal, to say that 
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"planning is the continuous and collective exercise of judgment in the taking of 
decisions affecting the future"? 
To be both continuous and collective, in any accepted meaning of those words, is 
clearly impossible. To the extent that it is continuous, the process reduces to that of 
managing the institution. (Compare Mintzberg's discussion of planning as "future 
thinking", or "controlling the future", or "decision making" (1994:7-1 0).) To the extent 
that it is collective, it must either be a non-continuous adjunct to management or a 
continuous attempt by the collective to manage the institution; which latter is not far 
from what the more extreme proponents of transformation would like to see, but which 
would (probably) make the day-to-day management of the institution impossible. 
The inherent contradiction plays itself out in what follows. The planning cycle, to the 
extent that it is defined in the review, is neither continuous nor thoroughly collective. 
(The flow chart setting out an annual Planning Cycle and Process is included here as 
Appendix 1.) Three "interdependent" planning processes are proposed: 
Strategic plans which cover a time horizon of (say) five years and which set 
objectives, goals, and targets to be achieved during that period ... ; 
Operational plans which are the translation of the strategic plan into specific 
action programmes for a two to three year period in implementation of the 
strategic plan; 
Budgetary plans which are the refinement of the operational plan into a fixed 
plan for the year ahead .... (1991 :136) 
These planning processes are linked, in a way which is not made clear, to four planning 
levels. "It is implicit in this planning structure," the review says, "that inputs are made 
from each of the four planning levels into each of the three planning processes. Guide-
lines and assumptions will be agreed at the University level and issued to all levels." 
(1991 :136) 
The four levels are: 
The University level which has the dual function of formulating plans and policy 
and of allocating resources to the University as a whole ... ; 
The Campus level at which plans and policies for a campus are developed 
(within the parameters set at University level) and plans from the Area levels are 
co-ordinated ... ; 
The Area level which consists of Faculties, Schools, and Divisions ... ; 
The Unit level which consists of academic departments and other functional 
entities such as the Audio-Visual Centre, the Multicopy Centre, etc." 
(1991 :135-136) 
Whatever else we have here, we are clearly looking at a "cascade" model of strategic 
planning. Someone at the top is looking out over Durban, taking the longer view and 
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setting the broad parameters, and those lower down are taking progressively shorter 
views and developing ever-more detailed plans as the strategic plan cascades down the 
structure. 
Clearly, also, this is more of an analytical than an integrative process. The strategic 
plan is decomposed into operational plans, which are again decomposed into budgetary 
plans. 
And the process is essentially top-down. The responsibility for University planning, 
policy formulation, and overall resource allocation belongs to the Joint Executive 
Committee (JEC), the review says (1991 :136-137). "This committee ... will allocate the 
required and approved resources to the two campuses· and to the Central Office for their 
operational costs and any special projects approved." (1991 :137) 
It should be noted that this committee is fairly large, at about 20 members (1991 :100), 
and the review states: "The allocation of resources will be based on the operational and 
development plans submitted to the JEC by the Central Office and by the two Campus 
Executive Committees. The preparation of these plans will derive from an interactive 
process between the various planning levels .. . and will require the JEC's approval." 
(1991 :137) 
But the whole cycle (see Appendix 1), begins with the JEC translating the strategic plan 
into operational plans and ends with the JEC revising the strategic and operational 
plans. The top-down nature of the process is clear. 
It is one of the paradoxes of this model of strategic planning that it inherently 
perpetuates one of the difficulties which the review committee explicitly wants to 
remove: the separation, at least conceptually, of planning from the budget. The review 
says that the first problem which only a new planning structure can address is "that the 
present planning process is divorced from the budgeting/resource allocation activity" 
(1991 :133). It adds: "Planning and resource allocation should be considered as the two 
sides of a single coin . It is unwise to try to separate them." (1991 :134) 
But the model still seems to suggest that a significant planning exercise can take place, 
at all levels and through at least two of the processes, without budget constraints pre-
determining the outcome to some extent. 
(This separation of planning from budgets is, incidentally, one of the common problems 
of tertiary education institutions in South Africa. It is one of the problems which the 
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Peninsula Technikon, for instance, is trying to resolve in its own planning and budgeting 
process. One can only speculate on how such a separation could come about: The fact 
that the institutions are (largely) funded rather than entrepreneurial; a divide between 
the planners (mostly academics) and the administration?) 
But the key paradox to note here is that this cascade-type planning programme sits 
uneasily with the avowed intention of devolution. The review says: 
The devolution of autonomy to campuses and Faculties, and the development of 
an integrated and interactive planning and resource allocation process, are 
essential to the well-being of the University and should lead to a high level of 
effectiveness and efficiency, as well as to an ethos of responsibility, decision-
taking, and accountability. (1991 :138) 
But how can an "integrated and interactive planning and resource allocation process" 
which is essentially decompositional and top-down be expected to have such an 
outcome? 
Look again at our starting point here: the implications which follow from the assumption 
that "planning is the continuous and collective exercise of judgment, etc." What 
becomes of "collective"? 
• Although the review says that "planning should also be participative at its 
base", it qualifies this by saying that "obviously only a few members of the 
University can be involved in all facets of planning" (1991 :132). This is clearly 
impossible if taken literally, and must mean that only a few members can be 
involved in the really important parts. 
• "All members should be involved in some aspects": Everybody (staff 
members, that is) can get involved in the less important parts, for example at 
the departmental or unit level. 
• "Students should be afforded the opportunity of giving feedback on courses 
and thereby having input into Departmental course planning": The students 
are allocated a still more tangential role, restricted effectively to commenting 
on their courses- clearly far less than anything they would accept under the 
current climate of transformation. 
The overall picture is that of a top-down plan, cascading down the structure, which, far 
from encouraging "responsibility, decision-making, and accountability", will carry 
everyone along with everything mapped out to such a degree of detail (read 
"specificity") that decision-making will become virtually redundant. 
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4.5 THE WORKING PAPER: SEPTEMBER 1992 
This is how Professor Gourley saw the consequences of the 1991 Vice-Chancellor's 
Review, in a January 1996 interview: 
The report came out in December 1991. It had to go through Senate and Council. 
So we got cracking towards the second half of 1992 and in 1993. 
We made a number of fundamental changes. We created a highly decentralised 
structure. We pushed as much authority down as we could. 
In the Senate House structure (or central office) we kept Finance, Public Affairs, 
Fund Raising, the Management lnfonnation Service, Research Office, Data 
Bases, Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, etc. 
We left very few committees at the top. We cut out something like 37 committees 
and created 12 new ones, with a nett loss of 25 committees. We also cut down on 
the number of people in committees. 
This was a major change in the way the organisation operated. 
Another objective was to cut down on the time it took to make decisions. A 
proposal would go through all the committees. It would take forever. We made it 
possible to get decisions made a lot quicker. 
Up to that time, virtually all the committees were composed of Academic 
members of staff. Other staff might attend meetings, without a vote. We said that 
was not acceptable. All members of staff should be part of the discussion, and 
able to elect people on to the various committees. 
This was a fundamental change in ethos. 
We had students on Senate and Council a long time ago. Where they wanted to 
be, they were there. This was fonnalised and extended, so that they could be on 
all committees. 
Professor Gourley continued: "Then the next part: we wanted to take the mission 
statement and tum it into more of a working document: something that people could do 
something with. We appointed a group of people and gave them tasks. They wrote 
position papers on things we thought were important. 'Quality and Equity': What are 
they? And a pretty standard thing about strengths and weaknesses." 
The result of this exercise, the 1992 Working Paper (University of Natal 5, 1992), sub-
titled Choosing a Focus, is an odd document. It's oddity derives mainly from a feature 
which will be familiar to many of those who have been involved in strategic planning at 
some time or another: it is presented as "a working paper'' (1992: Preface), not in the 
sense of something that people can "do something with" but in the sense of a draft 
intended for wide consultation, but it effectively decides many of the issues which it 
raises for debate. 
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The document, readers are told on page 1, "is by no means a final product and should 
be seen as only a draft for discussion within the community and every page is labelled 
as such" (1992:1, original emphasis) . 
Yet, to take one example, Chapter 8 discusses three possible strategies for the future 
(Haven of Excellence, Mass University Education, and Quality with Equity) and 
concludes: 
The sections which follow work through the implications of a new strategy on the 
University's Mission Statement and suggest how the rest of the planning process 
would work. In order to do this it has been necessary to make an assumption as 
to which of the three possible strategies is selected. For these purposes only the 
Quality with Equity strategy has been used. Whichever strategy is ultimately 
chosen by the University, the development of goals and objectives and 
subsequent planning process will be similar'' (1992:47, original emphasis). 
In fact, some key decisions such as devolution, with widespread implications for the 
institution, were already being implemented following the December 1991 Vice-
Chancellor's Review. But the working paper says repeatedly that the strategic plan is 
not yet in place. For example, Chapter 10, on Completing the Strategic Plan, opens with 
the statement: "Once Senate and Council have decided on the broad strategy for the 
University, the business of planning can begin in earnest" (1992:52). 
A second example: Chapter 6 is entitled "Changes Needed Whatever the Strategy". 
The Working Paper says: "The University now has to make changes for these two sets 
of reasons: the qualitative and the financial. Whatever strategy it selects from those 
outlined in section 8, there are some fundamental developments that must take place." 
(1992:29) 
These "fundamental developments", each dealt with in some detail, include the 
implementation of equal opportunities policies for staff and students, efficiency savings 
in administration, academic rationalisation, management of people, generating income 
and fostering academic entrepreneurs, democratisation of the University's governance, 
regional collaboration, and international links and markets. (1992:29-34) 
The question is: If that does not already constitute a strategy, what does? 
In a revealing comment in an August 1997 interview, Professor Leatt said: "The 
Registrar was beside himself. He never knew whether he should be implementing the 
December 91 report or contributing to the new strategic plan." 
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The submission here is that this indicates something more than a lack of clarity over 
priorities. It is indicative of the confusion which must arise when a plan is being 
implemented while the plan is still awaited. 
But the bind into which the "postponed plan" puts the planners (anticipated of course in 
the treatment of "strategy before structure" in the 1991 Review) is perhaps best 
illustrated in the section on democratisation of the University's governance. 
The Working Paper says: 
It is very important that discussions on participatory structures do not neglect the 
basics of good management practice. The consequences of many similar 
discussions in universities in the USA and the UK in the 1960s/1970s were that 
decision processes became too elongated and tortuous, large committees were 
expected to arrive at technical decisions and there was a great reluctance to trust 
individuals to do anything. The main objective of Phase 1 of the VCR was to 
eliminate the vestiges of such practices from the University. It would be a tragedy 
if they were to be reintroduced. A way must be found of giving stakeholders a 
proper role in decision-making without strangling the system again. (1992:33) 
The danger perceived by the authors is that the postponed plan, in having to deal with 
the now stronger transformational demands of the students who "would seek to question 
the powers of Council, Senate, Faculties, etc" (1992:33), might conflict with the existing 
plan then being implemented. Or to put it another way, they are saying that strategy 
must not be allowed to dictate to (the new) structure. 
It is not being suggested here that this sort of contradiction is an indication of bad faith 
on the part of the University leadership, although the document would more than likely 
have been seen by its readers at the University as another indication of a top-down 
approach to planning. 
But the problem is not unique to the University of Natal. Every institution which embarks 
on a planning process is faced with the dilemma between leadership and participation. 
What is the CEO's prerogative? How can the commitment of the rank and file members 
of the organisation be secured, if every new suggestion or movement is seen as 
another management imposition? 
It is rather the fundamental assumption of strategic planning which Mintzberg has 
identified that seems to dog the entire process at Natal, as it does elsewhere: the 
assumption that analysis will produce synthesis. Along with such subsidiary assumptions 
as "structure follows strategy" (University of Natal 4, 1991 :142), or that the rationale of 
strategic planning is "to seize the initiative and to be in control" (University of Natal 5, 
1992:13). 
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There simply is no resting point at which the entire institution can stop and say: "In the 
best of all possible worlds, where would we like to go?" We are already in a particular 
part of a particular world, which is not the best of all possible worlds, and we are already 
moving in a particular direction, and these facts have significant implications for where 
we might want to go. And no amount of analysing the situation is suddenly going to 
reveal the one best strategy: on that route, strategy formation remains a mysterious 
black box, as Mintzberg would have it. 
Where the Working Paper does show significant progress, is in the degree to which it 
brings a greater understanding of the University of Natal itself and of its location in that 
particular part of the world in which it finds itself. 
The Working Paper draws on planning papers written by University staff, on: Mission 
Statement Review; Institutional and Competitor Analysis; Political Scenarios; Student 
Scenarios; Land, Buildings and Equipment; Staff; Learning and Teaching; 
Collaboration; International Links; Income Generation. It also acknowledges a debt to 
the post secondary working party of NEPI (National Education Policy Investigation) 
which was then engaged in a thorough review of national educational needs and 
priorities. (1992:i,2) 
The Working Paper contains a profile of Natal University, comparisons with other 
Universities, tables showing student progress and time to complete, and a central 
position is given to anticipated financial difficulties, based on a projected 25% cut in 
state funding (1992:i, 17) and a possible total annual funding shortfall of R60-million by 
1995 (1992:19). 
The self-reflective nature of the document is indicated, for example, by a paragraph on 
its purpose: 
South Africa is poised for a radical transformation on political, social and 
economic fronts. The University of Natal must also radically transform itself. 
Throughout the world universities have found it very difficult to bring about 
changes in themselves without strong external pressure. They are by nature 
highly conservative institutions with cumbersome decision-making structures 
which resist innovation almost instinctively. The University of Natal is no 
exception and its last decade provides several examples of changes failing to 
happen for one reason or another. As a result many believe that opportunities 
have been lost through the regular adoption of "random misery" as a solution to 
difficult financial constraints. All this has happened despite the adoption of an 
excellent Mission Statement which had widespread acceptance. The missing 
ingredients have been a clear focus derived from all the desirable aspirations in 
the Mission Statement and any strategic objec;tives against which faculties could 
plan. (1992:3) 
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("Random misery" here refers to the practice of reducing expenditure by freezing 
positions wherever vacancies occur in the institution, as opposed to cutting back in 
some areas rather than others according to some policy, set of criteria, or "strategy". 
The Working Paper says that these "equal misery" and random-cuts-by-vacancy-freeze 
solutions are irrational and cut both the weak and the strong. (1992:29)) 
Although remaining loyal to the Mission Statement as a statement of intent, the Working 
Paper recognises in a number of places a failure on the part of the Mission Statement to 
produce significant change in the desired direction. For example, it says: 
The University's Mission Statement 1989 rightly gives enormous prominence to 
the concept of excellence. It highlights the commitment to excellence in 
scholarship, teaching, learning, research and development. 
The Planning Papers have shown that the University is not living up to these 
aspirations in several areas: the quality of teaching (as evidenced by time taken 
to graduate); the uneven performance in research; and the failure to integrate 
development studies into the life of the University. (1992:42) 
In Chapter 9, Reviewing the Mission Statement, the Working Paper considers 
arguments for and against revising the statement, before assuming that the arguments 
against changing it "will find favour with the University community and that the 1989 
Statement is retained for the moment with the possibility of minor amendments in two or 
three year's time." (1992:48) 
Again, it is difficult to see what the missing "clear focus" and "strategic objectives" might 
be, other than the plan being laid out in the Working Paper or a re-worked Mission 
Statement, which re-working was also implicitly being undertaken in the Working Paper 
while it explicitly maintained unswerving allegiance. 
Clearly, as the discussion around equity and quality demonstrates, "excellence" is no 
longer the sole, or even the predominant, aim of the University. 
To take just one telling example: In a brief discussion on the possibility of adopting an 
outright focus on quality, the Working Paper observes: "In the light of financial forecasts 
it is most unlikely that the State would acknowledge the University's special quality 
status with any extra funding ." (1992:42) 
The Working Paper's discussion on "goals" and "objectives", apart from bearing out the 
various ways in which key terms in the planning vocabulary can be defined, really 
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constitutes a re-writing of the Mission Statement, with the goals and strategic objectives 
(assuming of course that the Quality with Equity strategy is adopted) replacing the 1989 
Mission Statement's 12 point statement and 20 page supporting document. 
The proposed goals are: 
The University of Natal has a strategy of Quality with Equity. It dedicates its 
excellence in teaching, research and development to progress through 
reconstruction. It serves South Africa, and the Natal KwaZulu Region in 
particular, by delivering quality teaching which enables students from all 
backgrounds to realise their academic potential and to obtain degrees of a 
continuing international standard. It undertakes quality research to national and 
international standards and provides development services which meet clients' 
needs. (1992:49.) 
And proposed as a "suitable set of strategic objectives", should the University adopt the 
Quality with Equity strategy, are the following : 
The University of Natal will ensure that: 
1. Its courses and curricula are in line with the changing needs of society. 
2. It grows selectively in response to the needs of society, in so far as resources 
allow. 
3. Equal opportunities policies for both staff and students are implemented 
energetically and on the basis of agreed targets. 
4. The quality of teaching and learning activities is promoted and rigorously 
monitored in order to uphold exit standards. 
5. Any research it undertakes achieves national and preferably international 
standards of excellence. 
6. Staff are enabled, and expected, to devote their skills to achieving the 
University's Mission and Goals and are encouraged to be innovative, creative 
and entrepreneurial. 
7. It uses its resources in development and environmental studies to serve the Natal 
KwaZulu Region, South Africa and other African clients. 
8. It works, wherever possible, with other institutions in the Natal KwaZulu Region 
and elsewhere in pursuit of its strategies. 
9. It enables its community to have the widest input into governance that is 
compatible with effective and efficient management. 
10. It develops international and African academic links in order to enrich its basic 
disciplines as well as contributing to the community of scholars. · 
11. It maintains cost-effective academic and support services and a sound 
infrastructure. (1992:49-50) 
The Working Paper says "it is not the purpose of this document to suggest details of the 
programmes by which the University will achieve the above strategic objectives" as 
"that is the role of the various planning processes". (1992:50) But it proceeds to give 
some examples of "how the programmes and performance measures interact with the 
objectives" (1992:50); and then, "in order to illustrate some possibilitiesft, it shows in 
Appendix V (reproduced here as Appendix 4) "some programmes for each of the 10 [in 
fact 11] strategic objectives and then suggests measures for each programme". 
(1992:51) 
So, with the 1989 Mission Statement ostensibly still in place; with key recommendations 
from the 1991 Vice-Chancellor's Review being implemented and re-shaping the 
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institution; with the new strategic plan still awaited; we have a whole new cascade-
from a re-worked Mission Statement (in the form of the proposed goals), through 
objectives, to tentative programmes and measures. 
This new cascade again falls squarely within the more or less conventional model of 
strategic planning. The decomposition and analysis is there. A fair degree of specificity, 
in a Fordist or assembly-line paradigm, had been achieved. The synergy (or overall 
strategy), although to some extent pre-determined and heavily implied, is still awaited. 
The assumption that if everyone follows the steps, everything will work out fine, 
underlies the process. 
4.6 HEARTS AND MINDS 
The argument which has been advanced above is that the conventional strategic 
planning approach of the planners at the University of Natal tied them up in a number of 
knots. For example, their commitment to the notion that strategy should precede 
structure made it difficult for them to acknowledge the strategic implications of structural 
considerations (such as the distance between Pietermaritzburg and Durban requiring a 
degree of devolution). And, worse still, the notion that the cascade of the conventional 
strategic planning process would result, through its analytical process, in the synthesis 
of strategy, meant that the university's strategy was always on hold. Even when key 
strategic decisions had effectively been taken and were to some extent being 
implemented, the strategy was still awaited. And, argues Mintzberg, it was unlikely to 
come out of that process: analysis does not produce synthesis. 
But there is another bind, or contradiction, which needs to be more clearly focused . 
Devolution of authority was one of the avowed aims of the planners; and of course it 
was to some extent implied by structural considerations and the strategy-in-waiting. But 
the process, being essentially top-down, was not consistent with the intention. To put 
this in terms of our earlier discussion of Mintzberg on organizations, a Machine 
Bureaucratic process was being applied in a Professional Bureaucracy. 
The frustration of the University leadership is clear from the documents referred to 
above. Faced with the prospect of ever-deeper government cuts in subsidy and the 
debilitating effects of the "random misery" approach, the leadership was faced with an 
admirable mission statement or set of goals on the one hand, and a lack of meaningful 
change at grassroots level on the other. As we saw above, the Working Paper bewailed 
the highly conservative nature of universities, with their "cumbersome decision-making 
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structures which resist innovation almost instinctively", and added: 
The University of Natal is no exception and its last decade provides several 
examples of changes failing to happen for one reason or another .... The missing 
ingredients have been a clear focus derived from all the desirable aspirations in 
the Mission Statement and any strategic objectives against which faculties could 
plan. (1992:3) 
Professor Gourley, reviewing the process of drawing up the Working Paper in a January 
1996 interview, put it this way: "This clarified our thinking quite substantially. We 
learned a lot in the process. But it was not enough. We were making a clearing in the 
forest. But it wasn't specific enough." And as an aside: "For academics, the less 
specific, the better. So that they can yell at you from the sidelines.· 
At another point in the interview, she observed: "The thing we have come to understand 
about strategy, in a long process of learning the hard way: strategy doesn't mean 
anything unless you have the hearts and minds of the people." 
The frustration of the search for specificity, throughout this process, was the flip-side of 
the frustrating search for strategy. Both are attributable to the implicit strategic planning 
model. The constant analysis did not produce the desired synthesis, so the strategy was 
always (officially) on hold; but it was emerging all the time. To the extent that a strategy 
did emerge - for example in the Mission Statement or the Working Paper's goals, or 
acceptance of the devolution route -the process did not deliver the lock-step outcomes 
implicitly promised by the planning cascade. The broad vision did not result in the 
specific actions at the grassroots required to bring about the desired change. 
The argument here is that it could not reasonably have been expected to do so, 
although the helpfulness of such statements made with hindsight is questionable. The 
cascade model, if it is appropriate at all, is more appropriate to a Machine Bureaucracy 
than to a Professional Bureaucracy. 
Mintzberg says of the Machine Bureaucracy that it is ·a structure with an obsession, 
namely control". (1979:312) In the Machine Bureaucracy, considerable power rests with 
the managers of the strategic apex, both formal power in terms of the hierarchy and 
chain of authority, and informal power in terms of knowledge. "The only ones to share 
any real informal power with the top managers are the analysts of the technostructure, 
by virtue of their role in standardizing everyone else's work.· (1979:322) 
Says Mintzberg: 
Strategy in these structures clearly emanates from the strategic apex, where the 
perspective is broad and the power is focused . The process of strategy making 
is clearly a top-down affair, with heavy emphasis on action planning. In top-
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down strategy making ... all the relevant information is ostensibly sent up to the 
strategic apex, where it is formulated into an integrated strategy. This is then sent 
down the chain of authority for implementation, elaborated first into programs and 
then into activity plans. (1979:323; original emphasis unless otherwise stated.) 
Compare this with Mintzberg's picture of the Professional Bureaucracy, which he 
describes as a Uhighly decentralized structureD! where Ua great deal of the power over 
the operating work rests at the bottom of the structure, with the professionals of the 
operating core. ft The power of the professional uderives from the fact that not only is his 
work too complex to be supervised by managers or standardized by analysts, but also 
that his services are typically in great demand. This gives the professional mobility, 
which enables him to insist on considerable autonomy in his work." (1979:357) "In the 
professional hierarchy, power resides in expertise; one has influence by virtue of one's 
knowledge and skills.ft (1979:360) 
Looking at strategy formulation in Professional Bureaucracies, Mintzberg observes that 
as their outputs are difficult to measure, their goals cannot easily be agreed upon. He 
says: 
So the notion of a strategy - a single, integrated pattern of decisions 
common to the entire organization - loses a good deal of its meaning in the 
Professional Bureaucracy .... 
It would appear that the Professional Bureaucracy's own strategies represent 
the cumulative effect over time of the projects, or strategic "initiatives," 
that its members are able to convince it to undertake -to buy a new piece of 
equipment in a hospital, to establish a new degree program in a university, to 
develop a new specialty department in an accounting firm. Most of these 
initiatives are proposed by members of the operating core - by "professional 
entrepreneurs" willing to expend the efforts needed to negotiate the acceptance 
of new projects through the complex administrative structure .... 
(1979:363,364-365) 
The role of the professional administrator in the formulation of strategy is ufar from 
passive", says Mintzberg, and goes beyond helping the professionals: 
Every good manager seeks to change his organization in his own way, to alter its 
strategies to make it more effective. In the Professional Bureaucracy, this 
translates into a set of strategic initiatives that the administrator himself wishes to 
take. But in these structures- in principle bottom up- the administrator cannot 
impose his will on the professionals of the operating core. Instead, he must rely 
on his informal power, and apply it subtly. Knowing that the professionals want 
nothing more than to be left alone, the administrator moves carefully- in 
incremental steps, each one hardly discernible. In this way, he may achieve over 
time changes that the professionals would have rejected out of hand had they 
been proposed all at once. (1979:365) 
Clearly, the process followed at the University of Natal to this point was more in keeping 
with the Machine Bureaucracy than the Professional Bureaucracy. This is not to say that 
the University of Natal, or any other university for that matter, can practically be 
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characterised as thoroughly and exclusively a Professional Bureaucracy. As Mintzberg 
observes, "real structures in all but the most trivial organizations are enormously 
complex", and far more complex than the five configurations he describes. (1979:468) 
But by and large, the university adheres much more closely to the Professional 
Bureaucracy configuration than to the Machine Bureaucracy. 
Nor does this conclusion imply that the management (the "professional administrators") 
of the university were consciously trying to impose a machine bureaucratic system on 
the Professional Bureaucracy of the University. Far from it. For example, the quotation 
from the Working Paper (above) on the difficulties of innovation in universities shows 
the sensitivity of the planners to the nature of the organization. But the conventional 
strategic planning model which was being applied held the planners in thrall. And that 
model was not appropriate to the Professional Bureaucracy in which it was being 
applied. As such, it is not surprising that it failed to win the hearts and minds of the 
people. 
In the following chapter, we see what is in effect an abandonment on the part of 
Professor Gourley and the University executive of the search for specificity, in favour of 
encouraging "shared vision" on the part of the University community through the 
adoption of the "strategic initiative" of becoming a learning organization. With shared 
vision, the need for a lockstep planning process or cascade would become unnecessary 
(so the theory promises); and, co-incidentally, it might offer a means of bringing about 
consensus on change which was more in keeping with a post-Fordist world and an 
institution in which professionals comprise the operating core. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL: THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION, FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND RESTRUCTURING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the failure of the strategic planning process 
at the University of Natal to promote institutional change was attributable at least in part 
to the nature of the process itself. 
On the one hand, there was the problem of the plan which was always awaited. 
Although some changes were being made and some, like the move towards devolution, 
were clearly strategic in nature, the strategic planning process had yet to deliver an 
explicit strategy. Following Mintzberg, it was argued that the analysis of the strategic 
planning process had failed to produce the desired synthesis, or synergy, and was 
unlikely to do so. 
On the other hand, the supposed "cascade" effect of the planning process had failed to 
bring about significant change, as witnessed by the frustration of the top management in 
their search for more and more specificity. An admirable mission statement had long 
since been adopted, but there was little sign of significant change at grassroots level. 
Looked at from the perspective of organizational structure, it was argued, the University 
was experiencing the difficulties of bringing about change in an organization 
characterised as a Professional Bureaucracy, which is not geared for innovation and in 
which the employees value their autonomy, by means of a process which was more 
suited to a Machine Bureaucracy. 
Relating this to the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, it could be argued that the 
University was applying a method for bringing about fundamental organizational change 
which was premised more on Theory X (on cynical assumptions about human nature) 
than on the more sanguine Theory Y. This in itself would not be problematic, if it 
produced the desired results; but the results were clearly unsatisfactory. 
In terms of the discussion of Argyris and Schon's notions of "single-loop" and "double-
loop" learning, one could characterise the strategic planning approach as one which 
operates essentially at the single-loop level. It might be expected to bring greater 
efficiency to the system, but only within the prevailing paradigm. The questioning of 
presuppositions or "mental models" implied by double-loop learning is largely absent. 
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In Professor Gourley's terms, something more was required to win the hearts and minds 
of the University community. 
What can be seen occurring at the University of Natal, with the introduction of the 
notion of the University becoming a learning organization, is a shift from a Fordist, 
assembly-line approach to institutional change, represented by the more-or-less 
conventional strategic planning model , towards an approach which is more in keeping 
with a world of reflexive modernity. It is this shift towards becoming a learning 
organization which provides the second sub-unit of the case study, in Yin 's terms. 
Given the period of the case study's fieldwork- January 1996 to September 1997 - it 
might be argued that a third sub-unit is required, which focuses on the restructuring 
crisis which preoccupied the University community from at least July 1997 and which is 
likely to continue to preoccupy it for some considerable time. But it is part of the 
argument of this chapter that the restructuring crisis in fact highlights the inherent 
weakness of the learning organization approach to institutional change; and that 
consequently the learning organization and the restructuring crisis are best dealt with as 
one sub-unit of the case study. The difficulty to guard against in so doing, is a tendency 
to focus too much attention on the more recent and more emotionally charged 
restructuring crisis at the expense of other significant factors. 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, the relatively sudden and ad hoc arrival of 
the learning organization idea at Natal University is noted; the expected and actual role 
of a corps of facilitators as agents of change is examined; a general down-playing of the 
jargon of the learning organization is observed as the University moves towards a 
largely executive process of restructuring; the financial crisis of 1997 is outlined; and 
the restructuring crisis arising from management proposals to meet the financial 
challenge is examined. 
5.2 THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION ARRIVES 
The history of strategic planning at the University of Natal was characterised in various 
ways by observers interviewed in the case study as one of "a failure of 
implementation". Mission statements might be drawn up (1982, 1989), to which 
everyone would nod their assent, but little substantive change would take place. 
As shown in the previous chapter, Professor Gourley saw this as a "lack of specificity" in 
the outcomes of the planning process. Her predecessor, Professor James Leatt, spoke 
in an interview of the repeated failure of the University of Natal to "bite on the bullet" of 
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implementing change. "A critical success factor is the ability to implement," Professor 
Leatt said. "We didn't understand that well. We thought that if you knew what you 
wanted to do, that was almost as good as knowing howto do it.• The head of the 
University's Educational Development Unit in Durban, Janet Frame, said in a 
September 1997 interview that the University had "a singular inability to engage in 
processes that lead us somewhere. We are good at documents. But when it comes to 
trying to get everybody aligned behind the thinking of the University, there is a big gap." 
It was in an effort to bridge this gap that the University leadership introduced the notion 
of becoming a learning organization. 
Reflecting in January 1996 on the continuing search for specificity after the Working 
Paper, Professor Gourley said that a small task group was put together, which she 
convened. "Then the Vice-Chancellor [Professor Leatt] left in March 93. That was a 
disaster. But I had the bit between my teeth and the executive did too. The money was 
getting tougher and tougher. We went into a very self-reflective mode. We did some 
hard thinking and read through the background and position papers." 
The result of this process was an August 1994 document entitled Vice-Chancellors 
Review Phase II: Planning Guidelines 1994-1998 (University of Natal7, 1994). (Much of 
the document is taken up in an undated pamphlet intended for wide dissemination, 
called Strategic Initiatives for the University of Natal (University of Natal 8), and a 
revised version of the pamphlet dated March 1997 (University of Natal 12, 1997).) 
It should be no surprise that the Planning Guidelines 1994-1998 are based largely on 
the Quality with Equity strategy, as this was effectively the strategy-in-waiting. And, as 
Professor Gourley put it in a January 1996 interview: "You would have to be Rip van 
Winkel if you felt you hadn't been able to participate." 
The 1994 Planning Guidelines document says that the strategy was outlined only in 
broad concept in the earlier document: 
Although there was little substantive disagreement with the Choosing a Focus 
document [the Working Paper], the view was expressed that it needed to be 
elaborated upon and the details spelt out to facilitate its translation into concrete 
plans. This is the purpose of this document. It develops the strategy and should 
be read in the context of the existing strengths and structures of the University. 
(University of Natal 7, 1994:2) 
The document says its "core assumption" is the "model of one University with one 
overall set of strategies which are developed and applied in different ways in 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban." (1994:3) Effectively, this is the strategic move of 
devolution, arising out of the 1991 Review. 
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The "driving influence" of the financial situation is ever present, with predictions still of 
"heavy cuts in subsidy income of as much as 25%". Income is said to be already "far 
short of what we need to function as a quality institution". (1994:3) The sense of social 
and political change is perhaps more insistent: "South Africa is experiencing 
momentous change and the social transformations which are taking place have a 
profound effect on universities and other institutions." (1994:3) 
What is surprising in the Planning Guidelines, however, is the introduction of a new 
"strategic initiative", not signalled in the earlier documents. This is the strategic initiative 
to create a "learning organization" along the lines of Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline. 
And accompanying this new departure are some epistemological considerations. Under 
the heading "Challenges and Changes", the Guidelines document discusses a paradigm 
shift, a new Renaissance, a demand for a new kind of graduate, and a new 
environmental awareness as factors which "need to be taken into account in seeking to 
achieve quality in our teaching, research and development paradigms". (1994:5) 
The most significant of these factors, linking as it does to the notion of the learning 
organization, is the paradigm shift from seeing the world as "a disassociated collection 
of parts" to seeing it as an "integrated whole". "The more we study the major problems 
of our time, the more we come to realise that they cannot be understood in isolation. 
They are systemic problems- interconnected and interdependent ... " (1994:5, quoting 
Capra.) 
The Planning Guidelines document says: 
The new paradigm has profound consequences for all institutions, including 
universities. Over the last 300 years, the curriculum has been organised largely in 
terms of disciplines. This division promotes the 'old paradigm', that is, the 
tendency to view the world of nature, life and work as segmented, differentiated 
into parts. Curricula and research design, if they are to recognise the validity of 
the new paradigm, need to be organised in such a way that scholars are produced 
who go beyond the isolated facts, who make connections across disciplines, who 
help shape a more coherent view of knowledge and a more integrated and 
authentic view of life. 
The systems approach to solving problems has consequences which go beyond 
inter- or multi-disciplinary activity. It impinges on attitudes and even behaviour. 
This is because it is an approach which, rather than being individualistic and self-
assertive, places value on the integrative and the group. It results in a shift from 
competition to co-operation, from domination to partnership. (1994:5) 
The identified challenges and changes, the document says, "require new intellectual 
responses". It says commitment to change is one response; "commitment to learning 
about the new demands and learning the skills required to meet these demands is 
another." (1994:7) 
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Peter Senge, the document adds, would argue that the University should consciously 
transform itself into 'a learning organisation': 
He believes that the only organisations which are likely to be successful in the 
future are 'learning organisations' which 'discover how to tap people's 
commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organisation'. The 
development of team learning is a vital and integral part of this process. 'Team 
learning is the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a team to 
create the results its members truly desire. It builds on the discipline of 
developing shared vision. It also builds on personal mastery, for talented teams 
are made up of talented individuals. But shared vision and talent are not enough, 
the world is full of teams of talented individuals who share a vision for a while, yet 
fail to learn.' How we do this will be something on which all players would have to 
agree, but, we believe that it may well be somewhat easier to achieve in a 
university than most other kinds of institutions. (1994:8, quoting Senge.) 
To the extent that the adoption of the learning organization as a strategic initiative was 
a strategic decision, it is clear that it cannot be attributed to the foregoing strategic 
planning process. This is not a reflection on the learning organization; rather it serves to 
confirm Mintzberg's view that planning is unlikely to result in strategy formation. For the 
learning organization appeared on the agenda, at the University of Natal, pretty much 
out of the blue. L6oking at the formal documents, in the long process beginning with the 
formulation of the 1989 Mission Statement, there is no mention of the learning 
organization idea until the 1994 Planning Guidelines. 
From Professor Gourley's account, there is a strong sense of coincidence about the 
idea's arrival. "It was at that stage that I came across Senge," she said in a January 
1996 interview. And again: "I don't know whether everybody knew what they were 
buying into, when they voted for it." In her address to the University on the occasion of 
her installation as Vice-Chancellor on April 12 1994 (University of Natal 6, 1994), 
Professor Gourley argued strongly for universities and their curricula to address the 
complex moral or ethical issues of a world in which science could no longer confidently 
be expected to solve all the problems. But although the Club of Rome report, The First 
Global Revolution (1991), is referred to in both her address and the Strategic Initiatives 
document, Senge and the learning organization do not feature in the address. 
Professor Chris Cresswell, who was Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Vice-Principal 
responsible for the Durban centre until he took early retirement in 1993, returned to the 
University as Principal of the Durban campus after Professor Leatt's departure. While in 
Canada during the period of retirement, he had read Senge's The Fifth Discipline and 
saw it as having "tremendous merit". On his return, he found that Professor Gourley had 
read the book too. 
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The co-incidental or ad hoc introduction of the learning organization is borne out by the 
account of staffers Ralph Tyrrell (Staff Training and Development) and Megan Seneque 
(at the time in Architecture), two of the facilitators involved in promoting the idea within 
the University. They spoke about "coming across" Louis van der Merwe, a 
Johannesburg-based consultant who promotes the learning organization concept in 
South Africa, and of putting Professor Gourley in touch with him. Van der Merwe was 
later given the brief to run workshops - billed as "strategic planning workshops" - on 
campus. 
The process around the introduction of the learning organization idea may have been 
"quite ad hoc" but the idea was not marginalised, said Seneque, as it had full executive 
authority behind it. 
That the staff, including academics given to "yelling from the sidelines", might have 
voted for something without knowing quite what they were buying into could perhaps 
have been facilitated by the built-in ambiguity, in an educational institution, of the notion 
of a "learning organization". Whereas the notion might sound odd to the ears of workers 
in a coal mine or a packaging plant, it would sound much more familiar (although its 
implications might not be) to those employed in a university or technikon , or school for 
that matter. After all, isn't that what universities are all about, learning? It is the sort of 
ambiguity which allows the authors of the Planning Guidelines to say, referring either to 
the University consciously transfonning itself into a learning organization or perhaps to 
the more specific development of team learning: " ... we believe that it may well be 
somewhat easier to achieve in a university than most other kinds of institutions." 
(1994:8) 
The Vice-Chancellor, however, did not make the assumption that it would be an easy 
matter to achieve what Senge means by a learning organization in a university context. 
Universities are "incredibly hierarchical", she said in a January 1996 interview. 
Professors assume that because they are expert in one area, they are expert in all, 
including organizational matters. Academics are trained to be critical. They work in 
specialised disciplines, isolated from one another; and so on. Professor Gourley saw it 
as implying a "change of the whole ethos" of the institution and "a very fundamental 
transfonnation" . 
The difficulties of bringing about such a fundamental transfonnation were becoming 
clearer by September 1997 than they were when the learning organization notion was 
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introduced at the University of Natal; and the difficulties will be spelt out more fully in 
later sections of this chapter. But even in January 1996, when there was considerable 
enthusiasm around the learning organization, criticisms were being advanced. 
The first, ironically, given the ambiguity of the term "learning organization" in a 
university context, was a concern that the notion was a foreign import from the world of 
business. This argument, although not made as an outright judgment on the learning 
organization, was made in a variety of ways in interviews conducted at the University of 
Natal in January 1996. 
Professor Ahmed Bawa, physicist and Campus Vice-Principal in Pietermaritzburg at the 
time (now Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the Durban centre), raised it as a 
concern. He said: 
In the workshops on the learning organization, and in reading around the learning 
organization, I began to be concerned about simply translating from experiences 
in the corporate sector into the university sector. 
The input from the facilitators was how successful it was in making Shell the 
successful company it is now and other examples. The question I asked was: 
What is our measure. For Shell, it is how to maximise profits. It is more 
responsive to the market than we are. 
The idea of a learning organization was appealing to me. Both from my 
experiences at the University of Durban Westville and in policy frameworks of the 
state, I felt that strategic planning was very limited in its scope. It was time-
specific. It looked at the current reality and changes in society, and then tried to 
develop a five-year plan. Unless one had commitment to the five-year plan, 
strategic planning would falter. 
The learning organization was trying to create an organizational system which 
would be responsive to changes and which would Jearn in a general sense. The 
staff would be in a position to look at the pressures on the University and the 
changes in society, to be untraumatised, and to be in a position to change. 
There is an understanding of the potential you could unleash in staff by providing 
them with a framework, a management framework, which allowed them to be 
inventive and creative, which made the whole thing appealing to me. And 
especially the shift away from a very strong hierarchy. 
On the other hand, I began to ask the question: What is it we are trying to 
achieve, other than making the University more effective? How will we know if 
the learning organization is more effective than any other approach? 
To me, the key thing is student development. If it didn't facilitate student 
development, then the learning organization approach was not suitable for us. 
A perhaps more serious challenge relates not so much to the question of the "currency" 
of the University or its output, but to the nature of the University as an organization and 
the way people work within the organization. 
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This view was conveyed in discussion by facilitators Ralph Tyrrell and Megan Seneque, 
playing the role of Devil's advocates. Asked Tyrrell: 
Do you need a certain sort of set-up to make a learning organization, as a 
mechanism, work? 
There appears to be a contradiction: the learning organization principles seem to 
encourage a team set-up, where there's a particular nature of communication. It 
ignores sectors. All the walls go down, you have one territory. 
I'm not sure whether a university can actually operate like that. It is very 
territorial: this is written large in the faculties and departments. The very nature of 
research is specialisation. This creates a particular kind of mindset which is very 
difficult to change. 
The learning organization might mean more than an adaptation into this 
environment. It might end up destroying it, it will shake it up so much. There 
might be a lot of resistance, because of territoriality. 
And even if we compromise, will the University perform at the level of excellence 
that it wants? 
Here is a view: That universities are driven by a state of healthy conflict. This is 
championed. But the feel of Senge's work is that we all talk together; we are a 
family. What does that do to healthy debate and differences of opinion? Do we 
need a conflict model? 
Added Seneque: 
Academics say: The learning organization is a bit too much product driven. 
Senge is being applied in non-educational contexts. It is okay in the corporate 
sector, but the universities are different kinds of organization. 
The characteristics of a learning organization are not just things that exist in 
documents. It is changing people's ways of thinking and being. How is that going 
to influence my practice, in areas where people subscribe to academic 
autonomy? 
The sort of question being asked is: Change? Change in whose ~nterests? Why 
do we have to change? What do we have to give up? Who's going to pick it up? 
Particularly in the humanities, where small departments are under threat. There is 
a thin understanding of what's understood by a learning organization, based on a 
perceived threat. 
It is a problem if people think there is a blueprint, and you are going to 
manoeuvre them towards it. 
I am working with four departments within the Architecture faculty. We have 
come up with a policy framework for curriculum development and promoting 
learning. We are operationalising it differently for each department. 
One head of department said: 'It is a wonderful script, but there are no players.' It 
is not that he doesn't have the staff; but you have to work with each individual's 
mental models. 
The team approach is very anti the way academics work. The reward system 
rewards individual academic work. 
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Some lecturing staff have private practices, and are very comfortable. Team 
work. implies a big change. They have to make explicit all the things they have 
been able to do under the licence of academic freedom. 
There is a resistance to change which adversely affects their own interests. It is 
making problematic the current reality. 
Despite these reservations, there was considerable enthusiasm at the beginning of 1996 
for the learning organization and the potential benefits it could bring to the University. 
As Tyrrell put it in a later interview (September 1997), the learning organization 
represented a "sensible and human" way of managing the institution, with feedback and 
reflection. This is consistent with the view, expressed above, that the learning 
organization is more in line with reflexive modernity than is conventional strategic 
planning. But, as will become apparent, it too has not been able to deliver on its 
promises in terms of effecting fundamental change -at least in the short term. 
5.3 FACILITATORS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 
In the January 1996 interviews, Professor Gourley argued that two indicators of change 
in the University would be found in curricular reform, and in the activities of the 
facilitators. She saw the corps of facilitators- some 25 volunteers including Tyrrell, 
Seneque, and Frame - being developed on campus as key agents of change as the 
institution moved towards a learning organization. Professor Gourley's idea was that the 
facilitators would work. closely with the Deans and make the lives of the Deans easier, 
by facilitating change within the faculties and the production of faculty plans. The 
facilitators would report to the Vice-Principal: Planning and Resources, Professor 
Emmanuel Ngara. "He has to act by force of argument and influence, rather than crack 
the whip. That is the essence of a learning organization," said Professor Gourley. 
By September 1997, with the crisis over restructuring and retrenchments occupying 
everyone's mind, it was clear that the facilitators had been sidelined and had not been 
able to make the contribution that had been envisaged. By contrast, the crisis had given 
rise to a group of academics and other staff members who were actively resisting 
change (at least insofar as it implied retrenchments and loss of departments or courses 
of study) through the unofficial Academic Restructuring Committee (ARC) which was 
formed in August 1997. 
In a discussion with Ralph Tyrrell and Janet Frame in September, Tyrrell said the 
facilitators accepted that their role had run its course. Their task of continuing the 
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chorus of the learning organization principles had "dissolved, more or less": 
We saw ourselves riding along in the wake of the Louis van der Merwe 
workshops. We would continue conversations with the faculties and departments, 
along the lines of what was coming out of the workshops. The reference point 
was to be the Vice-Chancellor's Review II, but that seemed to get lost. 
The co-ordination didn't happen. We tried to be self-sufficient, but we all had our 
own jobs to do. We would try to do what we could from where we were. But we 
got a bit lost. The last time we met as a group was early this year [1997] - and we 
were still talking about what we should be doing. 
Brenda Gourley said to us: 'You define your role. Tell me what you should be 
doing. I am not going to dictate. Where do you think your intervention should be?' 
Said Frame: 
We felt, as the facilitator group, that our role was more responsive, rather than 
one of giving direction. We would respond to requests as people tried to engage 
with change. For example, as departments started to grapple with questions of 
how to change the curriculum, they would need the facilitators to help them. We 
were there to help other people to engage with what was required of them. 
But that presupposes that the whole University is fully in gear and going with it; 
that there's a plan on how to get the plan going. There is a missing link, of who is 
actually running the show and making sure that the University comes up with the 
actual plan, in terms of the strategic plan. 
We thought we would engage with people as they tried to draw up the actual plan. 
They had to ask, in relation to quality with equity: 'What kind of courses should 
we be teaching?' We saw ourselves as facilitating this process, but without a 
sense of urgency. We started out with a huge number of requests, but they 
skirted around the main business of the University. They came mainly from 
Finance, Student Counselling, and other support services. 
In many cases, they were successful. There was a lot of defining of the core 
purpose of operating units of the University. But it fails on the 'So what?' test if 
you don't address the core business of the University. 
There was a feeling among the facilitators that a more pro-active group should be 
formed. A November 1995 document (University of Natal 9, 1995), noting action plans 
agreed to on the last day of a Facilitation and Dialogue workshop, proposes the 
formation of a "Co-ordinating Change Task Group (or Strategic Initiatives Co-ordinating 
Groupr. The document says: 
It was felt by the group that progress of strategically aligned initiatives in the 
University need[ed] to be co-ordinated and monitored so that the system could 
learn from the process and respond appropriately. The view was expressed that 
the change process in the University must proceed within a coherent and well 
conceived framework and, while being driven by the Vice Chancellor, requires a 
task force consisting of University leaders from both the academic and general 
staff sectors to develop the framework and co-ordinate and review strategic 
initiatives. This framework should be established to ensure that the initiatives are 
given space and recognition, maintain their impetus, energy and alignment and 
are known about in the University community. 
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A possible grouping for the task force could be: 
Deputy Vice Chancellor, Planning and Resources 
Campus Vice Principals 
3 x Senior academics 
3 x Senior administrators 
Broadly, the role of the task force would be to co-ordinate strategic work being 
done, to monitor progress and new initiatives, report back to relevant groups or 
sectors and to act as a conduit for work being done to responsible elements in the 
system. The task force would also arrange for continuation of strategic work and 
workshops and provide the University community with regular information on the 
change process. (1995:1) 
After a workshop held on 6 June 1996, a document headed "Facilitating the Change 
Process at the University of Natal" was produced (University of Natal 10, 1996), which 
argued that a dedicated "Change Resource Group" was needed. The document 
identified the following functions of the Change Resource Group: 
• To infuse and integrate learning into the change process 
• To encourage, support, stimulate and reflect on the change process 
• To provide a focus for co-ordination, linking, networking and sharing 
information 
• To facilitate a shared understanding of the change process 
• To develop the capacity of staff to support the change process 
• To track, document and disseminate the University-wide initiatives 
• To advise the Executive on matters of change 
• To assist in the preparation of documentation for government, CUP, linkages 
and for funding 
A September 1996 proposal, headed "Strategic Intervention, Response to Recent 
Student Disruptions" (University of Natal 11, 1996), proposes a major data gathering 
exercise with the aim of providing "comprehensive data on the University community's 
sense of the current reality and degree of alignment with current broad University 
strategy to achieve our vision" and a subsequent large-scale meeting aimed at "finding 
common core values and a common way forward as a University". 
These proposals, and more recent ones, were treated with interest by the executive; but 
nothing has come of them. Effectively, in the view of the facilitators, the response was 
one of: "Don't call us, we'll call you." 
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5.4 RETREAT FROM THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
Although the facilitators have largely been sidelined and have not come to play a 
central role as agents of change, the University has not abandoned the learning 
organization as a strategic initiative. But clearly apparent in the rhetoric of the executive 
members is a certain down-playing of Senge and the learning organization. 
On the positive side, Professor Gourley pointed in a September 1997 interview to a 
Masters programme in Systems Thinking which is about to be introduced by some of 
the facilitators, in conjunction with other universities. And she pointed to the planned 
establishment of an Organisational Learning and Leadership Centre, made possible by 
a grant from the Kellogg Foundation. The centre will provide a locus for those interested 
in learning organization issues, offer a range of courses, and give the notion academic 
respectability. 
She sees the centre as representing "a huge injection of resources and energy into the 
system". She said: " We need to do as much as we can to help people who are 
championing the cause, so that eventually they become the leaders. It takes a long time 
to build a learning organization, especially at a university. It's a matter of changing the 
culture." 
On the other hand, Professor Gourley noted that there was a danger in talking "learning 
organisation jargon". "It puts people off," she said . "Academics are not into other 
people's jargon, especially business jargon. You lose fans rather than gain fans. You 
have to behave in a way that is consistent with a learning organization and encourage 
behaviour in others that is consistent with it." 
Reflecting on the role of the facilitators, she said a "very substantial" training course was 
run for them with the idea of building up a group of facilitators who would take on the 
role of getting people through the kind of things they would have to do. "It worked in 
some places and not in others." Responding to a suggestion that the input of the 
facilitators seemed to have been more on the curriculum side rather than planning, she 
says: "We can't foist it on them. They have to earn their own respect. Some have, some 
haven't." And she added: "It's a hell of a time to take on all these things." 
The stress of the times was remarked on by a number of other people interviewed, 
particularly in September 1997. Professor Mike Kahn, Dean of Architecture, spoke in 
terms of various "overlays" imposed on academic staff, which had left them emotionally 
and physically drained. 
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Between gearing themselves to respond to the VCR II document and the current 
restructuring crisis, Professor Kahn said, the staff had been responding to a host of 
other initiatives. These included a move to semesterisation to try to increase flexibility 
in the system, equal opportunity and affirmative action, and remedial work for under-
prepared students which meant "extra tutorials, extra studio sessions, extra pressure, 
extra work". Staff had had to rethink and restructure the whole teaching process. 
In the case of each initiative, Professor Kahn said, there had been a lack of "substantive 
communication·. Although the executive, or a working committee or task team, might 
have had major debates on an issue, other people were in every case presented with a 
fait accompli. This often included the Deans, who were expected to take an initiative 
down to their staff. People were not given an opportunity to ask how a task group had 
arrived at its recommendations. If an initiative was questioned, this evoked a testy 
response from those who had gone through their own internal debating, which in tum 
made the staff irritable. This started to lead to a breakdown in communication and trust. 
Professor Kahn said some people had reached the stage, with the latest overlay of the 
financial and restructuring crisis, of saying: "Just tell us what to do and we'll do it, within 
reason." 
For Professor Ari Sitas, Dean of Social Sciences, Senge's learning organization theory 
fails to address a fundamental organizational issue: "What happens to organizations in 
crisis, where conflicting interests emerge?" 
In an interview in September 1997, Professor Sitas said he saw three distinct phases in 
the University's planning activities: 
• The Vice-Chancellor's Review, effectively a strategic planning process, 
which started the debate around transformation of structures and curriculum. 
• The learning organization, which was seen to be a more participatory 
method of bringing about change. It was meant to get the staff to the vision 
which the VCR represented. 
• Restructuring, which had nothing to do with the other things. This was largely 
an undemocratic and non-participatory executive process, driven by fiscal 
constraints. 
Professor Sitas said: 
The first two phases had much more participation and discussion, but they didn't 
get us very far. The money side seems to have shoved things forward . 
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The executive process is beginning to happen. It is not possible to have people 
participate in cutting their jobs. There is no way you can have a participative 
process between faculties, when one half says, 'My side of the boat is not leaking, 
your side is leaking.' Those who are threatened are now trying to mobilize support 
both within and outside the University. 
Both Professor Sitas and Professor Kahn see the Deans as caught in the middle. On the 
one hand, they are expected to go along with a process mainly driven by top 
management in order to balance the books; on the other hand, they are expected by 
staff to defend the status quo or to improve their conditions of service. 
Professor Sitas sees two fundamental changes between the vision of the VCR and the 
emerging restructuring picture. Whereas the VCR had spoken of Durban as a unique 
laboratory of social issues, reflecting a complex society in transition, the talk now 
echoed the Education ministry's emphasis on the natural sciences and engineering. 
This was a technocratic response to getting the budget right. 
The second change related to the student population of the University. In the decade 
between 1987 and 1996, the use of external funds for financial aid had allowed for the 
inclusion of many black working class students. This was in line with the demographic 
transition envisaged by the VCR. But the current emphasis on the economic bottom line 
would reverse this trend in the interim period, with the University increasingly taking 
those students who could afford to attend while it hoped for the rapid development of 
the African middle class. Funding would not necessarily go to those faculties which had 
a majority of African students. 
In a paper entitled "Senge's Learning Orgworld" (1997), Professor Sitas says that 
management - in Senge's learning organization - becomes a humanistic project, with 
the focus on the lifelong Ieamer. Professor Sitas writes: 
Like Elton Mayo, Senge seems to believe that the world of work, its accumulation 
paths and corporate goals are rational and self-evident. He is not there to 
question organisational purposes but to clarify their visions, to make their visions 
attainable after a serious self-reflection and learning about organisational current 
reality. (Sitas, 1997:3) 
Professor Sitas questions Senge's tacit acceptance of the imperatives of organizations; 
Senge's assumption that "communication within institutions is undistorled by power 
dynamics and personal and social discord"; his "idealised version of the market and 
competition"; his assumption that "norms and values are extrinsic to organisational 
cultures and the social and ecological responsibilities of organisations are by 
implication, invisible"; and his assumption that "modem capitalist firms can be 
horizontal institutions with equal claimants to knowledge". (1997:3) 
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Nevertheless, Professor Sitas finds Senge's managerial approach useful in providing a 
methodology of teamwork, even though the team workers may be unequal in power and 
status; it provides "a vision of the modern employee as a human being whose self-
development and lifelong learning are central to working life"; and it provides for "a 
different culture of corporate and organisational leadership". (1997:4) 
The redeeming factors which Professor Sitas finds in Senge's learning orgworld 
notwithstanding, it is clear from the interviews reported above that people at various 
levels of the University were suspicious of the learning organization as something 
foreign to an academic institution (despite the apparent common interest in "learning") . 
The learning organization, this response says, is an import from the world of business; 
business is more market driven than a university; the currency of business is profit, but 
that of a university is something more like student development. 
From the perspective of organizational structure, the learning organization presupposes 
a situation in which "all the barriers come down", whereas universities are based on 
separation of disciplines and individual (not team) effort. 
Approaching the structural mismatch from the perspective of Mintzberg's account of 
organizational structures, a somewhat different gloss could perhaps be put on the 
lukewarm reception of the learning organization at the University of Natal. In Chapter 
Four, it was argued that the strategic planning approach adopted by the University in 
the earlier phase had mis-cast the University as a Machine Bureaucracy, rather than the 
Professional Bureaucracy which it is. In the case of the learning organization, it might 
be argued that the University is again mis-cast, this time as an Adhocracy, rather than a 
Professional Bureaucracy. 
Earlier, Mintzberg was quoted as saying that "the building of new knowledge and skills 
requires the combination of different bodies of existing ones. So rather than allowing the 
specialization of the expert or the differentiation of the functional unit to dominate its 
behavior, the Adhocracy must instead break through the boundaries of conventional 
specialization and differentiation .. .. Thus, whereas each professional of the 
Professional Bureaucracy can operate on his own, in the Adhocracy the professionals 
must amalgamate their efforts .... " (Mintzberg, 1979:434) 
This is, at least in part, the vision of the learning organization. And it picks out some of 
the key areas of contestation between the professionals in the operating core of the 
organization, as explicated above, and the restructuring of the University envisaged by 
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the executive. The Adhocracy must "break through the boundaries of conventional 
specialization and differentiation" and the professionals must "amalgamate their efforts". 
These are not the ways of the Professional Bureaucracy. 
To some extent, this captures the dynamics of change at the University of Natal, 
against a perceived need for innovation. Although it would be fanciful to suggest that 
the University was deliberately being steered in the direction of an Adhocracy, the 
notion of Adhocracy could serve as shorthand for a thoroughgoing re-arrangement of 
academic "pigeonholes" in the cause of developing innovative, multi-disciplinary 
programmes. 
However, in the concluding chapter of the case study, a more sociological rather than 
organizational explanation will be advanced, which provides a different context- within 
a social and political approach to pedagogy - for the fears expressed by staff members 
around "importations from business" and "barriers coming down". 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, the University's 1997 financial crisis and its 
restructuring proposals in response to the crisis are examined . 
5.5 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
As mentioned earlier, one of the driving forces behind the University of Natal's efforts to 
bring about institutional change over the past decade has been its unfavourable 
financial situation. But despite the importance of the financial plight of the University, 
and despite the drawing up of plans to address it, there has also been a failure of 
implementation, as referred to by Professor Leatt. Anyone wishing to support the case 
that implementation of plans has been problematic at the University of Natal could do 
worse than to compare the 1988 Walker Report (University of Natal 2, 1988) with the 
1997 Structures and Funding document presented to the University's Planning and 
Resources Committee (University of Natal 13, 1997). Although nine years apart, the 
concerns are remarkably similar. 
For present purposes, the Structures and Funding document is clearly the more 
important document as it is central to the financial and restructuring crisis which 
preoccupied the University in 1997; and there is not much to be gained, in the present 
context, by a detailed comparison of the two texts. (A brief account of the Walker 
Report's findings and recommendations was provided in Chapter 4.) 
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Like the Walker Report, the 1997 Structures and Funding document situates its analysis 
within the context of the latest planning document: in this case the 1994-1998 Planning 
Guidelines which resulted from the Vice-Chancellor's Review II. A financial crisis is 
described, with the conclusion that "in effect, in real tenns, the level of University 
resources is at present at least 5% below a sustainable level of expenditure, and this 
situation is likely to worsen in future years because dramatic changes in the financing of 
universities are likely~. (1997:10) The document calls for a reduction of 22% in the 
staffing compensation budget, or 645 posts over the next five years (about 200 
academic posts and 450 non-academic posts). (1997:17) 
A complicated restructuring is proposed for the academic side of the institution, which 
will be examined in more detail shortly, but key elements are still missing. 
Recommendation 3, for instance, says: "A fonnula should be devised for staffing and 
resource allocation to viable teaching programmes. This fonnula should take the 
research output of the teaching staff into account and should make provision for the 
employment of teaching assistants." (1997:21) On the administrative side, some 
recommendations (accompanied by organograms) are made for the University 
executive and middle management. But like the Walker Report, the document does not 
deal in detail with the administration. It says: 
The Task Group did not have the time and does not have the necessary expertise 
to undertake a detailed investigation in the functioning of individual administrative 
and support service departments, including the libraries and CSD with a view to 
effecting staffing cuts. A small special Task Team (or a number of Task Teams) 
should be appointed to oversee the necessary process, with the specific brief of 
achieving an overall reduction in non-academic staff levels in line with the target 
indicated in the Report (450 posts). (1997:24) 
The Structures and Funding Task Group favours the appointment of "external 
management experts to review the administration and support services activities", as 
opposed to "involving managers and administrative and support service departments in 
a review of their departments". (1997:24) The Medical Faculty, as in the Walker Report, 
is largely left alone, to be either a School or College of Medicine in tenns of the 
proposals. "In the time at its disposal, the Task Group was not able to review the 
Medical School. It believes, however, that as in other parts of the university, it should be 
possible to establish a target figure for staff savings of at least 15%." (1997:29) 
Given the similarities between the handling of the financial crisis facing the University in 
1988 and financial crisis facing it in 1997, the question arises of whether there is much 
difference between the two crises. Is the University of Natal , as it were, simply crying 
"wolf" once again? Will the 1997 report, like that of 1988, be put to one side while the 
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University embarks once again on an exercise of deciding what it really wants to do and 
draws up a new Mission Statement? 
Professor Chris Cresswell, for one, believes that the University of Natal faces a different 
magnitude of problem in 1997. He said in a September 1997 interview: 
The Walker Report came out at a time when the Government subsidy started 
declining for the first time. Before that, the University could rely on the subsidy. 
But now, the declining subsidy is coupled to the whole question of financial aid as 
well. The University did not have that problem at the time of Walker. 
After you have selected students, you have to put your own money in, as well as 
Tefsa [Tertiary Education Fund of South Africa] money, to assist them. 
Substantial amounts of money have been put into Financial Aid, and this year it 
became difficult to put money in. 
Financial Aid is tricky. As the fees rise, so you have to put more money in to 
assist disadvantaged students. With fee increases of 15%, that's a substantial 
difference. And those already in the system have first priority. You might find that 
the money may only be enough for second year and third year students. 
There was a R28-million cut in subsidy this year [1997], and the University's 
reserves are being depleted. Whether the staffing cuts will make the required 
savings, time will tell. 
On this view, one can argue that a critical factor in the expansion path which the 
University of Natal embarked upon was the extension of financial aid to students from 
the disadvantaged communities whom it admitted: in the first instance against the 
wishes of the then apartheid government which, as the Walker Report made clear, was 
against any growth; and in the second place against the financial logic of the Walker 
Report, which accepted the scenario of no growth and reducing government subsidies. 
Without the provision of financial aid, and a whole range of other student support 
·services which it developed, the University would not have been able to move so 
quickly from being a predominantly white institution, to one which has more or less 
equal numbers of African, Indian, and white students. The change of the University's 
residences from a "bastion of whiteness" in the 1980s to a 98% black residence 
population (Phillips, 1996:113) reflects the dramatic change. But it also put greater 
demands on financial aid, as the costs associated with living in residence are higher 
than for students living at home; and even under the Tefsa scheme, the fee and 
residence costs of a student would be well above the level of Tefsa funding. Clearly, the 
provision of financial aid, even though it was in many cases in the form of loans, had to 
be financed from somewhere and much of the finance came from the University's 
reserves; with the effect, as noted in the Structures and Funding document, that the 
University is "extremely vulnerable to subsidy cuts because its free reserves are less 
than only one month's operating expenditures". (1997:10) 
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5.6 THE RESTRUCTURING CRISIS 
The second question posed above was whether the 1997 report, like that of 1988, would 
be pushed to one side while the University again deliberated on what it wanted to do. 
This is not an easy question to answer. The fact that the University faces a very 
different financial crisis from that of 1988 might lead one directly to the conclusion that 
history will not repeat itself, and that this time the University will "bite on the bullet". The 
approval by Senate and by Council in September 1997 of a range of cost cutting 
measures, including retrenchments in academic departments, would tend to support this 
view, although there is still considerable support for an approach which calls for a new 
plan before any structural changes are made. 
On one level, the crisis facing the University of Natal is just about money. The 
University cannot balance its books; it has very low reserves; subsidies are likely to 
decline further; it may even be that the student intake is declining, which will reduce the 
income from fees. Something has to be done. And clearly, as the University's 
experience of student unrest has shown, it is not an option to do away with financial aid 
to students, although an effort was made at the beginning of 1997 to limit the aid to new 
students. The main cost of running the University lies in salaries; so if significant 
savings are to be made, the salary bill will have to be reduced. A reduction in salaries is 
not a realistic option; nor can salaries be held static for long, as they were in 1997. So 
the only option is to reduce the number of posts, both in academic and non-academic 
areas. 
Although this has been a more or less familiar scenario since 1988 (financial aid 
excepted), the crisis begins in April-May 1997, with the completion of the Structures and 
Funding report. The report places the financial situation in a wider context, including the 
University's Strategic Initiatives and proposals for academic and administrative 
restructuring, but the bottom line is that 645 posts must go over five years and all non-
viable courses should be discontinued. 
The formation of the Task Team which wrote the Structures and Funding document was 
made known at an open forum earlier in the year and the Task Team "met all members 
of the Executive and interviewed Deans, most senior members of administration and 
the Director of ESATI [Eastern Seaboard Association of Tertiary Institutions]". (1997:1) 
But its activities first attracted the attention of the wider University community when 
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details of the report appeared in the local press immediately after the report was shared 
with the Deans. 
Amended proposals went to a Senate meeting on 4 June and were accepted by an 
overwhelming majority, effectively appointing the Executive as the implementation 
team for making the staffing cuts. At the beginning of July, it became known that 
Executive members had visited certain academic departments on both the Durban and 
P'ietermaritzburg campuses (Classics, European Languages, Afrikaans) and announced 
that they would be closed down and the staff retrenched. As one observer put it: "The 
image was created of the Executive going out and telling departments: 'You are under 
arrest'." 
In the view of Dr Alan Matthews, a lecturer in Physics, this was the point at which the 
internal crisis began, as far as people on the ground were concerned. "I saw it as an 
attack on the University," he said in an interview in September 1997. His response, 
along with others attached to the Timetabling Committee who met to discuss the matter, 
was the formation in July of ARC, the Academic Restructuring Committee -an 
unofficial and informal group which became a focus for resistance to the proposed cut-
backs, mainly through the establishment of a discussion forum on the University's local 
area network (LAN). 
"ARC was opening up a critical public sphere," said Dr Matthews. "It became for most 
people an electronic newspaper for the expression of opinion. We had a flood of 
letters. • In the last week of August, ARC met with the campus principals and held a 
public meeting. "At the public meeting, a motion was put that the community wants 
more information on restructuring from the executive,· said Dr Matthews. 
A cursory glance at contributions to the ARC website reflects a high degree of anger 
and dismay. To take only a few examples among many, the Executive is accused of 
becoming "more and more high-handed in its dealings with the University community"; 
other writers say that its approach is "dictatorship rather than any attempt at rationality"; 
that it seems determined to "ruin and ransack Humanities"; and that the process it has 
embarked upon is "a recipe for the descent of a fine University into a glorified 
Technicon (sic)". 
Overall, however, the tenor of the resistance to the restructuring process is not one of a 
blunt call to defend the barricades. Although, significantly, the learning organization is 
entirely missing from the debate, there is some awareness of the Vice-Chancellor's 
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Review II. For example, it is referred to in one submission to ARC as "the University's 
long dormant plan for a vast and creative revamping of the University in the name of 
the liberal arts". 
Dr Matthews (who has worked at the University since 1992, on the Durban campus 
since 1993) said he was aware that there had been the Vice-Chancellor's review. He 
added: 
My impression is that it was Leatt who started that. I was in Pietermaritzburg 
when some documents were coming out. We went through a departmental review 
and SWOT analysis. But I don't recall any educative process around the Vice-
Chancellor's Review process itself. I knew there was a document floating around, 
but I don't recall any workshop or seminar that accompanied it. 
We were aware of the curriculum reform initiative, although a number of people 
in the Science Faculty were dismissive of it. They saw it as people not doing 
teaching talking to people who are involved in teaching. 
Dr Matthews said the Principal had come to speak to the department about the strategic 
initiatives and about income generation, but this had not been linked to the VCR. He 
argued: 
There is not a comprehensive, holistic approach which gives support to new 
initiatives. It is important to inform people, to make sure that they are informed 
and discussing it. Not just a few authority figures; we need to involve every single 
person in the University, at least to be aware of what's happening, and if possible 
to participate. 
It's a good strategic step to have communication and education -with everybody 
involved; then they agree with initiatives rather than oppose them. It is difficult to 
do things piecemeal, to introduce new things without an overall planning 
framework. 
Janet Frame made a similar point: 
My understanding is that the last of the documents out of the Vice-Chancellor's 
Review was the 1994-98 Planning Guidelines. They are called 'planning 
guidelines'. They are not the plan. We missed the final step. We never get to the 
actual plans. 
The 1994-98 document is written in a very discursive style. It seems like a good 
idea. But it needed to be translated into actual plans of the different faculties and 
newly created schools. Only then should we get to questions like: 'Who do we 
really need on the staff?' The detail comes from actual plans, not from planning 
guidelines. Because we missed that step, we don't have a plan in front of us 
which provides the rationale for seeing why we are closing this and that down. 
If the Executive were to say: 'If you can't come up with courses pertinent to where 
we want to position ourselves, we can't justify keeping you'; that is very different 
from coming in with 1995 figures and saying the course is not viable. 
There is no doubt merit in what both of these obseNers are saying, and many others 
are making similar points. But what can be seen when these responses are examined in 
the light of the earlier analysis? 
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Firstly, one can see the response of the Professional Bureaucracy to threatening 
change. There is a strong ~ense that the professionals in the operating core have not 
been properly consulted on matters which either affect them directly (as in the case of 
some of the ARC correspondents) or indirectly, and which are seen as threatening their 
autonomy. The Structures and Funding Task Team, for example, did not (directly) go 
any lower in their consultations than the Deans. Heads of Department and the mass of 
professionals below them in the hierarchy were not consulted, although there was an 
invitation on the LAN to make suggestions on cost-cutting. 
Secondly, one can see in the charge that the "overall plan· is missing the same 
hankering after specificity which characterised the earlier phases of the strategic 
planning process at the University for Professor Gourley and others. There are planning 
guidelines, but these are not specific enough; they do not have the teleological power 
which an overall plan should have, revealing clearly for all to see why Department X 
should go and Department Y should stay. 
For Professor Gourley, the plan is in place. It is found in the 1994-98 Planning 
Guidelines. And, she argued in a September 1997 inteNiew, nothing which was being 
proposed in the current restructuring exercise was inconsistent with the plan. The 
demand for another "overall plan" was, of course, the move which sank the Walker 
Report: We cannot make any decisions on how we are going to do things until we have 
decided what it is we want to do- with the assumption, which conventional strategic 
planning models have led us all to accept, that everything else will then fall into place. 
One of the tensions in the restructuring crisis is between a straightforward cost-cutting 
exercise, on the one hand, and changing the structural arrangements of the institution 
on the other. The criticism of Frame and others is that the response of the Executive to 
the mandate which it received from Senate seems to be driven entirely by financial 
considerations: those departments or, on the weaker version, those courses which do 
not have an adequate number of students are not (financially) viable and must be shut 
down. 
Professor Ahmed Bawa, previously Vice-Principal at Pietermaritzburg and now Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the Durban centre, obseNed in a September 1997 
inteNiew that it was a pity that the University had to be engaged in restructuring at the 
same time as down-sizing. The down-sizing, he said, was absolutely necessary, given 
the University's deficit budget and its depleted reseNes. 
106 
Professor Bawa continued: 
We could have said: Let's just down-size. But we thought that was risky- to do 
the down-sizing without a major effort at restructuring, in a way which affects the 
final outcome and which does not synergise with the restructuring proposals when 
they are made. We felt we had to engage both processes at the same time. 
From a human resources or learning organization point of view, that is almost the 
worst possible option to take. Down-sizing has banged people up against the wall. 
There is learning going on, but in the context that people have their backs to the 
wall. 
A more cynical view, expressed by one middle level manager in the Administration, is 
that the Executive is using the financial crisis as a means of pushing through structural 
changes which would otherwise have no chance of flying. 
Leaving that aside, what are the structural changes being proposed? A distinction needs 
to be drawn here between the proposals as contained in the Structures and Funding 
document and the amended proposals which went before Senate on September 17. 
There is a distinctly critical and adversarial approach adopted by the Structures and 
Funding Task Group to the existing academic structure of the University. In a section on 
The University Context, the group assesses the effects of the Vice-Chancellor's Review 
process. It refers to the major restructuring of the University's faculty, administrative 
and committee system arising out of VCR1; but it says that few of the objectives set out 
in the VCR's vision of academic development have been met. (1997:5) It goes on: 
In the absence of a mechanism whereby faculties could be required to conform to 
university policy, most of its proposals were ignored, while in some faculties they 
were misunderstood. 
• Although several plans for faculty amalgamation have been discussed and 
although a number of interdisciplinary schools have been launched, these 
developments fall far short of expectation that by 1996 new faculties would be 
established, that new quality assessment and monitoring procedures would be 
in place, and that substantial changes would have been made to curricula and 
teaching methodologies, including the incorporation of a core curriculum 
• The mounting of the new teaching programmes, including interdepartmental 
foundation programmes, a distance teaching programme and a Winter 
School, has been hampered by centre, faculty and departmental structures 
and progress has thus depended largely upon the enthusiasm of interested 
academics. (1997:5) 
Referring to the "large degree of suspicion of and opposition to university management" 
which was revealed to the Task Group during interviews, and to a mutual lack of 
appreciation of each other's efforts by the Executive and academics, the Task Group 
says that the explanation should be sought not in the enormity of the changes taking 
place, but "in the fact that the existing structures isolate members of staff from each 
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other and require that members of the Executive devote too much of their time to 
management.· (1997:5-6) 
Dealing with structural change in the section on Basic Principles, the report says: 
The Task Group believes that existing departmental, faculty, centre and 
administrative structures prevent the most economical use of resources and have 
discouraged academic innovation. The committee structure that was put in place 
by VCR1 has resulted in some duplication and to[o] many bottlenecks, not least 
because there is no central committee which can make decisions for the 
university as a whole. The University's management structure has resulted in the 
serious distancing of the Executive from the university community. Without 
structural change, therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the University will be 
able to respond to the challenges that confront it. (1997:7) 
Against that background, the Task Group recommends on the academic side: 
• That the present 14 Faculties be replaced by the establishment of 7 Schools, 
each containing about 100 members of staff (with the exception of Medicine) 
• That the present Departments be replaced by the establishment of fewer new 
enlarged Departments, containing at least 25 members of staff. 
(1997:18) 
Each School would be administered by a Dean, each Department by a Head; and 
academic Programmes would be co-ordinated by a Chair. "Each school will constitute a 
Board (similar to the present Faculty Boards) through which the affairs of the School will 
be conducted. The Schools will extend over both centres and Dean's Offices will be 
located either in Durban or Pietermaritzburg with a small administrative office in the 
other centre." (1997:19) 
The Task Group further proposed that the six Schools (excluding Medicine) should be 
grouped into two Colleges, each containing three Schools, with the Medical School 
constituting a third College. Two models for grouping the Schools into Colleges are 
proposed, but the details need not detain us. 
The Task Group says: 
The key feature of the proposed structure is that academic administration will 
shift in two directions towards a more central role for the Deans of Schools. The 
Deans will assume responsibility for much of the academic administration 
presently performed by the Campus Principals (top-down), and the Deans' 
Offices will also absorb many of the administrative functions presently performed 
by academic Heads of Departments (bottom-up). The total operating budget, 
including staff compensation, will devolve to the Office of the Dean. Student 
records, operating expenses and other administrative functions including SAPSE, 
Calendar entries, etc., will be performed by the Dean's Office. While the 
proposed structure retains Academic Departments as organisational units, they 
are not the primary locus of administrative activity. The functions of Academic 
Departments should be limited to the management of the programmes offered by 
the departments. As far as possible, academic staff, especially if their numbers 
are to be reduced, must be relieved of non-academic administrative functions. It 
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should be clear that the proposed new structures entail a different or expanded 
role for the Dean of a School that is similar in conception to that of a Dean at 
many American Universities. 
Another important feature of the proposed structures is that the Schools may 
extend across both the Durban and Pietermaritzburg centres. The School 
structure is intended to allow for flexibility as regards the location of Departments 
in the two centres. Each School should determine how best to organise the 
Departments that together constitute the School and the Programmes it offers .... 
(1997:19-20) 
By the beginning of September, a number of features of the original proposal had 
dropped out or been altered, as became apparent in discussions with Professor 
Gourley, Professor Bawa, and others. The idea of grouping the proposed Schools into 
Colleges had fallen away. Instead, larger and re-arranged Faculties would be the 
biggest building blocks in the structure, each to be headed by a Dean. The notion that 
these Faculties (or School structures in the original proposal) would necessarily cross 
the Durban and Pietermaritzburg centres had been modified in the face of resistance 
from some Faculties in Pietermaritzburg which (as one observer put it) were afraid of 
"sliding down the hill to Durban". While cross-centre Faculties will not be excluded in the 
new proposal, it is more likely that Faculties will re-group on a centre basis. Within each 
of the new Faculties will be located a number of Schools. Each School will contain a 
mixture of disciplines, each headed by a Chair, and inter-disciplinary programmes, each 
with a Co-ordinator. The Academic Department, as an administrative unit, will fall away. 
Financial management will be devolved down to the Faculty and School level, with 
Schools responsible for financial management other than staff salaries. Heads of 
disciplines within the Schools will be responsible for academic management, but not 
financial management. (Cf. Section 3 of the Discussion Document on Restructuring on 
the Durban Centre of the University of Natal, University of Natal 15, 1997 .) 
It must be said that there was a great deal of confusion apparent at the University on 
just what was being proposed in the restructuring, much of it no doubt arising from fears 
and rumours resultant on the Executive's visits to threatened departments in the two 
centres, and some from the amendments being made to the original Task Group 
proposals. (For example, one Dean's secretary was overheard telling someone on the 
telephone that the restructuring would result in courses like Science being offered only 
in one or the other of the two centres.) 
As in the case of the financial crisis, there is nothing that is startlingly new in the 
discussion around structures, but there is significant movement. The document which 
expanded on the 1989 Mission Statement, The Role in Society of the University of 
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Natal, 1989 Onwards, includes a section on Faculty and Departmental Functions and 
Structures. It says in part: 
The present arrangement of 16 faculties (9 in Durban and 7 in Pietermaritzburg) 
and the attendant 110, or so, departments has arisen by a process of evolution 
and elaboration of traditional programmes. The structure (Departments and 
Faculties) has evolved in order to give effect to functions (disciplines, curricula 
and courses) . With the advent of serious financial constraints, the University has 
to look critically first at its functions and then its structures ... . 
This critical review of new functions may well suggest new structures. New and 
more appropriate department alignments, fewer larger departments reflecting less 
undergraduate specialization, new faculty alignments avoiding, where possible, 
the luxury of small faculties - all these will need to be considered and will flow 
logically from rationalization of functions. (1989: 18) 
The organogram attached to the Role in Society document as Annexure 1 (included 
here as Appendix 3) gives a good idea of the thinking of the Executive at that time. If 
realised, it might have served as an interim step between the existing structure and the 
proposed new structure; but the duplication and confusion between the roles of Schools 
and Faculties, Boards of Study and Boards of Faculty, would no doubt have made the 
system expensive and probably unworkable. What the organogram shows graphically is 
a line of thinking which begins to prise authority and control away from the discipline-
based academic departments. In the new proposals, with the departments falling away 
completely as administrative units, a more radical (but probably more realistic picture) 
of what is intended emerges. 
Effectively, the proposals undermine the authority of the disciplinary departments by 
removing their administrative authority in relation to the members of the department; 
and they weaken the academic authority of the departments as well because, whatever 
the discipline, the members of the department may be dispersed through any number of 
inter-disciplinary programmes in the various faculties. To show graphically the way in 
which the professionals in the operating core of the University are seen in this model , I 
have amended the organogram from the Role in Society document by cutting the 
organogram in half and changing the labels slightly. (The altered organogram is 
included here as Appendix 5.) 
One of the main tasks of the next chapter is to consider the question of why the 
University of Natal is undertaking such a project, given that it goes well beyond the 
obvious requirements of cost cutting and efficiency. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RECONTEXTUALISATION OF THE CASE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter One of this case study, it was stated that the aim of the study was "to try to 
understand the complex social phenomenon of institutional change in higher education, 
as reflected in the University of Natal". 
It is submitted that any attempt to resolve the puzzle with which Chapter Five closed 
has to put the emphasis more on the "social phenomenon" in the above formulation 
than on the "institutional change". This means looking beyond the organizational theory 
which has informed the analysis of the case thus far, to the social implications of the 
pedagogic changes which are taking place at the University of Natal, and in higher 
education more generally. 
The fundamental difficulty here is that pedagogy does not (as it were) wear its social 
implications on its sleeve. The form of pedagogy is a code for the form of social and 
political control at work- the social and the political are embedded in pedagogy in ways 
which are not obvious on the surface. It is the work of this concluding chapter to begin 
to dis-embed the social and political implications of the pedagogic changes being 
mooted at the University of Natal. 
In taking this route, which is effectively a re-contextualisation of the case, a number of 
caveats need to be noted. The first of these is that recognising the explanatory limits of 
the organizational theory which has informed the study does not discredit the theory or 
make its use in this context inappropriate. It was stated earlier (see Chapter 2.4) that 
the case study aims at analytic generalization, rather than statistical generalization; and 
that it is an experiment, in a loose sense of "experiment", which aims to test theory in 
the real world. 
The contention here is that the organizational theory informing the study has been 
useful in throwing light on the process of institutional change in higher education, but 
that its explanatory powers have limitations which need to be recognised. Importantly, 
its overriding concern with the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations in general 
does not contribute to a close reading of the social and political implications of 
organizational change in higher education in particular; indeed, it is submitted, it tends 
rather to obscure the social and political implications of pedagogical changes. 
111 
The second caveat is that recontextualising the case should not be taken to imply that 
social and political considerations have somehow been absent from the debate around 
institutional change at the University of Natal. Far from it. Many of the key players are 
acutely aware of wider political and social forces and they hold various sophisticated 
interpretations of these forces; and a number of position papers have been written, 
informing some of the key documents produced by the University. But the emphasis in 
the earlier discussion has been on the organizational or institutional factors, rather than 
the political and social. 
The third point follows from the second: viz. that it is not the contention here that there 
is any one definitive view of the social and political forces at work- still less that the 
definitive view is about to be revealed. The claim is more modest, in accordance with 
Kemmis' picture (noted in Chapter Two) of the case study researcher "stumbling from 
lamplight to lamplight in the fog". (In Simons (Ed.) 1980:100) 
A view is presented, which leans heavily on work by Basil Bernstein and an 
interpretation of South African developments, in Bernstein's terms, by Johan Muller. 
The argument advanced, in brief, is that there is a confluence in South Africa at present 
of political and pedagogic trends, both moving in the direction of market determination 
of educational delivery. These trends require scholars to become knowledge 
entrepreneurs- developing, packaging, and delivering educational products in response 
to external market requirements, rather than in accordance with the internal logic of the 
scholar's discipline. For a university to achieve this, given the inherent resistance to 
change of the professionals in the operating core of the institution, it is necessary either 
to break down the disciplinary boundaries altogether, or at least - as appears to be 
happening now in the case of the University of Natal -to weaken the disciplines and the 
professionals who practice them by prising the disciplines free from the institutional 
blockhouses which they have traditionally occupied as academic departments within the 
organizational structure. 
The submission is that this view provides a significant elaboration of the organizational 
theory which forms the framework, or context, for the greater part of this study and 
permits a more powerfui explanation of the case of institutional change at the University 
of Natal than is possible in terms of the organizational theory alone. 
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6.2 THE NEED FOR INNOVATION 
The puzzle which remained at the end of Chapter Five was this: Why do the proposals 
for restructuring being put forward by the University of Natal's executive go beyond 
what could reasonably be expected in terms of organizational efficiency and the cost-
cutting which that efficiency might require? Both in the 1989 Mission Statement 
document and in the current proposals being considered at the University there are 
structural changes being mooted which cannot be justified in terms of the underlying 
financial crisis alone. 
Cost cutting might require the retrenchment of staff in certain departments, or even the 
closing of certain departments which are unable to meet whatever student:staff norms 
the University might set. And it might imply a more cost-effective grouping of 
departments into bigger faculties. But there is nothing in the cost cutting exercise per se 
which suggests that it would be useful to do away with the faculties as presently 
constituted and to replace them with inter-disciplinary schools; or that discipline-based 
academic departments should cease to operate as administrative entities, retaining only 
an academic authority over their members. 
In terms of the main actors' conceptualisation of the situation, at least as reflected in the 
interviews conducted, the answer should be sought in a perceived imperative for 
innovation. This approach is consistent with the epistemology outlined in the Strategic 
Initiatives document (University of Natal 8), which is based largely on Senge's world 
view, and consistent also with a set of values which are Theory Y in nature, rather than 
Theory X. 
This is one way of coding, or interpreting, the pressures being felt by the University 
leadership for institutional change. On this approach, the resulting scenario looks like 
this: 
On the one hand, there is a perceived need for universities to change very 
fundamentally the way they go about their business, a need driven at least in part 
by rapid changes in technology; combined, on the other hand, with the inherently 
conservative nature of the university as an institution, which conservatism stems 
at least in part from the inclination of the mass of professionals in the 
organization's operating core to protect their autonomy, within their disciplines as 
traditionally defined. In this scenario, Professor Gourley and the University 
executive are driven beyond the needs of operating efficiency by the need for 
fundamental innovation and change. 
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In a July 1997 newspaper article it was reported that astronauts on the struggling space 
station Mir spoke to a gathering of reporters and university lecturers in Johannesburg in 
a live satellite link-up. On the face of it, there is nothing startling about that. But the 
event had been organised by Britain's De Montfort University to demonstrate "the power 
of satellite technology to transform education across international barriers". 
The article quotes Brian Faxon of De Montfort as saying: "The barriers of education are 
fast breaking down. Making use of the Internet and satellite technology may in 20 years 
completely transform the structure of universities as we know them today." (Cape 
Argus, 22 July 1997) 
There are at least two significant points here. Firstly, the very fact that it was a British 
university which conducted the demonstration and has already established a presence 
in South Africa as a deliverer of tertiary education is important. While South African 
tertiary education institutions face increasing financial pressure from declining 
Government subsidies and increasing demands for quality and accountability, they also 
face increasing competition both from private educational institutions within South 
Africa and from entrepreneurial institutions abroad, like De Montfort. These institutions, 
generally speaking, do not carry the historical baggage which the South African publicly-
funded institutions do and are able to respond much more quickly to changing 
circumstances in the broad educational field, in technology, and in market trends. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in our context, is the observation that changing 
technology has the potential to fundamentally alter "the structure of universities as we 
know them today". Of course, the power of technological changes to create and to 
destroy whole industries as well as to change the quality of life of millions of people is 
not new. But we are talking here about an institution which has survived more or less 
unchanged since the Middle Ages: can it seriously be said to face radical change in 
terms of its structure, or organizational form? 
It is a challenge which the University of Natal takes seriously, as reflected in the 
Planning Guidelines document (University of Natal 7, 1994), and in the January 1996 
interviews with Professor Gourley. 
"In the whole technology industry, universities have lost their strategic advantage," 
Professor Gourley said. "They are no longer the repositories and storehouses of 
knowledge. There are other sources of knowledge, like computer networks, libraries, 
attendance at conferences." 
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The difficult question to answer, of course, is how universities are going to change. The 
uncertainty around this is located, for Professor Gourley, in a wider context of 
uncertainty. 
Asked, in the second January interview, whether the adoption of the learning 
organisation idea represented a shift away from the search for specificity, Professor 
Gourley said in part: "True. It took quite a long time to evolve into thinking that you will 
never get enough specificity, if that's what you want. It's not that kind of world any more. 
"Certainty has gone," Professor Gourley said, adding a little paradoxically but tellingly, 
"certainly in South Africa". 
"Organisations have to change much more quickly to a world which is changing much 
more quickly than it did before. You are dependent on people spotting changes ... We 
know that there are different ways of coming to answers." 
In terms of this line of argument, the far-reaching structural changes being proposed by 
the University executive represent an attempt to address the problem of innovation in 
the Professional Bureaucracy (as outlined in Chapter Three) by breaking down the 
boundaries which separate the "pigeonholes" of the disciplines. If, as Mintzberg argues, 
professionals are inclined to force new problems into old pigeonholes, perhaps they 
must in tum be forced to leave the comfort of their existing pigeonholes and find new 
ways of coming to answers. And Senge makes the point (also quoted in Chapter Three) 
that "structure produces behavior, and changing underlying structures can produce 
different patterns of behavior. • (1994:53) 
The argument finds its clearest expression, perhaps, in the University's Planning 
Guidelines document (University of Natal 7, 1994, referred to in Chapter Five) where it 
speaks of the paradigm shift from seeing the world as "a disassociated collection of 
parts" to seeing it as an "integrated whole". The document says that the division of the 
curriculum into disciplines promotes the "old paradigm" of segmentation: 
Curricula and research design, if they are to recognise the validity of the new 
paradigm, need to be organised in such a way that scholars are produced who go 
beyond the isolated facts, who make connections across disciplines, who help to 
shape a more coherent view of knowledge and a more integrated and authentic 
view of life. (University of Natal 7, 1994:5) 
But the weakness of this line of argument, broadly speaking, is that it takes the need for 
pedagogical innovation in the face of change as a socially and politically uncontested 
given. It is the same problem which Professor Sitas identified in Senge's work, in a 
different shape. To re-word it in a fairly crude way to emphasise the point: Shell might 
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be a very progressive and innovative corporation, from an organizational theory point of 
view, but this does not necessarily mean that its actions (as in Ogoniland in Nigeria) are 
beyond reproach from a political and social perspective. (See Sitas, 1997:3) 
Similarly, "innovation· becomes the University of Natal's attempt tore-code the various 
pressures which the institution feels in organizational theoretical terms. But the re-
coding, while clearly responding in some measure to real pressures, draws attention 
away from the social and political implications of the problems the University faces. 
Responding innovatively to the need for change, while an uncontested good in terms of 
learning organization theory, is not necessarily an uncontested good in terms of other-
primarily social and political - concerns. 
Some theory which begins to unpack the social and political implications of innovative 
changes in the field of pedagogy is required. 
6.3 DOMINANCE OF THE MARKET 
In many of the interviews conducted at the University in September 1997, respondents 
pointed out that - apart from its immediate and pressing financial problems -the 
University also had to position itself to respond to developments in the wider field of 
higher education. The National Commission on Higher Education, the subsequent White 
Paper, with its emphasis on outcomes-based learning programmes, the National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF), and the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) 
were commonly mentioned. 
The Structures and Funding document refers to all of these factors and lists a number 
of implications for the University of Natal. Then it turns to the international context. 
"Universities all over the world," it says, "are responding to the dual challenge of 
curriculum change and the reduction in government funding: (University of Natal13, 
1997:3) It adds: 
The universality of the financial problems which are presently being experienced 
by universities in all Commonwealth countries (with the exception of Malaysia, 
Mauritius and Hong Kong) lies in the fact that their governments talk to one 
another and listen to the advice of donor agencies concerning relative priorities of 
basic and higher education. Their responses follow several common patterns: 
• cost reduction exercises focussing on administrative and support costs 
• income generation drives, seeking to replace government income with 
funds from a range of external sources 
• restructuring the academic and administrative organisation to reduce costs 
and improve managerial efficiency. (University of Natal 13, 1997:3) 
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This approach begins to bring the developments at the University of Natal into wider 
perspective, but it is still operating at the level of cost-cutting and efficiency. 
The line of argument to be developed here seeks to locate the proposed changes at the 
University of Natal at another level of abstraction, within a wider context of political and 
social trends, including trends in tertiary education both nationally and internationally. 
As mentioned earlier, this view is based on recent work by Basil Bernstein and its 
application within the South African context by Johan Muller. 
In his paper "A harmonized qualifications framework and the well-tempered Ieamer: 
pedagogic models, teacher education and the NQF", Muller (1996) applies concepts 
developed primarily in Bernstein's Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity (1996) to 
the South African National Qualifications Framework (NQF). 
Much of the discussion revolves around two different models of pedagogic practice, 
referred to by Bernstein as a "competence model" and a "performance model". It should 
be pointed out, before going any further, that there exists considerable confusion among 
the educational policy makers in South Africa (the "official pedagogic recontextualizing 
field" or ORF, in Bernstein's terms) around the use of "competence" and "performance". 
While, on the strength of the terminology used, the NQF appears to fall squarely within 
a "competence model" of pedagogic practice, it does not always mean "competence" as 
defined by Muller, following Bernstein (see page 119 below), and often veers in fact in 
the direction of "performance" . This is at least partly the result, as Muller suggests, of 
the policy makers trying to accommodate both the social project implicit in the 
competence model and the economic, market-driven imperatives of global competition 
in one all-embracing qualifications framework. There are unresolved tensions around 
the use of terminology like "competence" which still have to work themselves out, 
perhaps (as Muller suggests) through the process of actually setting unit standards for 
qualifications. 
The argument developed here largely follows Muller's interpretation of how 
"competence" and "performance" are to be understood in the South African context; but 
it is also based on the view (further developed below) that the dominant discourse in 
South African higher education will tip the balance in the direction of a performance 
model, as described by Muller, whatever the current terminology might suggest. 
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In his analysis, Muller is looking at the entire field of education in South Africa, but with 
a particular interest in the implications of the pedagogic models being considered for 
teacher education. With regard to teacher education, for example, he argues that a 
more radical shift is taking place there than in other areas of education, because 
teacher education had embraced the "competence revolution" more wholeheartedly 
than other sectors and was now being affected by a shift towards a performance model. 
He says: 
Teacher education, via agencies like the NQF, at least in terms of stipulated 
outcomes, is being asked to move from one or other model of competence to a 
market-oriented performance pedagogy- or lose students and close down. This 
is a shift of a relatively drastic order .... (1996:21) 
With regard to tertiary education in general, Muller argues, a shift is taking place "from 
the curriculum of disciplinary singulars to market-responsive curricula, which are 
'targeted' and 'niched', often transdisciplinary, to capture some or other 'market 
segment' and to respond to some real or perceived market need. This will always be a 
partial shift, and will always be contested. Nevertheless, higher education is also feeling 
the effect of the twin imperatives of accountability and market relevance, and 
responding, enthusiastically or reluctantly, as the case may be." (1996:21) 
This shift, which Muller says is taking place "as we enter reflexive modernity" (1996:21), 
represents in the briefest of shorthands what we have seen occurring at the University 
of Natal in the case study - in particular with regard to the restructuring proposals, 
which might be said to represent an "enthusiastic" response to the shift. In order to 
make proper sense of what Muller is suggesting however, and perhaps to strengthen the 
point before looking at some of its implications, it is necessary to unpack some of the 
key terms being used and to provide some account of the argument supporting it. 
Muller's analysis is based upon Bernstein's account of pedagogic models which, 
although rooted in the UK experience, has wider applicability. Bernstein (1996) 
distinguishes between two basic pedagogic models: a competence model and a 
performance model. 
The competence model, he says, grew out of a "remarkable convergence" in the social 
and psychological sciences in the 1960s around the concept of competence. (Bernstein , 
1996:54) The social logic of the concept, he says, includes "an in-built procedural 
democracy, and in-built creativity, an in-built virtuous self-regulation" (1996:56) , which 
appealed to influential players in the educational fie ld - occupants both of the 
"pedagogic recontextualizing field" and of the "official pedagogic recontextualizing 
field" . (1996:57) 
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Contrasting the competence model to the performance model, Bernstein says the 
performance model "places the emphasis upon a specific output of the acquirer, upon a 
particular text the acquirer is expected to construct, and upon the specialized skills 
necessary to the production of this specific output, text or product.· (1996:57 -58) 
Reproduced below is Muller's summary, in tabular form, of the different specifications 
for "acquisition, transmission, and evaluation" of the models, and the different ways in 






learner control over selection, little control over selection, 
sequence and pace of learning sequence and pace of learning 
teacher personal control positional control 
transmission not pedagocically regulated pedagogically regulated 
rules implicit rules explicit 
pedagogic text ungraded and unstratified performance graded and stratified performance 
competence read through the performance the performance itself 
assessment general competence criteria 
'presences' in terms of difference 
learning sites anywhere 
role of the state increased 
class sponsors professional educational 
middle class 
costs higher teacher training costs 
hidden time-based costs 
less efficient with large classes 
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specific performance criteria 
'absences' in terms of deficit 
clearly marked learning sites 
decreased 
economic sector and 
entrepreneurial middle class 
lower teacher training costs 
economies of external control 
can deal with large numbers 
Complicating the picture somewhat, however, is a sub-category or mode of the 
performance model which Bernstein calls the generic mode. Generic modes, Bernstein 
says, are "constructed and distributed outside, and independently of, pedagogic 
recontextualizing fields". (1996:66) In the UK context, these modes originate from the 
Manpower Services Commission and the Training Agency under the aegis of the 
Department of Employment (Bernstein, 1996:66), whereas their South African 
equivalents issue from the National Training Board, where unions and employers found 
common ground around the hold-all concept of "lifelong learning" (cf. Muller, 1996:23). 
(Muller refers to "lifelong learners" as "the new generic label for the presumptive worker-
citizen of late modernity". (1996:26)) 
Generic modes, Bernstein says, are essentially directed to the extra-school experiences 
of 'work' and 'life' and have been found predominantly, but not exclusively, in Further 
Education. They are often misrecognised as competence modes, Bernstein suggests, 
because they are "produced by a functional analysis of what is taken to be the 
underlying features necessary to the performance of a skill, task, practice or even area 
of work" and these "underlying apparently necessary features are referred to as 
'competences'". The misrecognition, he adds, gives rise to a "jejune concept of 
trainability". (1996:67) 
Of more direct relevance to the present study of Natal University, however, are the 
other two modes which Bernstein identifies within the performance model, distinguished 
according to their "knowledge base, focus and social organization" (1996:65): singulars 
and regions. This is how Bernstein describes them: 
Singulars 
Singulars are knowledge structures whose creators have appropriated a space to 
give themselves a unique name, a specialized discrete discourse with its own 
intellectual field of texts, practices, rules of entry, examinations, licenses to 
practice, distribution of rewards and punishments (physics, chemistry, history, 
economics, psychology etc.). Singulars are, on the whole, narcissistic, oriented to 
their own development, protected by strong boundaries and hierarchies. 
(1996:65) 
Regions 
Regions are constructed by recontextualizing singulars into larger units which 
operate both in the intellectual field of disciplines and in the field of external 
practice. Regions are the interface between disciplines (singulars) and the 
technologies they make possible. Thus engineering, medicine, architecture are 
regions. Contemporary regions would be cognitive science, management, 
business studies, communications and media. (1996:66) 
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Bernstein then argues (referring to the UK): 
Regionalization in higher education has proceeded at a rapid pace in the new 
universities, as any glance at their brochures will testify. Which disciplines enter a 
region depends upon the recontextualizing principle and its social base. Thus the 
singulars entering medicine have expanded to include the sociology of medicine. 
Regionalization as a discursive procedure threatens pedagogic cultures 
dominated by singulars and raises issues of legitimacy for such cultures, e.g. 
journalism, dance, sport, tourism, as university studies. However, changes in the 
reproduction of singulars from course base to modular form facilitate 
regionalization. Regionalization necessarily weakens both the autonomous 
discursive base and the political base of singulars and so facilitates changes in 
organizational structures of institutions towards greater central administrative 
control. The regions have, perhaps, autonomy over their contents in order to be 
more responsive to, more dependent upon, the market their output is serving. 
Increasing regionalization of knowledge is then a good indicator of its 
technologizing, of centralizing of administrative control and of pedagogic contents 
recontextualized according to external regulation. Increasing regionalization 
necessarily is a weakening of the strength of the classification of discourses and 
their entailed narcissistic identities and so a change of orientation of identity 
towards greater external dependency: a change from introjected to projected 
identities .... (1996:66) 
The resonances between Bernstein's account of increasing regionalization in UK 
universities and the restructuring being proposed for the University of Natal are, it is 
submitted, very strong indeed. The institutional, organizational base of the academic 
departments, at least as administrative entities, is weakened and the academic staff 
within the departments are to be deployed in various programmes being offered in inter-
disciplinary schools within the faculties. The narcissistic, introjected identity of the 
academic department and the classification of its discourses are weakened in favour of 
a projected identity (or range of identities) projected from beyond the department and its 
discourses, according to the perceived needs of market-related inter-disciplinary 
programmes. This is precisely the shift "from the curriculum of disciplinary singulars to 
market-responsive curricula" (Muller, 1996:21) noted in the 'shorthand' above. 
The development is consistent with a message which, Professor Gourley said in a 
January 1996 interview, the University was receiving from the employers of its students, 
and with trends in employment: 
People said we were turning out scholars who were too narrow. We were 
producing students in fairly finite areas, for example accountants and doctors. 
This is a first-world environment, which is a shrinking part of the economy. A lot 
of people will be self-employed, or they will find work in the informal sector, or in 
NGOs, or in Government. What are we doing about producing people in those 
areas? 
And it ties in with the perceived need to provide cross-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary 
courses. In the first January 1996 interview, Professor Gourley said: 
We had got into little boxes in terms of disciplines. As one of our professors said: 
Problems in the real world are seldom so accommodating as to divide 
themselves up into disciplines. Nothing is solved by a single discipline in a 
community setting. 
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There is, however, a problem which has to be faced here before this recontextualization 
of the case can be pressed home with any confidence. To recontextualize the 
restructuring exercise at the University of Natal as an instance of increasing 
regionalization being driven by market forces, it should be clear that the higher 
education sector is in fact part- or at least is becoming part- of a performance model, 
as regions (in Bernstein's scheme of things) are a mode of the performance model. But 
the problem is that higher education in South Africa, along with all other educational 
sectors, is meant to be part of the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) and the 
NQF is supposedly competence rather than performance based. 
Muller comes to the conclusion in his paper that we have to "take seriously the 
possibility of competence practices in a performance regime". (1996:23) The purpose 
here is to give an indication of how Muller arrives at this conclusion, and then to push 
the argument a little further. The contention here is that the dominant discourse in 
higher education is that of the market and competitiveness, and that there is a 
fundamental mismatch between the direction that higher education is taking (essentially 
that of a performance model) and the competence model of the NQF which is supposed 
to accommodate it. 
These two models, says Muller, "distribute roles differently, project different subjects, 
and specialise discourses differently" (1996:17); and he proceeds to discuss them in 
ideal-typical terms. In the course of the discussion, he observes: 
Competence pedagogies, driven by an egalitarian project, are not geared to 
specialised futures. Performance pedagogies, on the other hand, are. These 
models move the focus from the Ieamer to the learning course and to the 
learning outcome. The Ieamer here may still be active, but her activity is more 
goal-directed, rather than driven from within. The emphasis, in other words, is 
here more upon the instructional than upon the moral order, more upon the order 
of objects in the discourse acquired than upon the authority and autonomy 
relations of the process of transmission and acquisition. 
Performance models consequently offer learners well stipulated curricula with 
explicit rules of acquisition, little control over the learning course, and definite 
criteria for the judgement of right and wrong, adequate or inadequate. 
Pedagogues thus exercise a good deal of control over the process in an invisible 
way, and evaluate performances on graded scales. 
Performance models are geared to be accountable to something outside of the 
Ieamer. We must distinguish between 2 rather different forms of performance 
model: the 'autonomous' and the 'market-oriented'. The former is the traditional 
elite tertiary (and schooling) model where learners are subjected to the 
disciplinary regime of subjects; the latter is skilling tailored to specific needs, 
tasks, and slots in the occupational hierarchy .... (1996:20-21) 
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At stake here, says Muller, "is the form of symbolic control appropriate to education, in 
other words, the technology itself. The class sponsors of competence are what 
Bernstein calls the professional agents and agencies of symbolic control -the new 
knowledge and educational professionals whose struggle is over the conditions of their 
own reproduction and expansion (in our case, NOLA, SAIDE, IEB, the INSET NGOs 
etc.). The class sponsors of market-based pedagogics are by and large the economic 
middle class. The educational professionals want an enlarged role for the state and an 
increased growth of public expenditure; the economic sector wants a reduced role for 
the state, wants greater decentralisation, and greater local, industry-specific or even 
firm-specific autonomy. • (1996:21) 
The sponsors of the NQF, argues Muller, "are an alliance of sections of both fractions, 
and the resultant model beginning to emerge is a mixed or hybrid one. To the degree 
that the competence sponsors prevail, therefore, is the degree to which the role of the 
pedagogue will be 'de-regulated' and assessment un-graded. The degree that the 
performance sponsors prevail will reflect the degree to which unit standards, at least in 
the form successful in vocational systems, prevails .. . ." (1996:22) 
Discussing the idea of mixed modes, Muller says: 
It would seem that the NQF is trying, as so many technologies in reflexive 
modernity are, to respond to conflicting tendencies, requirements and 
imperatives. First is the project of social justice, egalitarianism, redress and 
empowerment. Scrupulous attention to this imperative prescribes the 'similar to' 
relations of the competence model with its attendant techniques of ungraded 
assessment. 
Second is the instrumental discourse of flexibility, mobility and re-trainability that 
comes from the employer sector as well as from post-fordist and post-modem 
theorists. In the South African case, the sponsors of these two social discourses, 
the unions (abetted by their educational professional allies) on the one hand, and 
the employers on the other, declared common cause in the NTB. From there, the 
conjoint social agenda was carried forward into national education policy 
discourse and into policy. The semantics of the case have helped to obscure the 
differences: 'lifelong learning' is, after all, loose enough a concept to inhabit 
comfortably enough both discursive realms. It is only in the nitty gritty of writing 
the unit standards that the scales will tip, and in the debate around gradable 
assessment, which has so far not occurred. It is, for instance, not at all unlikely 
that some of the industry board projects are writing their outcomes in 
performance terms, while others in the ABET field, for example, will almost 
certainly be trying to write them in competence terms. The stage of development 
of the policy is such that the difference has not so far come to the fore, but surely 
must quite soon. (1996:22-23) 
The appropriate focus here is not so much on questions of how the different models 
project subjects (be they learners or teachers), nor on the form of symbolic control 
appropriate to education, important though these questions are. It is rather on the 
conflicting discourses of empowerment and market-responsiveness which underlie the 
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two pedagogic models; and to a lesser extent on the failure to recognise clearly the 
discourses at work because of confusion around the implications of key terms like 
"lifelong Ieamer". 
In its Draft White Paper on Higher Education (1997) the national Department of 
Education spells out its vision of a "transformed system of higher education" and the 
first two points embrace both discourses. Its vision is of a system that will: 
• promote equity of access and fair chances of success to all - irrespective of 
race, colour, gender, creed, age or class- seeking to realise their potential 
through higher education 
• meet, through well-planned and co-ordinated teaching and learning 
programmes, the high-skilled employment needs presented by a growing 
economy aspiring to global competitiveness (Department of Education, 
1997:12) 
Under the heading "A Qualifications Framework for Higher Education", the White Paper 
says that "the establishment of SAQA with the full and active participation of higher 
education providers is a milestone and puts the evolution of the NQF in the forefront of 
such systems world-wide". (1997:20) But it adds in the next clause: 
The precise modalities of integrating higher education qualifications into the NQF, 
that is, through unit standards or whole qualifications or otherwise, are being 
analysed and discussed within the higher education sector and SAQA structures. 
(1997:21) 
It is of course the requirement of the empowerment discourse, or the project of social 
justice, that higher education should be brought into the National Qualifications 
Framework, with its underlying competence-based pedagogic model. But the difficulty 
of doing so is already presaged in the uncertainty around "the precise modalities of 
integrating higher education qualifications into the NQF". 
It is surely not too fanciful to see the South African experience following more or less 
the course of the New Zealand Qualifications Framework (NZQF), on which the NQF is 
to some extent modelled. If a serious effort is made to write unit standards for all 
tertiary education qualifications, the burden and cost of doing so is likely to result in the 
same sort of resistance from the tertiary education sector which Muller mentions, with a 
consequent shift to registering only the whole qualifications on the framework. 
As Muller points out: 
Outcomes-based teacher education is only a small part of an ambitious reform 
plan to project all certified and [certifiable] learning activities onto a single 
national qualifications grid, the NQF. The NQF and its parent body the South 
African Qualifications Authority (SAQA, as established by the South African 
Qualifications Authority, Act of 1995), are set to generalise the outcomes 
approach through all tiers of the education system, from general education, 
through further education, to higher education. (1996:5) 
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Muller adds: 
It is evident that the NQF vision is propelled by a strong version of the social 
project discussed above, driven as it is by the ANC-aligned trade union federation 
COSATU through the medium of the National Training Board (NTB), from 
whence the idea of a NQF originates. The watchwords are consequently 'access, 
portability of credits, flexibility, coherence and articulation', all principles of the 
NTB. 
Specifically, the NQF rests upon a twin-pronged argument, with an egalitarian 
strand and an epistemological strand. The egalitarian argument takes issue with 
the high exclusivity and selectivity of the present qualifications system which 
restricts both access and progress. The NQF, by contrast, will promote access 
and maximise progress. It will foster the former by accrediting prior learning by 
permitting multiple re-entry, and multiple sites of delivery. It will foster the latter 
by permitting multiple re-assessment on a pass/fail basis. This means, as Young 
1996 says, that· ... in theory, therefore, all students can pass" (5) . This will mean 
a move away from content-defined curricula and norm-referenced assessment, to 
competency-defined curricula and criterion-referencing , ... "from information 
(content) to a focus on skills and competences" (DOE, 1996:41). Furthermore, in 
theory, anyone can start anywhere in the NQF and proceed to any other level, 
since they are all interconnected: 'from sweeper to engineer', or 'porter to doctor', 
as the COSA TU slogans have it. ... 
The epistemological argument takes issue with the academic/vocational tracks of 
traditional education which are premised on a strong divide between mental and 
manual labour. The NQF, by contrast, sees all knowledge and skills as 
interleaved. Consequently, in place of learning tracks, the NQF offers 'learning 
pathways' which are learner-selected and learner-driven. 'Learner-driven means 
that learners proceed at their own time and pace through the learning pathway 
which is facilitated by arrangements of re-entry, re-assessment, and credit 
transfer and accumulation. 
A serious dream of integration and social justice propels this epistemological 
elision. If it is a faulty epistemology that underpins the hierarchical division of 
skills and qualifications into mental and manual, academic and vocational, blue 
collar and white collar, then the epistemology must change. The NQF thus 
assumes that all skills and competencies are essentially and in principle on the 
same epistemological footing , which they have to be to be exchangeable in terms 
of a transferable credit value. (Muller, 1996:5-6) 
Referring to the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA), Muller notes that its 
general features are "remarkably similar to the emergent features of the NQF" 
(1996:11) and remarks on the "vociferous campaign" which the tertiary education 
community has mounted in recent years against inclusion on the NZQA, "or at least 
against the writing of unit standards for tertiary education qualifications, including for 
teacher education qualifications". (1996: 11) He argues: 
The general opposition to unit standards, the objections deriving from desires to 
protect institutional autonomy aside, has at root to do with opposition to the 
epistemological argument of integration. The heart of the problem according to 
Elley (1993) and others, is that in 'academic subjects' (or in subjects that have 
'large bodies of knowledge' ... )skills and knowledge are not separable in the 
same way that they are in 'vocational' subjects where skills are relatively clear-
cut. 
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Where skills are separable and clear-cut (in 'skill-based' fields), they can be 
easily stipulated (typing 30 words per minute, for example) and placed on a 
progressive 'ladder of mastery' which is amenable to the stipulation of unit 
standards (30wpm, 40wpm, SOwpm, etc.) It is not nearly so easy to establish what 
learners can 'do' in 'knowledge-based' fields and the 'ladder of mastery' is not 
nearly so easy to calibrate. If this is so, then it becomes difficult if not impossible 
to spell out standards in knowledge-based subjects. This is why, says Hall, 
tertiary education is 'curriculum centred', rather than 'Ieamer centred', 
contradicting a central premise of the NZQA (and the NQF for that matter). 
A second feature of the NZQA which the tertiary critics object to is the form of 
assessment. As Hall (nd) notes, an outcomes-based system is based on a 
competency approach to education, which entails pass/fail (ungraded) 
assessment as part of the unit standard methodology. (11) This is simply 
inappropriate for most academic subjects, he says, and advocates instead a 
'standards-based' system of graded performance via clearly defined 'performance 
standards' and some form of norm-referenced assessment. 'Performance 
standards' are specified in terms of content and level, even though this is less 
easily done for academic subjects. Consequently, the standards should not be 
overspecified. (1996:11-12) 
However the South African experience of the NQF with regard to higher education does 
develop, the contention here is that the Department of Education's plan for higher 
education -while no doubt consistent with the NQF - contains a far more powerful 
organizing principle than the NQF and its unit standards: that of the "programme-based" 
provision of higher education. 
In the chapter on Structure and Growth, under the heading "A Single Coordinated 
System", the White Paper states: 
2.1 The Ministry believes that if the legacy of the past is to be overcome and the 
challenges of reconstruction and development addressed, the higher 
education system must be planned, governed and funded as a single 
national coordinated system. 
2.2 The single coordinated system will be predicated on a programme-based (as 
opposed to institution-based) definition of higher education .. . . This 
recognises that the provision of higher education can and does take place in 
a multiplicity of institutions, sites and media. (Department of Education, 
1997:15) 
This is a much more powerful organizing influence than the NQF for a number of 
reasons. Despite the profound pedagogical implications of a competence-based NQF 
being established, there is a sense in which the burdensome and costly exercise of 
writing unit standards for all tertiary education qualifications could be undertaken and 
completed without changing very much in the way universities go about their business. 
There is nothing necessarily transformational about writing unit standards for existing 
courses and registering them on the framework. In theory, the task can be done, and 
delivery continue much as it did in the past. 
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But a move to programme-based (as opposed to institution-based) provision of tertiary 
education has profound implications for the way in which higher education institutions 
go about their business, particularly when their funding is linked to the approval of 
programmes and an allocation of X-number of funded student places by the central 
Council on Higher Education. In theory, on this model, everything is thrown into 
question. All institutions become competitors for students (and the funding attached to 
them) in terms of an assessment of national needs and the ability of institutions to meet 
them, determined by some body outside of the university. Moreover, and this point will 
be emphasised again shortly, all academic structures within a university also become 
competitors for the provision of approved programmes. 
Quite clearly, the tendency of this innovation is more in the direction of the second leg 
of the Department of Education's vision for higher education, than the first. It seeks to 
meet "the high-skilled employment needs presented by a growing economy aspiring to 
global competitiveness". (Department of Education, 1997:12) As such, it is in line with 
the underlying market-responsive discourse rather than the empowerment or social 
justice discourse of the NQF. And because it is directly linked to the allocation of 
resources to the institutions of higher learning, it makes the market-responsive 
discourse immeasurably the more powerful. 
The trend of this argument, and its implications for the restructuring envisaged at the 
University of Natal now become clearer. However the programme-based approach 
works out, it is going to be driven by an assessment of national (read "market} needs 
which lies outside the University and most certainly outside the narcissistic concerns of 
individual academic departments as presently constituted. The continued existence of 
the University could depend on its flexible response to perceived market needs, 
probably requiring programmes of an inter-disciplinary nature in many cases, in an 
environment in which the Department of Education explicitly states that "the provision of 
higher education can and does take place in a multiplicity of institutions, sites and 
media" (1997:15). The need for the institution to respond to this kind of scenario is 
much greater than the need, outlined in the earlier section of this chapter, to be more 
innovative. 
And there are other forces moving in the same direction. The idea that tertiary 
education provision should be linked to market needs is much more readily accepted in 
the technikon sector than the university sector. Indeed, the basic rationale of technikon 
education is to provide career-specific education to meet market and national needs. 
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And there is a widely accepted notion that South Africa needs to increase significantly 
the number of technikon students relative to university students, to meet the need for 
technologists which competition on global markets will require. So the dice, in a sense, 
are loaded in favour of technikons and against the traditional discipline-based 
universities in the move to programme-based education. 
The National Commission on Higher Education, against the arguments of Peninsula 
Technikon Rector Brian Figaji, accepted the notion of a dynamic or "fuzzy" relationship 
between institutions and programmes, within a single co-ordinated system of higher 
education. (NCHE Report, 1996:165 and 317-319) What this does, essentially, is to 
remove any marked boundary between universities and technikons. Some Commission 
provisos notwithstanding (1996:167, 170), any tertiary education institution can offer any 
course it chooses (or in the proposed programme-based dispensation, can bid for any 
programme it chooses), whether or not that course was traditionally offered by a 
university or a technikon. (Ironically, given the above argument on the favoured status 
of technikon education, one of the first outcomes of this decision has been a motivation 
by some technikons to change their name to include "university" in the title and to drop 
"technikon" .) 
The burden of the argument thus far, then, is that the predominant discourse in higher 
education at present is not the social justice or empowerment discourse associated with 
the NQF and the competence model of pedagogy, but the market-responsive or 
competitive discourse which is associated with future institutional funding, market 
needs, and a performance model of pedagogy. 
To the extent that this is so, the regionalization which Bernstein identifies in higher 
education in the UK can be expected to occur in South Africa. In fact, as already 
suggested, it is precisely market-driven regionalization which is beginning to be effected 
in the restructuring of the University of Natal, driven to some extent by its immediate 
financial crisis and the perceived need for innovation but, beyond that, by the social 
logic of the increasingly dominant discourse in South African higher education. 
Returning for a moment to Muller's argument, where he distinguishes two different 
forms of the performance model, one could say that what is happening at the University 
of Natal is a shift from the "traditional elite tertiary ... model where learners are 
subjected to the disciplinary regime of subjects" towards "skilling tailored to specific 
needs, tasks, and slots in the occupational hierarchy". (Muller, 1996:21) 
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Referring to the rather different UK situation, Bernstein says that there is "no official 
recontextualizing field (ORF) for the construction of an official higher education 
discourse" (1996:74), whereas we have seen that there is in South Africa. He adds: 
However, there is strong indirect regulation on the recontextualizing process by 
the Higher Education Funding Council Executive (including the crucial research 
selectivity exercise) and by the Research Councils, and in the case of some 
institutions by their industrial niche. Within these constraints higher education 
institutions have to optimize their outputs with regard to teaching and research. 
Whilst each institution has its own recontextualizing field and particular 
management structure, each institution is in competition with significant others. 
Thus the higher educational field takes on an internal stratification of institutions 
which provides its referent group for internal recontextualizing. 
Those at the top, or near the top, of this hierarchy may maintain their position 
more by attracting and holding key academic stars than by changing their 
pedagogic discourse according to the exigencies of the market. This is not to say, 
of course, that developments in the intellectual field are not provided for, and 
especially those which have a technological pay-off, but that they are less likely 
to regionalize their discourses. On the other hand, those institutions which are 
much less fortunate in their position in the stratification are usually in no position 
to attract stars, and so will be more concerned with the marketing possibilities of 
their pedagogic discourse. Thus these institutions are likely to develop projected 
identities. What they are is a function of the exigencies of the market context 
which signifies the resources out of which their particular identity is constructed. 
Regionalization here is likely to be a crucial recontextualizing procedure, and the 
contents and names are likely to shift with what is taken to be the demand. If 
these institutions develop projected identities, then those near the top are 
perhaps able to maintain their traditional introjected identities, albeit rather more 
ambiguous and ambivalent now, owing to their more applied orientations. Thus in 
higher education not only is there a stratification of recontextualizing contexts and 
of regionalization but also a stratification of identities not only of institutions but 
also of staff and students." (1996:7 4, original emphasis) 
It can be argued that in South Africa there is a significant stratification of higher 
educational institutions. The distinction between "historically advantaged" and 
"historically disadvantaged" institutions (and the consequent debate around redress 
funding) is premised on such a stratification, although one arising out of the peculiar 
historical aberrations of apartheid. But there is not the same sort of divide within the 
South African situation as there is between the Oxbridge universities and the others in 
the UK, where it is the universities like Oxford and Cambridge which are able to resist 
the pressures towards regionalization "more by attracting and holding key academic 
stars than by changing their pedagogic discourse according to the exigencies of the 
market," as Bernstein puts it. · 
The point should also be made, explicitly, that universities like Oxford and Cambridge 
have enormous financial resources at their disposal, independent of government 
allocations, which gives them a degree of autonomy not shared by universities in South 
Africa. But to the extent that there are disparities between the South African institutions 
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in terms of their endowments, the University of Natal is not in a favourable position, if 
the basis of the financial crisis is being accurately reflected. 
In the South African situation, as opposed to that in the UK, there is an official 
recontextualizing field in higher education. And the funding matrix which is being 
prepared around the notion of programme-based delivery of tertiary education is 
inevitably going to affect all of the institutions to a very significant extent. All of the 
institutions of higher education in South Africa will be forced to look to the "marketing 
possibilities of their pedagogic discourse", with the consequences of regionalization as 
"a crucial recontextualizing procedure" and increasingly projected (rather than 
introjected) identities for the institutions. It is the beginnings of that process, it is 
submitted, which can be discerned in the restructuring proposals being pursued at the 
University of Natal. 
6.4 DEVOLUTION OF AUTHORITY 
To a large extent, then, it may be said that the recontextualization of the case resolves 
the puzzle with which Chapter Five closed, of why the University of Natal is pushing for 
institutional change which goes beyond the simple requirements of cost-cutting and 
efficiency. It is, whether consciously or otherwise, following the dictates of the dominant 
discourse in the field of higher education, as outlined above. But before closing this 
discussion, there is a subsidiary puzzle to be resolved, which arises out of the preceding 
I 
argument. 
In his discussion of regionalization, Bernstein remarks that regionalization "necessarily 
weakens both the autonomous discursive base and the political base of singulars and so 
facilitates changes in organizational structures of institutions towards greater central 
administrative control." (1996:66) Arguably, in the case of the University of Natal, one 
can see a weakening of "the autonomous discursive base" of singulars, or particular 
disciplines, in the move towards interdisciplinary schools, and a weakening of their 
political base in the loss of administrative authority in the academic departments. But 
what about the change "towards greater central administrative control", when the 
restructuring proposals are explicitly promising greater devolution of authority? 
The University of Natal's Structures and Funding document (University of Natal 
13:1997) advocates in its section on Organisational Structure a closer association 
between the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses (effectively a reversal of the 
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notion of devolution which informed the earlier strategic planning phase at the 
University), but it promises greater devolution to the new Schools (or newly structured 
Faculties, in the amended proposals). 
The document says: 
The key feature of the proposed structure is that academic administration will 
shift in two directions towards a more central role for the Deans of Schools. The 
Deans will assume responsibility for much of the academic administration 
presently performed by the Campus Principals (top-down), and the Deans' 
Offices will also absorb many of the administrative functions presently performed 
by academic Heads of Departments (bottom-up). The total operating budget, 
including staff compensation, will devolve to the Office of the Dean. Student 
records, operating expenses and other administrative functions including SAPSE, 
Calendar entries, etc., will be performed by the Dean's Office. (1997: 19) 
In any organization which is facing a severe financial crisis, some centralization of 
administration in the interests of cost effectiveness can be expected. So there is 
probably nothing very surprising in the shift from the earlier notion of devolution (as 
between the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses) towards greater centralization; 
although it is unlikely that the fear which the Structures and Funding document refers to, 
"that Pietermaritzburg interests will be swamped" (1997:18), would be allayed by the 
vague suggestion of "moving some of the central administrative functions to that centre 
[Pietermaritzburg), together with the requirement that administration of one of the 
Colleges and that of certain Schools should be located there". (1997:18) 
But in that same context, the greater devolution of authority to the Deans appears odd 
on the face of it. On the one hand, the Structures and Funding document is proposing a 
closer association of the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses to "make the optimum 
use of its resources" (1997:18), but at the same time it is proposing an increased 
administrative role for the Deans' Offices which would seem to imply some considerable 
duplication of administrative functions (student records, operating expenses, SAPSE, 
etc.) which could be more cost-effectively handled centrally. 
Such a situation is also paradoxical if one takes seriously the Sengean world view with 
its corollary, as expressed by Professor Gourley, that problems are best handled by 
those closest to them and that authority should be devolved as far as possible. On such 
a view, devolution from the centre to the Deans makes sense, but the "bottom-up" 
centralization of authority in the office of the Dean does not. Consistent with this view, 
there should be only a "top-down" devolution of authority, and the devolution should not 
stop with the Deans. 
131 
Of course, there might be internal political considerations at work behind the proposals. 
For example, some or other deal might have had to be struck to enhance the status and 
authority of the Deans in order to win their agreement on a reduction of the number of 
Faculties (and hence the number of Deans). But in the absence of evidence on this 
score, the views of Professor Kahn - on the various "overlays" under which Deans and 
others are already labouring -tend to suggest that the existing Deans would not 
enthusiastically go in search of additional responsibilities. 
The contention here is that one way of making sense of the paradox around devolution 
of authority is by applying the argument on regionalization developed in the previous 
section of this chapter. On this view, the "bottom-up" centralization of authority, from the 
Heads of Department to the Deans, is quite understandable. In the interests of changing 
the introjected identity of the institution to the projected identity required by the market, 
providing inter-disciplinary programmes to meet perceived market and national needs, 
the strong boundaries of the narcissistic academic departments must be broken down. 
Part of this process is achieved by separating the administrative authority from the 
academic authority of the academic departments, and that administrative authority 
which is prised free naturally adheres to the now larger Faculty in the office of the Dean. 
Such centralization is clearly consistent with the view of Bernstein, referred to above, 
that regionalization "facilitates changes in organizational structures of institutions 
towards greater central administrative control.· (1996:66) 
Somewhat more difficult to deal with on this view, then, is the "top-down" devolution of 
authority from the Campus Principals to the Deans. The short answer to this problem is 
that this devolution is effectively a recruitment of more members to the executive. But 
some explanation, linked to the previous discussion, is required to bring into focus the 
nature of the authority residing in this executive, whether in the person of the current 
executive members or of the Deans in the "enlarged executive" being suggested. 
Muller was quoted earlier as referring to the "twin imperatives of accountability and 
market relevance" being felt in higher education. (1996:21) As the preceding discussion 
focused on the imperative of market relevance, the discussion around devolution of 
authority needs to focus on the other imperative of accountability. 
In the Draft White Paper on Higher Education, the Ministry of Education says under the 
heading of Public Accountability: 
The principle of public accountability bears upon decision-making, the spending 
of funds and the achievement of results. Firstly, it requires that individuals and 
institutions should demonstrate responsible actions to one or more 
constituencies. Secondly, it requires that individuals or institutions receiving 
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public funds should be able to report how, and how well, money has been spent. 
Thirdly, it requires that institutions should demonstrate the results they achieve 
with the resources at their disposal. (1997:14) 
What will this mean in practice? At one level, one can see the implications in the crisis 
which has affected primary and secondary school education in the Western Cape over 
the last few years. The central government, in an effort to meet its own macro-
economic objectives and operating in terms of a project of social justice and equity, 
allocates Rx-million to a particular province. It then becomes the responsibility of the 
provincial government to allocate its resources, with the provincial education 
department competing with other provincial departments for adequate provision. 
Assuming, as in the case of the Western Cape, that the provision is inadequate for 
present needs, and assuming that teachers' salaries are by far the biggest component in 
the provincial education budget, it becomes the responsibility of the provincial 
education department to cut back on the number of teachers. Notwithstanding 
complications in achieving this, occasioned by the activities of stakeholders like 
teachers' unions and recalcitrant school governing bodies, that is the bottom line: 
teacher numbers must be reduced, unless either the provincial government or the 
central government is willing and able to bail out the provincial education department. 
(A recent newspaper report indicated that the national Department of Education was 
scrapping its controversial guidelines for teacher: pupil ratios, whereby provincial 
departments had to achieve ratios of 1:35 for high schools and 1:40 for junior schools 
by the year 2000. (Cape Argus, 22 December 1997) The headline to the report called 
this a "reprieve on class sizes"; but it is in fact no reprieve at all : the target ratios can 
officially disappear, but the same effect be achieved by strict adherence to budgets, as 
outlined above.) 
What we see happening, both in relation to the school sector and higher education, is 
the setting of much tighter frameworks by the State for the performance of institutions. 
Management, at the various levels of the system, is being made accountable in a much 
stricter sense than previously. Inputs are controlled, with fixed budgets and budgets 
which are set to decline over time. Outputs are controlled by setting and enforcing 
quality standards, to be achieved in higher education through the planned Higher 
Education Quality Committee, to be established as a permanent committee of the 
Council on Higher Education and registered with SAQA. (cf. Department ·of Education, 
1997:21) 
The tighter budgetary controls and the envisaged funding formula for higher education 
suggest a fundamental change in the way universities will operate, as we have seen 
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above. Putting this bluntly, there will be rewards for success and punishment for failure 
(with success and failure being determined outside of the university itself), whereas in 
the past there was no punishment for failure. 
Still using broad brush strokes for the moment, one can locate this within a global shift 
in the relations between the State and the economy since the early 80s, as a result of 
Thatcherism and Reaganism. In the era of deregulation, the State moved back from 
direct control of the economy and allowed the market to dominate. The State's authority 
in society was exercised through tighter control of the organs of symbolic control on the 
one hand (eg . of the pedagogic recontextualizing field) ; and, on the other hand, through 
tighter control of the inputs to social services like education and tougher insistence on 
accountability for the outputs. 
Bernstein, referring to the accelerating role of State intervention in education in the UK 
since the late 1970s, says that "the crucial impetus came under the Thatcher regime". 
(1996:72) He argues: 
At all levels of the educational system a combination of the decentralization in 
respect of local institutions and their management, and centralization with regard 
to their monitoring and funding , changed the culture of educational institutions, 
their internal management structures, criteria for staff appointments and 
especially promotions and their pedagogic practices. Survival and growth 
depended now upon optimizing a market niche, upon objective productions, upon 
value-adding procedures. At the same time centralization of the control over the 
contents of education, the denuding of the responsibilities of LEAs, the setting up 
of minister-appointed and directed committees and authorities, reduced the 
autonomy of the PRF and changed the positions of dominance within it. It also 
introduced new discourses, e.g. management, assessment. .. . The shift to 
performance models and their modes was initiated by the ORF which now more 
directly regulated pedagogic practices, contents and research . Clearly which 
performance modes regulated which practices depended upon the levels of 
education and curricular distribution within institutions within a level. (1996:72) 
Referring in the first instance to schools, Bernstein says: 
The management structure's major focus is upon the school's performance, with 
regard to attracting and retaining students, their conduct and their attainments. 
From this point of view, although pedagogic discourses are differently focused , 
the management focus of all institutions at all levels is similar. The management 
structure has become the device for creating an entrepreneurial competitive 
culture. The latter is responsible for criteria informing senior administrative 
appointments and the engaging or hiring of specialized staff to promote the 
effectiveness of this culture. Thus there is a dislocation between the culture of the 
pedagogic discourse and the management culture . The culture of the pedagogic 
discourse of schools is retrospective , based on a past narrative of the dominance 
and significance of disciplines, whereas the management structure is prospective 
pointing to the new entrepreneurialism and its instrumentalities. The State has 
therefore embedded a retrospective pedagogic culture into a prospective 
management culture. However, the emphasis on the performance of students 
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and the steps taken to increase and maintain performance, for the survival of the 
institution, is likely to facilitate a state-promoted instrumentality .. .. 
Thus the State, through greater centralization and new forms of decentralization, 
has shifted pedagogic models and modes, management structures, and cultures 
of all educational institutions and sponsored generic modes. (1996:75) 
Allowing once again for differences between the UK and the South African situation, the 
pertinence of this argument to the unfolding developments at the University of Natal is 
clear. What can be seen in the proposed restructuring, including the devolution of 
authority to the Deans as described above, is the management structure of the 
University becoming "the device for creating an entrepreneurial competitive culture" 
throughout the University. 
In order to respond to the "twin imperatives of accountability and market relevance" (in 
Muller's terms) , the executive of the University is faced with the need to be innovative -
to introduce new, trans-disciplinary programmes in response to perceived market 
needs. But the retrospective pedagogic discourse of the University, rooted in singular 
disciplines and defended by the professionals in the operating core of the institution, is 
antithetical to the prospective managerial discourse pointing to the new 
entrepreneurialism and its instrumentalities (following Bernstein). 
Ultimately, the scenario which appears to be developing is this: all institutions providing 
tertiary education programmes in South Africa (including private institutions and foreign-
based institutions like De Montfort) will be in competition for the increasingly scarce 
resource of government funding . This competition will be reproduced within the 
institution, with each Faculty competing with others for students and resources. The 
Deans will become increasingly involved in entrepreneurial activity. To promote 
entrepreneurial activity within the Faculties, the power of the professionals in the 
operating core (located in the discipline-based academic departments) will increasingly 
be undermined. The individual lecturers will ultimately cease to be professionals, 
professing a discipline whose boundaries are defined in its own terms. They will become 
"knowledge entrepreneurs" - each one an entrepreneur for his or her subject, 
responding to perceived needs of the market, and competing with all other lecturers for 
the diminishing resources available. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
This journey through the fog of institutional change in higher education began with the 
simple quotation from Henry Mintzberg: "What all of us want is more effective 
organizations." (1994:381) It is clear from the study that it is no simple matter to bring 
about fundamental institutional change, in pursuit of such effectiveness, in a complex 
institution of higher education like the University of Natal. 
To the extent that the case study may be said to have a conclusion, or to have reached 
an "analytic generalization", it is probably to be found in the last paragraph of the 
previous section. It presents a view of the implications of the struggle to bring about 
institutional change at the University of Natal, based upon the preceding presentation of 
the case, its analysis in relation to theories of organizational change, and its 
recontextualization in a wider social context. 
The complexity of an institution like the University of Natal is in itself enormous. The 
complexity of its relations to the wider social and political environment within which it 
operates is much greater. In approaching such complexity with theoretical tools, in order 
to bring the complexity within manageable bounds, one is inevitably involved in 
simplification and possibly distortion. But the hope is that light is thrown on significant 
patterns within the complexity and that some understanding of the social phenomenon 
being studied is achieved. 
It has been argued that part of the difficulty of bringing about institutional change is 
attributable to the structure of the University, which has been characterised as a 
"Professional Bureaucracy". The University, unlike many organizations in the corporate 
world, has ·in its operating core a large number of professionals. These professionals, 
who may have more allegiance to an outside professional organization than to the 
University where they happen to work, value their autonomy and they value democracy 
(at least in the qualified sense in which Mintzberg uses the term, where it refers to the 
dissemination of power to individual workers). 
The executive at the University of Natal was faced with the problem, from at least 1988, 
of how to bring the professionals in the operating core along in a programme of 
institutional change which -among other important things- had implications for the 
continuation or discontinuation of certain jobs and even certain disciplines within the 
University. 
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The University executive's response, as Professor Gourley put it, was to become 
involved in strategic planning in a much more specific way than had been the case in 
the past. Strategic planning would be the process whereby the institution as a whole 
would decide upon what it wanted to do and how it would do it. Once the plan was in 
place, the cascade effect of the strategic planning model would see to it that appropriate 
changes took place throughout the University. But, it was argued, strategic planning was 
unable to deliver on its promises. As a means of arriving at a "strategyD for the 
institution, it was unlikely to succeed as the strategic planning process is essentially 
analytical and the formation of strategy is synthetic. The effect of this was to obscure 
key elements of the University's strategy while "the planD was awaited. The cascade, as 
a mechanism for bringing about change, failed. The process, it has been argued, mis-
cast the University as a Machine Bureaucracy, rather than a Professional Bureaucracy. 
The emphasis of the executive then shifted from "the strategic plan" to "strategic 
initiativesD - broad brushstrokes rather than detailed plans - and among the initiatives 
was the commitment to becoming a learning organization. With this approach, 
"specificity" as a goal was abandoned. The cascade, lock-step, Fordist notion of 
strategic planning was effectively abandoned, although never explicitly branded as 
being inappropriate. But the fundamental message of the learning organization is that 
"shared visionD is more important than a detailed plan. 
In one sense, the learning organization may be a planning model better suited to the 
Professional Bureaucracy than the conventional strategic planning model which, it was 
argued, may be applicable in a Machine Bureaucracy. For example, the learning 
organization theory's emphasis on personal mastery is likely to appeal to individualistic 
professionals; but systems thinking perhaps less so. 
But it is clear from developments at the University during 1996-97, that the learning 
organization did not provide a short-term answer to the problem of bringing about 
consensual change. The change agents identified to promote the concept, the corps of 
facilitators, have not played a central role in developments. And the executive has 
taken a step back from using "learning organization jargon". 
In considering the financial and restructuring crisis which arose at the University in the 
second half of 1997, a puzzle arose around the type of restructuring being proposed for 
the University, which, it was suggested, could not be satisfactorily explained in terms of 
the organizational theory which the actors themselves employed, nor through an 
examination of the need for innovation, without locating the institution and the need for 
innovation within a broader social context. 
137 
The location attempted provides, again, a view of the changes being effected at the 
University of Natal which resolves both the puzzle around restructuring going beyond 
the simple requirements of cost cutting and efficiency, and the consequent puzzle 
around devolution of authority. The view is, essentially, one of an institution undergoing 
change, driven by financial crisis and wider social and market forces, from an institution 
of singulars (the academic departments) with strict boundaries and an introjected 
identity to one of regions and trans-disciplinary programmes, with projected identities, in 
which knowledge entrepreneurs compete with each other both within and between 
institutions for students and the resources attached to them in response to perceived 
market needs. 
It is not a view which everyone will find attractive. Muller has made the point that the 
shift from "the curriculum of disciplinary singulars to market-responsive curricula" will 
always be contested. (1996:21) Bernstein, for one, clearly regrets the shift which he so 
persuasively defines. 
In a paper entitled "Thoughts on the Trivium and Quadrivium: The Divorce of 
Knowledge from the Knower" Bernstein refers to a progressive replacement from the 
medieval period of the religious foundation of official knowledge by a humanizing 
secular principle. He then adds: "I want to argue that we have, for the first time, a 
dehumanizing principle, for the organization and orientation of official knowledge. n 
(Bernstein , 1996:86) 
Bernstein says: 
Today throughout Europe, led by the USA and the UK, there is a new principle 
guiding the latest transition of capitalism. The principles of the market and its 
managers are more and more the managers of the policy and practices of 
education. Market relevance is becoming the key orientating criterion for the 
selection of discourses, their relation to each other, their forms and their 
research. This movement has profound implications from the primary school to 
the university .... 
Of fundamental significance, there is a new concept of knowledge and of its 
relation to those who create it and use it. This new concept is a truly secular 
concept. Knowledge should flow like money to wherever it can create advantage 
and profit. Indeed knowledge is not like money, it is money. Knowledge is 
divorced from persons, their commitments, their personal dedications. These 
become impediments, restrictions on the flow of knowledge, and introduce 
deformations in the working of the symbolic market. Moving knowledge about, or 
even creating it, should not be more difficult than moving and regulating money. 
Knowledge, after nearly a thousand years, is divorced from inwardness and 
literally dehumanized. Once knowledge is separated from inwardness, from 
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commitments, from personal dedication, from the deep structure of the self, then 
people may be moved about, substituted for each other and excluded from the 
market. (1996:87) 
To paraphrase slightly the headline to an article on higher education in The Times 
(reported in the Johannesburg Sunday Times, 24 August 1997): "The money changers 
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Mission Statement: 1989 
The Role in Society 
of the University of Natal 
1989 Onwards. 
(University of Natal, 3:20) 
(Reproduced from separately 
issued pamphlet.) 
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THE ROLE IN SOCIETY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
1989 ONWARDS 
MISSION STATEMENT : 1989 
· The Univ;;rsity of Natal strives to ser..;e all sectior:s of its community 
through excellence in scholarship, teaching, teaming, research and 
development. 
0 It rejects apartheid and, as a non-racial university, its community consists of all people in all social 
circumstances, developed and developing, urban and rural. 
• It seeks to honour its commitment to being an Equal Opportunities/Affirmative Action university and 
promote, internally and externally, the achievement of a free, just and equitable order, rejecting any form 
of discrimination based on race, colour, creed, religious conviction, nationality, gender, marital status or 
sexual orientation. 
• It seeks to achieve the highest level of scholarship through academic integrity, pursuit of knowledge, creative 
endeavour and application of these to the benefit of its entire community. 
0 It seeks to achieve excellence in teaching by recruiting the best staff, rewarding excellence in teaching and 
establishing vigorous programmes of staff development. 
• It seeks to achieve excellence in learning by admitting students of high academic potential, providing 
conditions that will enable them to realise their academic potential and offering good courses and curricula 
leading to reputable qualifications. 
• It seeks to achieve excellence in research by recruiting the best staff, encouraging and rewarding the 
research endeavour and providing the best possible facilities. 
• It seeks to achieve excellence in programmes of development by mounting appropriate curricula and 
undertaking research leading to the advancement of the community in all its diversity. 
• It seeks to maintain the highest standards in all its teaching/learning and research/development 
programmes, whether they be pure, applied or developmental in objective. 
" It seeks to protect for itself and other universities the highest levels of University Autonomy and Academic 
Freedom. 
• It seeks to grow so that it satisfies both national and community needs for high quality academic and 
professional tertiary education. 
6 It seeks to mount efficient and effective services in support of its academic objective. 
• It is committed to the preservation and conservation of the environment and natural resources of the region. 
The University of Natal 
is an equal ()pporlllnities, 
affirmative action University. 
Source: 
APPENDIX 3 
Schools and Faculties 
organogram (1989) 
The Role in Society 
of the University of Natal 
1989 Onwards. 
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programmes and measures 
Vice-Chancellor's Review: 
Working Paper (Phase II) 
September 1992. 
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Amended Schools and 
Faculties organogram 
My amendment. 
Based upon organogram in: 
The Role in Society 
of the University of Natal 
1989 Onwards. 
(University of Natal, 3:21) 
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Strate~ies. objectives. programmes and measures 
Objective 
1. Changed curricula 
2. Selective growth 
3. EO Policies 
4. Quality Maintained and 
Monitored 
5. Research standards 
6. Staff 
7. Developmental activities 
8. Collaboration 
9. Governance 
10. Academic links . 
11. Support Services 
Prowmme 
Faculty programmes and reform 
timetables 
Faculty programmes 
Central support programmes 
Faculty programmes 
timetables 
Social/ cultural programmes 
Academic audits 
Peer reviews 







Joint academic programmes 
Sharing of equipment 
Community involvement 
Management structures 
Research link:age programmes 
and 
Faculty administrati~ 
Campus/ centre administration 





? by subject 
? by location 
% achievement in 
- recruitment 
- progress of cohorts 









Profit to University 
Companies established 




Numbers of committees 
Faculty statistics 
Donor fundings 
Cost per student 
Cost per student 
Books purchased per studei 
Periodicals subscribed 
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Mr Gerhard Mare, 
Acting Director: Centre for Industrial, Organisational and Labour 
Studies 
Professor David Maughan Brown, 
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Mr Arnold Shepperson, 
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NOTE: The above list includes the structured interviews conducted in the course ofthe 
case study research. Other more casual conversations, telephone calls, etc. 
are not reflected. 
156 
' 
